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Abstract
This thesis deals with language policy evaluation from a language dy-
namics modeling perspective. As linguistic diversity is an essential feature
of most modern societies, states and administrations have to thoroughly de-
sign and analyze language policies. Potential effects, benefits and costs have
to be assessed and weighted against one another. A pivotal characteristic of
language policies is that the numbers of their beneficiaries and costs can
change dramatically over time. To account for these changes, the thesis pro-
poses a combination of traditional policy evaluation techniques with well
designed language dynamics models. In contrast to previous models in the
literature, the thesis proposes and analyzes models based on parameters ob-
tainable from empirical data. It is argued that this is a prerequisite to analyze
the long term effects of policies in a realistic fashion. This thesis consists
of four self-contained essays. In the first essay we show with the help of
an abstract model that it can be optimal for the state to keep a minority lan-
guage alive in the form of bilingualism. In the next two essays more realistic
models are developed and applied to the empirical cases. In the last essay
extensions of the previous models to the case of several minority languages
are presented.
Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der Evaluation von Sprachpo-
litiken mit Hilfe von Sprachdynamik Modellen. Da sprachliche Diversität
ein zentrales Merkmal moderner Gesellschaften darstellt, müssen Staaten
und Administrationen Sprachpolitiken sorgfältig gestalten und evaluieren.
Mögliche Effekte, Nutzen und Kosten von Politiken müssen bewertet und
gegeneinander abgewogen werden. Eine wichtige Eigenschaft von Sprach-
politiken ist dabei, dass sich die Anzahl derer, die von ihnen profitieren,
sowie deren Kosten über die Zeit stark verändern können. Um dies zu be-
rücksichtigen, präsentiert die Dissertation eine Kombination aus klassischen
Politikanalyse Werkzeugen und neuen Sprachdynamik Modellen. Im Ge-
gensatz zu bereits existierenden Modellen, können in den neu entwickelten
Modellen Parameter aus empirischen Daten geschätzt werden. Dies ist ei-
ne Voraussetzung, um langfristige Effekte von Politiken realistisch abbilden
zu können. Die Dissertation besteht aus vier eigenständigen Aufsätzen. Im
ersten Aufsatz wird mit einem abstrakten Modell gezeigt, dass es für einen
Staat optimal sein kann die Minderheitensprache in Form von Bilingualität
am Leben zu erhalten. In den folgenden beiden Aufsätzen werden realisti-
schere Modelle entwickelt und damit zwei empirische Fälle analysiert. Im
letzten Aufsatz werden Erweiterungen der vorherigen Modelle auf den Fall
multipler Minderheitensprachen vorgestellt.
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1 General introduction
Linguistic diversity is an essential feature of most modern societies. This is ap-
parent in countries like India, South Africa, Canada, Singapore or Switzerland.
But even in seemingly monolingual countries, e.g. in Western Europe, there is
a significant number of people who do not solely speak the official or majority
language of the state but also have skills in one or several other languages. Such
languages can be international vehicular languages (like English), languages his-
torically rooted in (part of) the territory of the state (like Welsh in the UK, Basque
in Spain, Hungarian in Romania), or the language of migrants and their descen-
dants (like Turkish in Germany or Arabic in France).
This linguistic diversity has to be addressed and managed by the state. The state
can not be fully neutral with respect to language. When publishing legal texts,
designing education policies, offering public services or putting up street signs,
linguistic decisions have to be made. That means that there is no pure laissez-faire
option for dealing with linguistic diversity. “The correct opposition is therefore
not one between linguistic freedom and linguistic regulation but rather between
different forms of linguistic regulation. In other words, there is no zero-option in
the field of language policy. We cannot not intervene” (De Schutter 2007, p. 17).
Hence, language policies are unavoidable. But can they also be desirable? The
question of desirability can be approached from an economic point of view. As
illustrated inWickström et al. (2018), several language-related goods and services
have the typical properties of collective or public goods and come with different
externalities. The most important one is probably the network externality of lan-
guage learning. Consider a person i learning language L. Part of the benefit she
gets from learning L is that she can communicate with other speakers of L in this
language. She decides to learn L if her individual benefits exceed her individual
learning costs. If she decides to learn L, all other speakers of L can communicate
with her in L as well. That is, her decision to learn L increases the benefits of
all other speakers of L. But these benefits to other speakers of L are not taken
into account in her individual decision on whether to learn L. “[T]he individual
calculus here differs from the social one” (Wickström et al. 2018, p. 25). Con-
sequently, spontaneous interaction can lead to sub-optimal results from a welfare
point of view. To see that, consider the case where the learning costs of person i
exceed her individual benefits (ci > bi). At the same time, the aggregated ben-
efits from person i learning L to other people j in the population who speak L,∑
bj , could be larger than the difference between person i’s costs and benefits,
i.e.
∑
bj > ci − bi. In this case, the other speakers of L could compensate per-
son i. Without compensation, person i does not learn L (i’s learning costs exceed
i’s benefits), but with the compensation she does (compensation plus i’s benefits
exceed i’s learning costs). If person i is compensated and learns language L, then
no one is worse off and some are better off (bi +
∑
bj > ci). This illustrates that
there are efficiency reasons for a state to engage in language policies. Another
motivation for language policies can be fairness and equality between language
1
groups.1
If the correct opposition is the one between different forms of linguistic regu-
lation, then which linguistic regulation or language policy should be selected?
As with any public policy, language policies come with potential advantages and
drawbacks. To rank several policy options or to decide whether to implement a
policy, these advantages and drawbacks have to be compared. “Public economics
provides relevant frameworks to guide such choices”, and the “analytical tool that
suggests itself is cost-benefit (or cost-effectiveness) analysis” (Wickström et al.
2018, p. 10). Standard cost-benefit analysis monetizes costs as well as benefits
and helps to compare both. If aggregated benefits of a policy exceed its overall
costs, then the policy yields a potential Pareto improvement. Those who gain from
the policy could – in principle – compensate those who lose from it, so that no one
loses and in the end some are better off.
People can benefit from language policies in different ways due to the different
functions of languages. Languages serve two basic functions: a communication
function and an identity function. First, languages enable people to communicate
with other people. They can read historical documents like books and diaries,
they can talk to their peers or write pamphlets for future generations. The greater
the amount of people they can communicate with in one language and the more
domains of a society this language can be used in, the wider the communica-
tive range of that language. Language policies alter both aspects, the number of
speakers and the domains a language can be used in. If a language is taught in
public schools, then this is likely to have a positive impact on the (future) number
of speakers of that language. Hence, speakers of a language L normally benefit
from L being taught at school. Language policies that enable individuals to use
L in communication with the state (e.g. by providing forms in L), in court rooms
or in hospitals, or that offer public services in L also enlarge the communicative
range of L. This would allow speakers of L to use L in those domains, which
is especially relevant if L is their native, first and/or preferred language. Hence,
speakers of language L normally benefit from language policies that increase the
communicative range of L.
Second, languages are essential carriers of cultural and ethnic identity. They of-
ten serve as markers of belonging to ethnic and national groups, are the medium
of socialization of children, and give access to literature, music, history and dis-
course of ethnic and national groups.2 Therefore, speakers of a language can also
value language policies for identity reasons. Many policies that increase the com-
municative range of a language also increase its status in the society. This can be
valued even by individuals who do not depend on the larger communicative range
to function in society. Take a society with a majority languageH that can be used
in all public domains and a minority language L that is only used in private com-
munication between speakers of L as an example. Assume that all native speakers
1See, e.g., Part II of Wickström et al. (2018).
2For a multidisciplinary discussion on language and identity see e.g. Fishman & Garcia
(2010).
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of L are also fully proficient in H , i.e. bilingual. Now consider a language policy
that offers certain public services in L. There is no language barrier in public ser-
vices for bilingual individuals, whether or not the policy is implemented. There is
no simple communicative gain for them, since they speak H . Nonetheless, they
might value the mere fact that their first language and with it their cultural heritage
is recognized by the H dominated state. It has a symbolic value to speakers of L.
Policies like using both languages H and L on bank notes are purely symbolic,
but can still be valued by individuals due to the identity aspect of language.
Most language policies produce costs and benefits not only at the point in time
they are first implemented, but every year they are in place.3 Education policies
are a good example here. Consider the introduction of an education program in a
minority language L. There are set up costs, e.g. for the design of the program,
teacher training, and production of textbooks. There are also significant variable
costs, e.g. wages, teacher training and production of new text books. Concerning
benefits, not only the L speaking pupils at the time of the implementation of the
program benefit, but later pupils as well. This example shows that to properly
evaluate language policies, present as well as future benefits have to be taken into
account. In principle, standard cost-benefit analysis can account future effects of
a policy by discounting (estimated) future costs and benefits and considering the
net present value of the policy.
A number of language policy measures share the feature that their costs and ben-
efits depend on the number of beneficiaries. In the case of the minority language
education program, for example, the number of beneficiaries is related to the num-
ber of pupils speaking L. If the number of pupils increases, then, consequently,
more pupils benefit from the policy and the costs of the policy increase. Roughly,
one can say that costs and/or benefits of many language policies depend on the
linguistic composition of the population subject to the policy. And this linguistic
composition is by no means constant. Minority languages gain speakers, e.g. due
to migration, or loose them, e.g. due to a general decline of the minority language.
Hence, the estimation of future costs and benefits of a language policy should be
based on estimates on changes in the linguistic composition of the population.
Largely unrelated to public economics and policy analysis, there is a literature
on models that provide estimates or predictions of future changes in the linguis-
tic composition.4 They are called language competition or language dynamics
models. Somewhat surprising, a large number of essays on language competition
models were published in physics journals, which reflects the background of their
authors. They apply models they normally use to describe physical processes to
model language dynamics. Other models in the literature are inspired by mod-
els from biology. Several authors collaborated with scholars from linguistics and
sociolinguistics to make the linguistic interpretation of their physics or biology
models more sound. Some essays even show that model projections can fit empir-
ical macro data on the linguistic composition.
3Some symbolic measures like adding a language to bank notes are an exception.
4See Section 3.1 for a more detail literature overview.
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Another strand of literature analyzes language competition from an economics
perspective in which one can find game theory approaches as well as voter mod-
els. What separates them from the non-economic models is a conception of indi-
viduals as utility maximizing actors. They investigate the evolution of the macro
dynamics that stem from the individual decisions and identify (democratic) equi-
libria. In some models, the state plays an active role. In Kennedy & King (2005),
for example, the state collects a tax and spends the revenue on language education
policies. Individuals vote on the budget of the education program, and the state
executes the democratic public will. In a cost-benefit analysis, on the other hand,
the state is an instance that makes decisions from a macro perspective, weighing
societal benefits against societal costs. Such a conceptualization is closer to actual
democratic societies in which citizens elect political representatives who have to
make decisions. As I outlined earlier, political decisions related to language are
unavoidable and laissez-faire politics can lead to sub-optimal societal outcomes
due to externalities.
In this thesis, I look at language policies and language dynamics from the perspec-
tive of the state or of policy makers. The question I want to answer is whether the
(expected discounted) benefits of a specific language policy exceed its costs, and
if so, by how much. An answer to this question yields an indication of whether a
policy should be implemented or which of a list of possible policy options should
be chosen. A combination of cost-benefit analysis and language competition mod-
els can provide such answers. As described earlier, language competition models
produce projections for the future development of the linguistic composition of
a population. These projections then inform estimates on future costs and bene-
fits of a policy. Finally, these estimates derive a more realistic estimation of the
net present value of a language policy. I call this approach dynamic cost-benefit
analysis.
The underlying language competition model plays a crucial role in the dynamic
cost-benefit analysis approach. It has to satisfy at least two conditions. First,
it should be able to reproduce observed historical dynamics. If the model pro-
duces projections that do not coincide or, at least, show similarities with empirical
observations, then estimates on future costs and benefits are basically worthless.
Second, the model has to offer a meaningful way to model language policies. The
straightforward way to include policies is to model them as a change in the model
parameters. To do that, one has to have a clear interpretation of what a change
in model parameters actually means in practice. Unfortunately, this is somewhat
problematic in many of the physics and biology inspired model approaches, since
parameters originally reflect physical properties of a physical system and not so-
ciolinguistic characteristics of a society.
For this thesis, I start with a language competition model analyzed in Wickström
(2005). Here, this model is referred to as model W . It is built on a conceptual-
ization of individuals as rational actors. In the model, families weigh the commu-
nication and the identity aspect of language against one another when deciding
which language(s) to transmit to their children. Throughout the thesis, I adapt and
extend model W . I include more aspects of real life language dynamics such as
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migration and education, and present and analyze different functional forms of the
general extended model.
This thesis consists of four self-contained essays. In the essay in Chapter 2,5 my
coauthors and I analyze whether revitalizing a declining minority language can be
optimal in terms of welfare. To do so, we build on modelW . We stay close to the
original model, but use different functional expressions to model language trans-
mission within the family context. I refer to this version of model W as model
W˜ . As described above, families are utility maximizing actors who consider the
communication value and the symbolic value of the languages in question. The
former is represented by the number of speakers of a language, while the latter is
modeled through the status of a language. The language dynamics are then driven
by family formation and intergenerational language transmission. We analyze a
scenario with two languages. Without state intervention, the minority language
loses speakers and will disappear in the long run. The state has the opportunity to
invest into status planning to increase the status of the minority language. Hence,
the state can affect the decision making process of individual families. This in-
vestment is costly. At the same time, it can decrease the pace of the decline of
the minority language or even stop it. We assume that the state wants to enable
wide communication possibilities and to support the minority language. Both can
be achieved by a high number of bilinguals. Hence, the objective of the state is
to achieve a maximal amount of bilinguals at minimal costs. Combining the lan-
guage competition model with this objective we get a dynamic control problem.
We solve this problem and identify an optimal investment strategy. Last, we show
that under certain conditions it can be optimal to invest sufficiently in the minority
language for it to survive in the long run.
In the essay in Chapter 3,6 I develop an extended version of model W˜ . In modelW
and model W˜ , the language dynamics are driven solely by family formation and
language transmission from one generation to the next. Empirical and theoretical
literature on language transmission, acquisition, and decline from sociology, soci-
olinguistics, as well as economics indicate that intergenerational language trans-
mission is indeed one of the most important processes for language dynamics. If
languages are not passed from one generation to the next, then they tend be lost
after a few generations. This is, for example, well studied for migrant minority
languages in the United States. First generation migrants use their heritage lan-
guage at home and pass it on to the second generation. The second generation are
bilingual and often don’t pass their mother tongue to their children. Consequently,
the third generation then is mostly monolingual in English. What the literature
also shows is that intergenerational language transmission is not the only impor-
tant process to be considered. A second pivotal process is language education.
Languages taught at school, as medium of instruction or as foreign languages,
affect the linguistic repertoires of pupils and hence the linguistic composition of
the population as a whole. Moreover, language education is obviously interesting
5This essay was first published in Mathematical Social Sciences, cf. Templin et al. (2016).
6This essay was first published in Rationality and Society, cf. Templin (2018).
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from a language policy perspective, since policies often determine which lan-
guages are used and taught in public schools. Language education is therefore
modeled explicitly in the extended version of the model. The extended version,
called model E1, also takes into account concentration of speakers of the minor-
ity language, language learning by adults, and migration. Furthermore, I offer
an operationalization of the abstract status parameter used in the previous models
W and W˜ . After presenting and analyzing model E1, it is applied to the case of
Spanish and English in the United States. It is shown that model parameters can
be estimated from quantitative empirical data and that the model can be fitted to
observed historical Spanish-English language competition.
The extended model is used again in the essay in Chapter 4,7 but in a stream-
lined version. This version is referred to as model E1const. In Chapter 3, language
transmission and adult language learning are functional expressions of the relative
status of the minority language as well as the linguistic composition. These func-
tional expressions make use of parameters that reflect the relative importance of
the status aspect with respect to the communication aspect of language in language
related decisions. In contrast to many other model parameters, these parameters
are not estimated from empirical data. Moreover, depending on the specific case
as well as on the time span, the functional expressions remain relatively constant
over time. Therefore, I offer in Chapter 4 a version of model E1, in which the
functional expressions are replaced by constant expressions. The advantage of
the streamlined Model model E1const is that all its parameters can be estimated
from empirical data. This is illustrated for the case of Spanish and Basque in the
Basque Autonomous Communities in northern Spain. Despite the substitution of
the more accurate functional expressions by constants, the streamlined model with
estimated parameters can reproduce the observed historical language dynamics, at
least for reasonable time horizons. At the end of the essay, I illustrate how the lan-
guage competition model can be used to perform dynamic cost-benefit analysis.
In the first three chapters, I consider a situation with two languages (H and L)
and three language groups: monolinguals inH , monolinguals in L and bilinguals.
It is needless to say that the linguistic reality of most states in this world is more
complex. Moreover, in the previous three chapters the age of individuals is not
considered. When it comes to the formation of new families and the transmis-
sion of languages to young children, all individuals are implicitly assumed to be
equally relevant. In a situation where a minority language is only spoken by the
oldest generation, but not by young parents, this assumption is clearly problematic
and most likely yields unrealistic projections. Therefore, I offer two additional
extensions in Chapter 5. First, I propose and analyze an extension of the model
from Chapter 3, that is model E1, with multiple age groups, called model E2mG.
Second, I consider the case of one majority language H and several minority lan-
guages L1, ..., Ln. The model with just one minority language can then be seen as
a special case of the more general model with multiple minority languages, called
model E2nL. It is shown that on the one hand, both extensions are valuable espe-
cially for the analysis of policies that only target single minority language groups
7This essay is accepted for publication in Language Problems and Language Planning.
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in a setting with multiple minority languages or of policies that only target certain
age groups, like education policies. On the other hand, it is also shown that the
simpler model E1 with only one minority language and without age differentia-
tion can yield a useful and easier to handle approximation of the more complex
cases of model E2mG and model E
2
nL.
7
2 Optimal language policy for the preservation of a
minority language ∗∗
2.1 Introduction
In many of the states in this world, one can find two or more larger language
groups, often in form of a majority language and one or several minority lan-
guages. This is by no means a static situation, since "[a]ll over the world, people
are stopping speaking minority languages and shifting to languages of wider com-
munication" (Sallabank 2012, p. 104). This often results in the displacement of
the minority languages by the majority language. To some extend such processes
are inevitable and can be observed throughout human history. Nevertheless, in the
modern world the decline of minority languages appears to occur much faster than
ever before. It is predicted that 90 percent of the currently 7000 spoken languages
will not survive the end of the century (Krauss 1992).
Language shift and maintenance
In response to this accelerated process of (minority) language decline, revitalizing
and maintaining (endangered) minority languages is on the agenda of many of
their speakers. Moreover, governments, non-governmental organizations as well
as international organizations such as the European Union "are actively working
to save and stabilize endangered languages" (Fernando et al. 2010, p. 49). In
scientific discourses a large variety of arguments to support (minority) language
rights or to save endangered languages were put forward over the past decades. In
this essay we will not assess such arguments in detail or develop new ones,8 but
rather investigate in a formal model setting the possibilities, effects and costs of
language policies aiming at saving endangered languages. To do so, we first have
to identify causes of language shift as well as measures that are available to reverse
language shift. Here again, we will not go into all the details and mostly refer to
the extensive literature on this topics, see e.g. Fishman (1991), Crystal (2000),
Nettle & Romaine (2000) and May (2011). Furthermore, we have to specify the
target function: what is the desired state of affairs that language policies should
aim at?
Referring to Nettle & Romaine (2000) and Crystal (2000), Sallabank groups dif-
ferent causes for language shift in four often overlapping main categories: a) nat-
ural catastrophes, famine, disease, b) war and genocide, c) overt repression and d)
cultural/political/economic dominance, where the last one is the most common,
∗∗This is a manuscript of the following article: Templin, T., Seidl, A., Wickström, B.-A., &
Feichtinger, G. (2016). Optimal language policy for the preservation of a minority language.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 81, 8–21. Copyright c©[2016] (Elsevier). The final version is
available at DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.006
8For an overview of the current discussions concerning language rights see e.g. May (2011)
or Sallabank (2012). See also Fishman 1991 for a popular work on reversing language shift.
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cf. Sallabank (2012, pp.103f). Since we are interested in such cases, where indi-
viduals voluntarily choose to change to the majority language or not to pass the
minority language to the next generation, we concentrate on the last category. Es-
pecially in nation states with one official/national language (which is often but not
necessarily the language of the majority) this language is dominant in education,
politics, media and public life. In modern democratic states the result is "that
the majority culture [...] is endemic and omnipresent; and minority cultures, hav-
ing very little, if any, public legitimization and private space, thereby constantly
decline in survival potential, the more their members participate in the ’greater
general good’" (Fishman 1991, p. 63). Here, uneven power relations between
the national majority and minorities play a major role. Minorities are often un-
derrepresented in politics and in the public sphere and socially disadvantaged, cf.
May (2011). This, in turn, can lead to negative attitudes towards the minority
language, which are also internalized by its speakers (Sallabank 2012, p. 104).
When the two main aspects of language are considered — language as a tool for
communication and language as a carrier of cultural identity — it is no surprise,
that a language that cannot be used in the majority of societal domains and that is
furthermore stigmatized to some degree will not be learned, spoken or passed to
the next generation.9
A language shift is a process that is typically comprised of three phases. In a first
phase, called diglossia, formal language domains are dominated by the majority
language which implies a loss of official and public functions of the minority
language. This forces the speakers of the minority language to use the dominant
one. In a second phase more and more speakers of the minority language become
bilingual, while both languages are still used, at least in some domains. Especially
among the younger generation one can observe a decreasing number of speakers.
This causes a further decline of domains where the minority language can be or
is used. The third phase finally is the replacement of the minority language: "For
a generation or two, some bilingual arrangements may be observed, but often [...]
these prove to be way-stations on the road to a new monolingualism in the larger
language" (Edwards 2010, p. 6).
The language shift process can be counteracted by language policies aiming at
the survival of the minority language. Language planning can be divided into
three categories: status planning, corpus planning and acquisition planning. All
three can have a positive impact on the chances of survival of minority languages.
Through status planning, e.g. giving some official status to the minority language,
the prestige of the language can be increased for its speakers as well as for the
other members of the society. Corpus planning, which aims at standardizing the
orthography and grammar of a language, can also increase its prestige and at the
same time can reduce learning costs. Teaching the minority language at school,
which belongs to the category of acquisition planning, enables students to learn
the language properly/in the first place and can also have a positive impact on
9"The communicative value of languages is largely determined by the number of speakers it
gives access to and by the status or social positions of these speakers" (Robichaud & Schutter
2012, p. 127).
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its status and identity value. In general, (re)introducing and/or strengthening the
minority language in at least some domains can enhance the chances that it stays
vital.
In this essay we concentrate on the role of the state in language revitalization
processes. We presuppose that the state is basically interested in supporting the
minority language by guarantying minority language rights.10 At the same time,
we assume that the state aims at ensuring social cohesion by enabling wide com-
munication possibilities. The existence of two linguistically segregated language
groups can threaten the solidarity between the society members and hence social
cohesion. Even without referring to a necessity of a shared national identity for
solidarity and cohesion one can at least say that "a shared language contributes
to democracy" (Robichaud & Schutter 2012, p. 135). Enabling wide commu-
nication possibilities while guarantying minority rights can be achieved through
widespread bilingualism. If the minority language can be preserved in form of a
relatively large number of bilingual individuals, the language minority is able to
pass cultural values linked to the minority language to the next generations while
communication possibilities throughout the society are assured. As outlined ear-
lier, bilingualism is often a step towards the death of the minority language. Thus,
preservation of a vital bilingual community requires a continuous effort by the
state. In our model — and this is operationalized into the target function — the
state tries to maximize the number of bilingual speakers at minimal expenditures.
Language competition models
In the past two decades a wide variety of language competition models were devel-
oped. One important point of departure for this new research on language compe-
tition was the work by Abrams & Strogatz (2003). There, a simple language com-
petition model with two monolingual subpopulations is developed. The fraction
of speakers of each language evolves according to a differential equation, which
takes into account the size of the subpopulations and the prestige of both lan-
guages. Although the authors can fit their model to aggregated empirical data of
endangered languages, it shows some weaknesses. In Abrams & Strogatz (2003)
neither bilingual speakers nor the social structure of the population are considered.
Moreover, it is predicted that always one of the two competing languages will die
out in the long run. Due to such limitations, the model was revised and extended
by many authors, especially from the field of (statistical) physics. Patriarca &
Leppänen (2004) and Patriarca & Heinsalu (2009) include spatial components in
their adaptions of the AS model. Taking geographical inhomogeneities into ac-
count they were able to show that it is possible that both languages survive in two
10As mentioned above, there are many arguments supporting such policies:
"Indeed, the dynamics of ethnic tension involving language, leading in some cases to political con-
flict, occur most often notwhen language compromises are made or language right are recognized,
but where they have been historically avoided, suppressed or ignored" (May 2011, p. 161).
"So people’s self-respect and dignity are often affected by the esteem their language gets from
others or from the state. We might then justify different language policies by appealing to the im-
portance of language recognition for individuals’ dignity" (Robichaud & Schutter 2012, p. 136).
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different geographical regions. Mira & Paredes (2005) introduce the concept of
similarity between competing languages and prove that both languages can sur-
vive if they are close to each other. Stauffer et al. (2007) propose microscopic
or individual based versions of the AS model and apply simulation techniques in-
stead of averaging over the whole population. Mira & Paredes (2005), Minett &
Wang (2008), Heinsalu et al. (2014) and others extend the A-S model by addition-
ally considering bilinguals. Pinasco & Romanelli (2006) propose a Lotka-Volterra
type model inspired by population dynamics to model language competition and
also show the possibility of coexistence. Spatial extensions of this model can be
found in Kandler & Steele (2008) and Kandler et al. (2010). A good review of
the different approaches is given in Patriarca et al. (2012).
In the model of Abrams and Stogatz (A-S model) speakers of two language H
and L are assumed. Speakers ofH can convert to speakers of language L and vice
versa, while the population size remains constant. Minett and Wang point out
that "in practice, [...] typically a speaker does not suddenly give up one language
completely in favor of an other" (Minett &Wang 2008, p. 23). Therefore, they in-
clude bilingual speakers in their adoption of the A-S model. Furthermore, Abrams
and Strogatz implicitly consider language transmission from one generation to the
other when fitting their mathematical model to empirical data from more than a
hundred years without theorizing this fact. Minett and Wang therefore consider
two modes of language transmission: 1) vertical, i.e. transmission from parents
to their children and 2) horizontal, i.e. (adults) learning the second language and
becoming bilingual. For the vertical mode, a uniparental model of transmission is
applied. In contrast, Wickström (2005) only considers vertical transmission, but
explicitly models family formation. It is assumed that adults mate due to a random
search and matching process with a success probability that is smaller for couples
with an H-monolingual and a L-monolingual partner than for all the other possi-
ble couples. In the so formed families offspring is produced and raised in one —
or in some cases both — of the parents’ languages, depending on the communica-
tional value of each language and their status/prestige. As Wickström (2005) we
only consider the vertical mode, i.e. intergenerational language transmission11.
InWickström (2014) it is illustrated that the A-Smodel and its extension byMinett
& Wang (2008) can be reformulated in terms of the general model presented in
Wickström (2005). Furthermore the spatial model in Patriarca & Leppänen (2004)
can be interpreted as a version of the Wickström framework with two subpopula-
tions I and II, who value languages H and L differently. It is shown that under
some general assumptions on the nexus between transition probabilities and the
size of the subpopulations stable steady states of the system are the same as de-
rived by Patriarca & Leppänen (2004) in spatial terms. For this essay we build
on the general model formulation presented in Wickström (2005) and Wickström
(2014). Hence we consider speakers of a high status majority languageH , speak-
ers of a low status minority language L and bilingual speakers B.
11Transmission in the family is the ‘gold standard’ of language vitality and the most important
factor in language survival (Fishman 1991, p. 113).
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Only some of the language dynamics models outlined above deal with language
revitalization policies. In terms of a mathematical model, such policies can be
operationalized as a change of relevant model parameters that are related to the
linguistic environment: “political, social and/or economic changes can lead to a
change in the sociolinguistic environment and consequently to a change in the
competition dynamics” (Kandler et al. 2010, p. 3859f). Yet, most often model
parameters are assumed to be constant over time. To maintain a bilingual equilib-
rium Minett & Wang (2008) suggest a simple intervention strategy: whenever the
amount of speakers of the minority language drops below some threshold value,
then the status of the minority language or some other model parameters have to
be increased. That such a "dramatic intervention" (Fernando et al. 2010, p. 51)
is quite unrealistic, was already mentioned in Minett & Wang (2008). It can be
seen as a theoretical approximation of a more sophisticated intervention, which
starts to increase the minority language status when the numbers come close the
threshold.
A greater effort to model language planning was undertaken in Fernando et al.
(2010). They consider intergenerational language transmission as well as horizon-
tal transmission. In contrast toWickström (2005) parents do not just choose one or
two languages to raise their children in. Instead, the probability that a child speaks
a language l strongly depends on the amount of l-conversations it is exposed to.
Within the family this amount only depends on the linguistic repertoires of the
parents. Furthermore, Fernando et al. consider the influence of the community by
taking into account conversations heard in the public sphere and languages taught
at school. This is also reflected in three different kinds of interventions contem-
plated there: 1) increasing the status of the minority language,12 2) increase the
amount of the minority language heard in public and 3) formal language teach-
ing. In their simulations Fernando et al. illustrate the effect of different kind of
governmental interventions.
After 100 years simultaneously the status of the minority language as well as the
amount of that language used in public are increased and the minority language
is taught in formal education to some monolinguals of the high-status language.
In the model this is realized by increasing three corresponding parameters at year
100. Citing Fernando et al. (2010, p. 51) when reviewing Minett & Wang (2008)
one may ask: "How such a dramatic intervention could be achieved is not ex-
plained".
In Kandler et al. (2010) the authors fit their basic model with time-independent
parameters (“shift coefficients”) to data on language competition between Welsh
12Unlike most of the models listed above, there is no explicit status parameter in Fernando
et al. (2010). The status of the minority language is reflected by the parameter that “measures
the effectiveness of hearing language [the minority language] in motivating its learning (i.e. the
receptiveness of the child to [the minority language])" in an HH or HB family (p. 60). This pa-
rameter is not to be understood as an individual trait of the child. Among other things, it represents
“the “status” of [the minority language], where status is used to mean the entire constellation of
societal factors that motivate the learning of a given language” (p. 60, emphasis in original). This
status related parameter functions as an amplifier for L-conversation heard by a child.
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and English in Wales. For the period from 1901 to 1971 the model captures the
observed dynamics quite well. Yet, the basic model could not adequately account
for maintenance interventions implemented in the past 40 years, which could be
the cause of reduced decline of Welsh. Therefore, the authors extend their basic
model “by incorporating a simplified concept of (extended) diglossia” (p. 3862).
The high-status language is used in important domains as higher education or non-
local businesses. This yields an incentive for speakers of the minority language
to become bilingual. At the same time, political interventions might support the
low status language in other domains such as local legislation. This, can create
incentives for monolinguals of the dominant language to become bilingual and
for bilingual parents to transmit both languages to the next generation. Kandler
et al. introduce an additional term in their model that captures the demand of
participation in domains where the low status language is used. This demand is
reflected by the parameter w1. Assuming that w1 doubles after 1971, the extended
model is able to approximate the empirical data. The increase of w1 is a result of
language planning incentives.
In the above three examples, language planning policies are modeled as a change
in model parameters. These changes occur at some single point in time, i.e. at
some point in time the value of a parameter (or multiple parameters) jumps to
another value. Depending on the parameter that is changed as well as on the size
of the jump, such a “dramatic intervention” might be rather unrealistic. In their
adoption of the model proposed in Minett & Wang (2008), Bernard & Martin
(2012) also include the opportunity for policy makers to alter the status of the
minority language. In contrast to the previous approaches, they assume that the
variation of the status at each time step is bounded. Hence, the size of the jump is
limited, which yields a potentially more realistic model for intervention. Setting
up a dynamic control model, they were able to show that when starting in a given
domain there exist adequate intervention strategies such that both monolingual
subpopulations can be preserved.
In this essay we also propose a language competition model with dynamic inter-
vention. A first difference to the model analyzed in Bernard & Martin (2012) is
that we build on the general model formulation presented in Wickström (2005).
Secondly, in our approach the status can not be regulated directly. Instead, we
assume that the state has a certain budget that can be used for status planning. To
increase or even stabilize the status of a (minority) language continuous invest-
ments into status planning are necessary. Hence, we assume that whenever the
state reduces its efforts to maintain the minority language beyond a certain value,
then the status of that language decreases. This implies that without any interven-
tion the status tends to zero in the long run. The investment strategy is denoted by
a process (st)t≥0. Since the budget is assumed to be finite, we can normalize the
investment such that st ∈ [0, 1]. Thirdly, we propose an optimal control model.
The aim of languages policies is not to maintain monolingual subpopulations of
both languages, but to maintain both languages in a scenario with large commu-
nication possibilities throughout the society. Hence, the aim is to maximize the
amount of bilingual speakers. Furthermore, investments into status planning are
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costly. Therefore, the objective here is to maximize the bilingual subpopulation at
minimal costs.
The dynamic control model proposed below is a three-state system. The three
states are: the fraction of speakers of language H (denoted by XH), the fraction
of speakers of language L (denoted by XL) and the relative status of language
L (denoted by S). The fraction of bilingual speakers is simply given by XB =
1 − XH − XL, and the relative status of the majority language H is given by
1 − S. In Fernando et al. (2010) the authors criticize such an assumption in the
model of Minett and Wang because it implies "that it is impossible to make one
language more attractive without making the other less so" (Minett &Wang 2008,
p. 50). However, in a language competition situation, where individuals have to
decide for one language, the other or both, this assumption makes sense when we
think of relative attractiveness instead of absolute attractiveness. Hence, instead
of statements as ’language H has an attractiveness value of 3.5’ the model here
only allows statements like ’language H is three times as attractive as language
L’.
The evolution of the system is described by three differential equations. The status
can be affected by state intervention s, i.e. S˙ = g(s, S), where g is some function
increasing in s. The evolution of the distribution of language repertoire groups R
depends only on the distribution itself and on the status S. Hence, the fractions
XR, R = H,L,B, can be influenced by state intervention, but only indirectly
through the controlled status.
This essay is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 the general language dynamic
model is introduced. In Section 2.3 we suggest specific functional forms for the
general model described in the previous section. Section 2.4 aims at identifying
the optimal public investment strategy. Furthermore, some general statements
on steady states of the optimally controlled system are derived. In Section 2.5
we consider some case studies to illustrate our results numerically. Section 2.6
provides conclusions and some remarks for future research.
2.2 Model
We consider a (large) population consisting of individuals equipped with one of
three different language repertoiresR: monolingual speakers of the dominant lan-
guage H , monolingual speakers of the minority language L and bilinguals speak-
ers B. The relative sizes (fractions of the population) of the respective language
repertoire groups are denoted by XH , XL and XB. The fractions add up to 1,
hence XB = 1 − XH − XL. The variable S represents the relative status of the
minority language L in the society.
2.2.1 Family formation
In every generation individuals form families. There are six family types F : HH
(twoH monolinguals),HL,HB, LL, LB and BB. Family formation is assumed
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F ψF
HH X2H +XHXL
HL 0
HB 2XHXB
LL X2L +XHXL
LB 2XLXB
BB X2B
Table 1: Distribution of families for a given distribution of adult speakers.
to be random but restricted by the condition that both adults should share a com-
mon language, i.e. they should be able to communicate with each other. Hence,
couples with anH-monoglot and a L-monoglot are excluded. Given any distribu-
tion of speakersXH , XL, XB, the expected distribution of family types is given in
Table 1, where ψF denotes the fraction of F -type families.13
2.2.2 Family behavior
Families bring up their children either as monolinguals inH or L, or as bilinguals.
The fraction of F -type families bringing up children with language repertoire R
is denoted by qR(F ; ·) ∈ [0, 1]. Naturally, the q’s add up to one: for every family
type F ∑
R
qR(F ; ·) = 1.
The q−functions are one of the main ingredients of the model proposed here.
Parents choose a language repertoire depending on their own languages, on their
emotional attachment to those languages as well as on the communication values
of all the languages at hand. Therefore, the fraction of families of type F rais-
ing their children as R’s, R = H,L,B, varies with the current distribution of
speakers in the society as well as with the status of languages H and L. Hence,
qR(F ; ·) = qR(F ;XH , XL, S). The dependence on the variables XH , XL cap-
tures the practical advantage of belonging to a certain language group, since they
measure the frequency with which an individual encounters another individual in
group H , L and B, respectively, and hence measure how many people one can
communicate with. Following the individual utility maximization approach de-
veloped in Wickström (2005), we assume that qH is non-decreasing in XH , and
13See Section 5.2.2 for the derivation of the expected distribution ψF in a more general case.
15
non-increasing in XL, and vice versa for qL:
∂qH(F ;XH , XL, S)
∂XH
,
∂qL(F ;XH , XL, S)
∂XL
≥ 0,
∂qB(F ;XH , XL, S)
∂XH
,
∂qB(F ;XH , XL, S)
∂XL
≥ 0,
∂qH(F ;XH , XL, S)
∂XL
,
∂qL(F ;XH , XL, S)
∂XH
≤ 0.
This reflects the first aspect of language mentioned in the introduction: language
as a tool for communication. The second aspect – language as a carrier for cultural
identity – is reflected in the dependence of the q′s on the family type F and the
relative status of the minority language S. It is hypothesized that the emotional
attachment in the family to a certain language, and hence the frequency of its
transmission to the next generation, depends on its strength in the family. The
stronger the position of a language l in the family, the higher is the fraction ql:
1 ≥ qH(HH; ·) ≥ qH(HB; ·) ≥ qH(BB; ·) ≥ qH(LB; ·) ≥ qH(LL; ·) ≥ 0,
0 ≤ qL(HH; ·) ≤ qL(HB; ·) ≤ qL(BB; ·) ≤ qL(LB; ·) ≤ qL(LL; ·) ≤ 1.
It is furthermore assumed that both parents shall be able to communicate with
their children, cf. Fernando et al. (2010). Hence,
qH(LB; ·) = qH(LL; ·) = 0,
qL(HB; ·) = qL(HH; ·) = 0.
The average emotional attachment to a language l also depends on the general
prestige or cultural status of the languaga in the society. The higher the status,
the higher is the willingness of its speakers to pass their language to the next
generation. We therefore assume that qH is non-increasing in S, while qL is non-
decreasing in S:
∂qH(F ;XH , XL, S)
∂S
≤ 0,
∂qL(F ;XH , XL, S)
∂S
≥ 0.
From the assumptions made above two properties of the q functions can be con-
cluded. Since qL(HH) and qH(LL) are equal to zero, we get
∂qH(HH;XH , XL, S)
∂XH
=
∂qL(LL;XH , XL, S)
∂XL
= 0.
Furthermore, qL(HB; ·) = qH(LB; ·) = 0 yield
∂qH(HB;XH , XL, S)
∂XH
=
∂qL(LB;XH , XL, S)
∂XL
= 0.
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2.2.3 Dynamics
While in Abrams & Strogatz (2003) a constant population size is assumed, other
researches explicitly model logistic population growth, see e.g. Pinasco & Ro-
manelli (2006) or Kandler et al. (2010). If growth rates and carrying capacities
vary between the language repertoire groups, then the population dynamics can
have a major impact on possible steady states. Yet, if growth is homogeneous
throughout all the groups and a common carrying capacity is assumed, then pop-
ulation dynamics do not affect the steady states, cf. Heinsalu et al. (2014). In
this essay we also assume homogeneous growth at rate θ and a common carrying
capacity K. Since the number of children born in a family and thus the overall
population dynamics is independent of the status14, considering status planning
does not violate the homogeneity assumption. Therefore, the model proposed
here “could describe the interaction between linguistic groups that have already
reached a state in which reproduction and access to resources takes place in simi-
lar ways” (Heinsalu et al. 2014, p. 5), and can not account for situations in which
one language repertoire group has much less access to resources than the other
language repertoire groups.
Let N denote the size of the population, and NR, R = H,L,B, denote the sizes
of the language repertoire groups. The dynamics of the overall population size is
described by the logistic differential equation
N˙ = θN
(
1− N
K
)
= θN
∑
R
([∑
F
qR(F ; ·)ψF
]
− 1
K
NR
)
.
The size of language repertoire group R changes according to
N˙R = θN
∑
F
qR(F ; ·)ψF − θN
K
NR.
Therefore, the relative size of language repertoire group R,XR = NR/N , evolves
according to
X˙R = θ
(∑
F
qR(F ; ·)ψF −XR
)
.
For languages H and L this reads as
X˙H
θ
= (X2H +XHXL)qH(HH) + 2XHXBqH(HB) +X
2
BqH(BB)−XH ,
(2.1)
X˙L
θ
= (X2L +XHXL)qL(LL) + 2XLXBqL(LB) +X
2
BqL(BB)−XL, (2.2)
where ql(F ) = ql(F ;XH , XL, S), l = H,L.
14The relative status S only influences parents decisions on the language repertoires of their
children.
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The status variable
The status of the minority language L is expressed in the variable S, 0 ≤ S ≤ 1.
Investments in status planning s can increase the status of the minority language:
S˙ = f(S, s)− µS. (2.3)
It is assumed that the function f is non-increasing in S and non-decreasing in s.
Furthermore, for s = 0 the function f should be zero. This implies, that without
any state intervention the relative status of the minority language B converges to
zero at rate µ.
2.2.4 The objective function
The aim of state intervention is a large bilingual subpopulation. At the same
time, state interventions to increase the status of the minority language are costly.
Hence, the decision maker is looking for an investment policy (s(t))t≥0, st ∈
[0, 1], that yields a high level of individual bilingualism (benefit) at low costs. By
w(XH(t), XL(t), s(t)) we denote the value of the system at time t, i.e. benefits
minus costs at time t. We require w to be increasing in XB = 1 − XH − XL,
non-increasing in XH and XL, and decreasing in s. The total discounted value is
given by ∫ ∞
0
e−rtw(XH(t), XL(t), s(t))dt,
where r ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount rate. The problem of finding the best invest-
ment strategy for language maintenance can now be formulated as a maximization
problem:
max
(st)t≥0
∫ ∞
0
e−rtw(XH(t), XL(t), s(t))dt.
Note, that S(t) and therefore XH(t) and XL(t) depend on the size of s prior to
time t, cf. (2.3), (2.1) and (2.2).
2.3 Specific functional forms
In this section we provide specifications of the q-functions, the status dynamics
and the objective function that satisfy the general assumptions made above.
For parameters 0 ≤ η < β < δ and ε+ γ < ζ < 1 let
qH(HH;XH , XL, S) = 1− ηSXL,
qH(HB;XH , XL, S) = max{0, ζ(1− S)− βSXL},
qH(BB;XH , XL, S) = max{0, ε(1− S) + γ(1− S)XH − δSXL},
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and
qL(LL;XH , XL, S) = 1− η(1− S)XH ,
qL(LB;XH , XL, S) = max{0, ζS − β(1− S)XH},
qL(BB;XH , XL, S) = max{0, εS + γSXL − δ(1− S)XH}.
These constructions imply, that given a sufficiently high fraction of H speakers
in the society and a sufficiently low status of the minority language L, bilingual
or even mixed couples (LB) will not raise their children as monolinguals in L,
since in this scenario neither L is a very useful communication tool in this soci-
ety nor can the prestige of this language really compensate the communication
disadvantage.
Throughout the essay we will assume η to be zero. In this case the system dynam-
ics simplify to
X˙H
θ
= XB [2XHqH(HB;XH , XL, S) +XBqH(BB;XH , XL, S)−XH ] , (2.4)
X˙L
θ
= XB [2XLqL(LB;XH , XL, S) +XBqL(BB;XH , XL, S)−XL] . (2.5)
2.3.1 Dynamics for fixed status
For the moment let S be fixed. The essential dynamics of XH and XL can each
be described by two parameters, cf. Wickström (2005). These parameters are
introduced in the following. Let X∆L (S) denote the fraction of L speakers where
XH = 0 and X˙H = 0. Hence,
qH(BB;XH , XL, S) = 0 ⇒ ε(1− S)− δSXL = 0 ⇔ X∆L (S) =
ε
δ
1− S
S
.
For X∆H respectively we get
X∆H (S) =
ε
δ
S
1− S .
Next we look for X∗H and X
∗
L. X
∗
H is the fraction when X˙H = 0 given XL = 0.
Hence, X∗H is a solution to
0 = 2XHqH(HB;XH , XL, S) + (1−XH)qH(BB;XH , XL, S)−XH ,
or, with the above specifications, the unique positive solution of the quadratic
equation
0 = γX2H −
[
2ζ + γ − ε− 1
1− S
]
XH − ε. (2.6)
Note, X∗H < 1 iff S > 1/2ζ . From this, we easily conclude that X
∗
H is increasing
in ζ, ε and γ, and decreases with an increase of S. On the other hand,X∆H increases
in ε and S and decreases with an increase in γ. It is unaffected by a change of ζ .
From the relations between X∆H , X
∆
L and X
∗
H , X
∗
L we can identify possible bilin-
gual equilibria for the fixed status S:
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Lemma 2.3.1.1. Let η = 0.
(a) If X∆H ≤ X∗H < 1 there exists a stable equilibrium with 0 < XH < 1 and
XL = 0; the fraction of H-speakers equals X∗H
(b) If X∆L ≤ X∗L < 1 there exists a stable equilibrium with 0 < XL < 1 and
XH = 0; the fraction of L-speakers equals X∗L
(c) If 1 ≥ X∆H > X∗H and 1 ≥ X∆L > X∗L, we have a stable equilibrium with
bilinguals and monolinguals in both languages (XH , XL, XB > 0).
Lemma 2.3.1.2. Let η = 0. For monolingual stable equilibria the following
statements hold true
(a) XH = 1 is a stable equilibrium if and only if S ≤ 1− 1/2ζ .
(b) XL = 1 is not a stable equilibrium
(c) XH , XL ∈ (0, 1) with XH +XL = 1 is stable iff
XHqH(HB;XH , XL, S) +XLqL(LB;XH , XL, S) ≥ 1
2
. (2.7)
A necessary condition for this last inequality is S ≤ 1− 1/2ζ .
Lemma 2.3.1.1 can be established using a phase diagram, cf. Wickström (2005).
The proof of Lemma 2.3.1.2 is found in the Appendix.
2.3.2 Variable status and status control
Now we specify the dynamics of the minority language status S, which is in-
creasing as a result of investments into language policies and decreasing due to a
general negative trend. We assume the following functional form:
S˙ = f(S, s)− µS = ν(1− 2S)√s− µS, (2.8)
where ν > 0 is a model parameter correlated to the effectiveness of intervention.
Here two assumptions are made: a) for a low status language the necessary effort
to increase its status is low, while for a high status language it takes more effort.
b) Language L stays the minority language. This assumptions is expressed in the
term (1 − 2S). The status can not exceed 1/2, while the (1 − S), which can be
interpreted as the status of H , does not fall below 1/2. H can be thought as the
first official language.
The control variable s is bounded (s ≤ 1). Thus, any steady state status S (S˙ = 0)
has an upper bound:
S ≤ ν
2ν + µ
.
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Since X∗H is decreasing in S, while X
∆
H increases in S, Lemma 2.3.1.1 (a) yields
a second upper bound for S, which is relevant for equilibria with 0 < XH < 1
and XL = 0. A third one results from Lemma 2.3.1.1 (b), see below. A minimal
value for this kind of equilibrium is given byX∗H(S) < 1, whereX
∗
H is the unique
positive solution to (2.6).
We therefore introduce the following status thresholds
S :=
ν
2ν + µ
,
S˜ : X∗H(S˜) = X
∆
H (S˜),
S := 1− 1
2ζ
.
Note, due to symmetry it holdsX∗L(1− S˜) = X∆L (1− S˜). Table 2 shows possible
stable equilibria for the problem with fixed a status corresponding to these thresh-
old values. The second interval is not empty if ε/δ ≤ 1/2ζ . The third interval is
not empty if ε/δ ≥ 1− 1/2ζ . Figure 1 illustrates some of the cases listed in Table
2.
S ∈ [0 , S] (S ∨ 1− S˜ , S˜] (S ∨ S˜ , 1− S˜)
equil. H , HL HB, LB HLB
Table 2: Possible stable equilibria for the fixed status problem for different values
of S.
The first line contains intervals for S, while the second one shows the
corresponding potential stable equilibria. “H, HL” means that a pure H-
monolingual steady state as well as a steady state with monolingual speak-
ers of H and L is possible.
To find optimal state intervention strategies we need to consider the derivatives of
the function f(S, s) = ν(1− 2S)√s:
∂f
∂s
(S, s) =
ν
2
1− 2S√
s
, (2.9)
∂f
∂S
(S, s) = −2ν√s. (2.10)
2.3.3 Objective
Departing at the initial state XH(0), XL(0) and S(0) the aim of the optimization
problem is to find the best investment policy (s(t))t≥0 such that, r ∈ (0, 1), k > 0,
ξ ∈ [0, 1], ∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
k ·XB(t)− [XL(t) +XB(t)]ξs(t)
)
dt (2.11)
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(a) S = 0.3 < 0.375 = S (b) S = 0.3 < 0.375 = S
(c) S = 0.4 < 0.49 ≈ min{S˜, 1− S˜} (d) S = 0.4 < 0.49 ≈ min{S˜, 1− S˜}
(e) S = S ≈ 0.42 (f) S = S ≈ 0.42
Figure 1: Phase diagrams and trajectories for fixed S.
Phase diagrams and trajectories for fixed S for different values of S. For
the trajectories the initial distribution isXH = 0.6 andXL = 0.2. Param-
eters are as in Example 2.5.0.1 in Section 2.5.
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is maximized, while the system is developing according to (2.4), (2.5) and (2.8).
For ξ = 0 the costs for the state intervention do not depend on the numbers of
speakers of language L. Here one can think of adding language L to (street-
)signs. For ξ = 1 the costs linearly increase with the number of speakers - one
could think of bilingual education in schools.
2.4 Optimal control and optimal steady states
Substituting XL +XB by 1 −XH in the objective function, the Hamiltonian can
be expressed as
H(XH , XL, S, s) = k ·XB−(1−XH)ξs + λHX˙H + λLX˙L + λS (f(S, s)− µS) ,
(2.12)
where λH , λL and λS are the costate variables measuring the marginal value of
the corresponding state variables XH , XL and S, respectively.
We assumed that the control variable is bounded, i.e. that the budget for language
policies fostering bilingualism is limited. This budget constraint is formalized by
the inequality s ≤ 1. To include the constraint in the formal model we define
the Lagrangian L := H + ω(1 − s), where ω is the Lagrange multiplier. For the
identification of the optimal intervention at a given state we consider the derivative
of L with respect to the control variable s:
Ls = −(1−XH)ξ + λS ∂f(S, s)
∂s
− ω. (2.13)
To identify an optimal intervention, we are looking for s and ω such that Ls = 0
and ω(1− s) = 0. We have
Ls = 0 ⇔ (1−XH)ξ + ω = λS · ∂f(S, s)
∂s︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
⇒ λS ≥ 0.
Note, if XH < 1 then we even have λS > 0. For the explicit form of the function
f defined in (2.8) we get
Ls = 0⇔ (1−XH)ξ + ω = λS · ν
2
1− 2S√
s∗
⇔ s∗ =
(
λS
ν
2
1− 2S
(1−XH)ξ + ω
)2
. (2.14)
The second derivative of L with respect to the control variable s is non-positive
if λS > 0 in which case the Legendre Clebsch condition is satisfied. Whenever
XH = 1, in which case λS = 0 could be possible, s = 0 is obviously optimal.
Applying the optimal control we have
S˙ = f(S, s∗)− µS = λS ν
2
2
(1− 2S)2
(1−XH)ξ + ω − µS. (2.15)
If the constraint is inactive, i.e. s < 1, then ω = 0. If, in contrast, the constraint is
active (s = 1), then
ω = λS
ν
2
(1− 2S)− (1−XH)ξ ≥ 0. (2.16)
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2.4.1 Stationary points
To state the co-state equations we first introduce some functions. For l = H,L set
gl(XH , XL, S) := 2Xlql(lB;XH , XL, S) +XBql(BB;XH , XL, S)−Xl,
which equals X˙l/(θXB) whenever XB > 0. Then,
H = XB(k + θλHgH + θλLgL)− (1−XH)ξs+ λS(f(S, s)− µS).
Using this notation we have
HXH = −(k + θλHgH + θλLgL) + θλHXB
∂gH
∂XH
+ θλLXB
∂gL
∂XH
+
ξ
(1−XH)1−ξ s, (2.17)
HXL = −(k + θλHgH + θλLgL) + θλHXB
∂gH
∂XL
+ θλLXB
∂gL
∂XL
, (2.18)
HS = θXB
(
λH
∂gH
∂S
+ λL
∂gL
∂S
)
+ λS
(
∂f(S, s)
∂S
− µ
)
. (2.19)
The co-state equations are then given by
λ˙H = rλH −HXH ,
λ˙L = rλL −HXL ,
λ˙S = rλS −HS.
To find inner stationary points we try to identify solutions
(X̂H , X̂L, Ŝ, λ̂H , λ̂L, λ̂S)
to
0 = X˙H = X˙L = S˙ = λ˙H = λ˙L = λ˙S.
For X̂H and X̂L to be stationary we need either X̂B = 0 or gH(X̂H , X̂L, Ŝ) =
gL(X̂H , X̂L, Ŝ) = 0.
Note, any steady state status 0 < Ŝ < S corresponds to a steady state control
variable 0 < ŝ∗ < 1 and hence to some ω̂ = 0. In this case, the stationarity of the
status (S˙(Ŝ, λ̂S) = 0) yields an explicit relation between Ŝ and λ̂S , cf. (2.15):
λ̂S =
2µ
ν2
Ŝ
(1− 2Ŝ)2 (1− X̂H)
ξ. (2.20)
Plugging this into (2.14) we get for the stationary optimal intervention
ŝ∗ =
(
µ
ν
Ŝ
1− 2Ŝ
)2
< 1. (2.21)
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If Ŝ = S, then ŝ has to be equal to one and thus λ̂S ≥ 22ν+µνµ (1−X∗H(S))ξ has to
hold true, cf. (2.16).
Using the explicit expression for the function f introduced in Section 2.3, the
equation λ˙S = 0 yields
0 =− θX̂B
(
λ̂H
∂gH
∂S
+ λ̂L
∂gL
∂S
)
+ λ̂S
(
r + µ+ 2ν
([
λ̂S · ν
2
1− 2Ŝ
(1− X̂H)ξ
]
∧ 1
))
. (2.22)
2.4.1.1 Monolingual stationary points
First we want to consider stationary points with X̂B = 0. Obviously, if XB = 0,
then the linguistic composition does not change anymore, since families of type
HL are impossible, while no bilinguals, which function as a kind of language
transmitters, are part of the population. In the steady state all families are of types
HH and LL and children of such families are raised monolingual in the respec-
tive language. Hence, both monolingual language groups reproduce themselves
independent of the statuses of both languages. Thus, the state does not invest
any money to support the status minority language, which would produce costs
without having any positive effect, i.e. Ŝ = ŝ∗ = 0.
2.4.1.2 Bilingual stationary points
Now we want to consider stationary points with a bilingual sub-population, i.e.
X̂B > 0. Using the notation introduced above this yields that whenever X̂l > 0,
l = H,L, the stationarity implies gl(X̂, Ŝ) = 0.
Bilingual stationary points with XL = 0
The most interesting case is when monolingualism in the minority language L
vanishes and only monolinguals in H and bilinguals remain. Such a state is de-
sirable, since all society members are able to communicate with each other, while
speakers of L can still preserve their cultural identity. IfXL = 0 we need X˙L ≤ 0.
This is equivalent to X̂H ≥ X̂∆H (S).
Let
S < S ≤ min{S, S˜},
and XH = X∗H(S). The co-state equation λ˙H = rλH −HXH = 0 is independent
of λL, since gL = 0 and ∂gL/∂XH = 0, see A.1. Hence, we can derive λH(S) =
λH(XH , S). Given this λH we can choose some λL such that λ˙L = 0. In A.1 it is
also shown that ∂gL/∂S = 0.
To identify optimal steady states we have to distinguish two possibilities. First we
can check if there is a steady state at S. To do so, it has to be investigated if there
exists a λ̂S > 22ν+µνµ (1−X∗H(S))ξ which solves
0 = λ˙S(λ̂S) = λ˙S(S,XH(S), λH(S), λ̂S).
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The second case covers S < S < S. Here, let λS(S) be defined by (2.20). In this
case steady states can be found by identifying statuses S which solve
0 = λ˙S(S) = λ˙S(S,XH(S), λH(S), λS(S)).
Depending on the parameter constellation and especially depending on k, ν and µ
such a solution exists. If k is too small, then no such solution exists, that means it
is not profitable to maintain the minority language L.
Lemma 2.4.1.1. For k sufficiently large there exists at least one solution Ŝ∗ ∈
(S,min{S, S˜}] such that
0 = λ˙S(Ŝ
∗) = λ˙S(Ŝ∗, XH(Ŝ∗), λH(Ŝ∗), λS),
where λS = λS(Ŝ∗) if Ŝ∗ < S, and λS > 22ν+µνµ (1−X∗H(S))ξ if Ŝ∗ = S.
For a proof see the Appendix.
Bilingual stationary points with XL > 0
For an optimal steady state with XH , XL, XB > 0 we need
S ∨ S˜ < Ŝ ≤ (1− S˜) ∧ S.
This is only possible if S˜ < S < 1/2, which does not hold true for all parameter
constellations, cf. Example 2.5.0.1.
For fix S we need the following for any steady state:
qH(HB), qL(LB), qL(BB) > 0.
The last inequality is due to S < 1/2 and ζ < 1. If qH(BB) = 0, then ζ(1−S) >
1/2 has to hold true, else qH(BB) > 0.
As before, for suitable S (here max{S, S˜} < S < S), we can find XH(S) and
XL(S) such that X˙H = X˙L = S˙ = 0. For some parameter constellations there
can be more than one stable solution XH(S) and XL(S) such that X˙H = X˙L =
0. Furthermore we get a unique λS(S). The co-state equations yield a linear
system in λH , λL with 3 equations and coefficients depending on S. To identify
the optimal status, one has to check if this linear system has a solution for some
suitable S. This also holds true at the left boundary. At the right boundary one has
to check if the linear system in λH , λL and λS has a solution with a sufficiently
large λS , see above.
2.5 Numerical calculations
In this section we numerically investigate the linguistic behavior of the population
under the optimal policy. We show the existence of different stable and optimal
steady states. Moreover, we illustrate the dependence of the selected steady state
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k ξ Ŝ ŝ∗ X̂H X̂L kX̂B − ŝ∗
Example 2.5.0.1
60 0 - - - - -
75
0 0.41 0.74 0.85 0 10.3
1 S ≈ 0.42 1 0.81 0 13.4
90 0 S ≈ 0.42 1 0.81 0 16.3
Example 2.5.0.2 20 0 0.47 0.03 0.44 0.03 10.6
Table 3: Stable bilingual steady states for Examples 2.5.0.1 and 2.5.0.2.
This table contains stable bilingual steady states – if such exist – for dif-
ferent values of k. The steady state values of the status Ŝ, the optimal
control ŝ∗, the fraction of speakers X̂H and X̂L as well as the steady state
objective kX̂B − ŝ∗ are listed. Here r = 0.5 and ξ = 0.
on the initial distribution of speakers as well as on how much bilingualism is val-
ued with respect to expenditures by the decision maker (parameter k). To analyze
the evolution towards the steady states we plot exemplary trajectories.
Two examples are considered. For both of them we set η = 0. In Example 2.5.0.1
we choose µ, the rate of decline of the minority language status S, to be 0.2, which
is relatively high. In contrast, Example 2.5.0.2 depicts a case where the status of
the minority language declines rather slowly over time (µ = 0.01). Furthermore,
the parameter ζ , which measures the aggregated weight that is put on the status in
the decision of lB families, l = H,L, to socialize their children as monolinguals
in l, is slightly higher in Example 2.5.0.1. In both examples we chose the discount
rate r to be 0.5.
Example 2.5.0.1. β = 0.4, δ = 0.7; γ = 0.1, ε = 0.4, ζ = 0.8; ν = 0.5, µ = 0.2,
θ = 1 and ξ = 0
Example 2.5.0.2. β = 0.4, δ = 0.7; γ = 0.1, ε = 0.4, ζ = 0.7; ν = 0.5,
µ = 0.01, θ = 1 and ξ = 0
First we calculate the S- thresholds, cf. Section 2.3.2. In Example 2.5.0.1 we
have S = 0.375, S = 0.417 and S˜ = 0.492, while in Example 2.5.0.2, S = 0.286,
S = 0.495 and S˜ = 0.463. According to these numbers and the statements made
in Section 2.3.2, stable equilibria with XH , XB > 0 and XL = 0 are possible for
both examples. In Example 2.5.0.2 furthermore equilibria with XH , XB > 0 and
XL > 0 are possible, since S˜ < S. This is not the case for Example 2.5.0.1,
since there S < S˜. The actual stable bilingual equilibria are displayed in Table 3.
For Example 2.5.0.1 we investigate the influence of different values of k, namely
k = 60, k = 75 and k = 90. For Example 2.5.0.2 we concentrate on the case of
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k = 20. For any parameter constellation there also is a manifold of steady states
at (X̂H , X̂L, Ŝ) = (X̂H , 1 − X̂H , 0), where X̂H can take any value between zero
and one. In these steady states it is optimal to have ŝ = 0. Note, however, that not
every point on this manifold is a candidate for the optimal long run solution due
to its stability properties, cf. Lemma 2.3.1.2. Next, we analyze the two examples
in greater detail.
Example 2.5.0.1, k = 60
If k is small the decision maker does not have a particularly high incentive to
support the status of the minority language in the long run. As can be seen in the
first row of Table 3 there is no bilingual steady steady. The following happens. Let
us consider a situation where the fraction of H speakers, XH , is relatively high,
while XL and XB and the status variable S are small. Because of the dominance
of H speakers, most families are of type HH . Thus, XH increases. Initially XB
decreases due to the low status of L and the low chances ofH speakers of meeting
a bilingual partner. This development is challenged by the decision maker who
invests much into raising the status of L. Under such a policy the incentive to
raise their children bilingual increases for HB and BB couples. This yields an
increase in the number of bilinguals. Another effect of this is that LB couples
have a stronger incentive to raise their children as L-monoglots. However, since
the fraction of L speakers (monolingual and bilingual) is small, the policy does
not have a strong effect on the overall development of the language and over all
XL decreases even further. As a result, it soon does not pay off anymore to invest
into the status of the language as these measures affect less and less people. Thus,
the status of L decreases again. Consequently, the incentive to raise children
bilingual and therefore the fraction of bilinguals decreases as well. In the long-
run, the majority of the population only speaksH and bilingual speakers disappear
completely. This behavior is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
Example 2.5.0.1, k = 75, ξ = 0
Table 3 shows that for k = 75 there exists a steady state with 15% bilinguals
and no monolingual speakers of the minority language L. To obtain this fraction
of bilingual speakers in the long run, 75% of the budget has to be used. If this
bilingual steady is reached or not depends on the initial state values. For the initial
states considered in Figures 4 and 5 the system converges to that steady states. If
the initial XL, XB and S would be even smaller than in Figure 4, the system is
likely to converge to a steady state with almost onlyH-monolingual speakers, few
L-monoglots and no bilinguals.
For the base case (XH = 0.85, XL = 0.05, S = 0.1), see Figure 4 and the left
panel of Figure 6, the fraction of the bilingual population first decreases, since
the status of language L is low, as are the fractions of L speakers and bilinguals,
so the majority of couples consists of H speakers. Due to the dominance of HH
couples and the high likelihood that HB and BB couples raise their children as
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Figure 2: Time path for initial state XH(0) = 0.85, XL(0) = 0.05, S(0) = 0.1
(Ex. 2.5.0.1, k = 60).
Figure 3: q-functions for initial state XH(0) = 0.85, XL(0) = 0.05, S(0) = 0.1
(Ex. 2.5.0.1, k = 60).
H-monoglots, XH first increases. Initially one would invest as much as possi-
ble into the status to increase it. As a first result of this policy LB couples get a
stronger incentive to raise their children as L-monoglots. Furthermore, HB and
BB couples become less likely to raise their children just as speakers of language
H and instead are more likely to raise the children bilingual than before. Conse-
quently,XH now decreases whileXB increases see Figures 4. Hence, the negative
term in qL(LB) decreases and even more LB families raise their children as L’s.
This is a problem as long asXL, which is continuously decreasing, is above some
threshold. To avoid this effect, the increase of S is slowed down for a while, until
XL is small enough and then increased again to obtain the steady state status.
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Figure 4: Time path for initial state XH(0) = 0.85, XL(0) = 0.05, S(0) = 0.1
(Ex. 2.5.0.1, k = 75, ξ = 0).
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Figure 5: Time path for initial state XH(0) = 0.85, XL(0) = 0.05, S(0) = 0.4
(Ex. 2.5.0.1, k = 75, ξ = 0).
If, in contrast to the base case, the initial status is high, see Figure 5 and the
right panel of Figure 6, then initially the state does not have to invest as much
into increasing the status of the minority language. Due to the high status of L,
manyHB couples will raise their kids bilingual. As a result, at the beginningXH
decreases whileXB increases. Furthermore, the fraction of language L speakers is
so low that LL and LB couples are rather unlikely and XL decreases. To further
support the growth of XB it is optimal to increase s for some time. Due to the
smaller fraction of L speakers, HH and HB couples are more likely than LB or
BB couples, thus,XH recovers after some time and even grows. At some point of
time the status S and the fraction of bilingual speakers XB is high enough while
XL is very low, such that s can be lowered again until it reaches its steady state.
Example 2.5.0.1, k = 75, ξ = 1
For ξ = 1 the costs for state intervention increase with the number of speakers
of L, i.e. L-monoglots as well as bilinguals. Thus, the higher XH , the lower are
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Figure 6: q-functions for Ex. 2.5.0.1, k = 75, ξ = 0).
In the both panels XH(0) = 0.85 and XL(0) = 0.05. In the left panel
S(0) = 0.1, while in the right one S(0) = 0.4.
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Figure 7: Time path for initial state XH(0) = 0.85, XL(0) = 0.05, S(0) = 0.4
(Ex. 2.5.0.1, k = 75, ξ = 1).
the costs for state intervention. In Figure 7 we can see that for the base case, the
system behaves quite similar to the case of ξ = 0. The major difference is that
state intervention is not just maximal in the beginning, but the entire budget is
used over the entire time horizon. Due to the large amount ofH-monolinguals the
intervention is much cheaper compared to the case where ξ = 0 (more than 80%
cheaper). Therefore, in the long run the status and XB are higher while the XH is
smaller, cf. Table 3.
Example 2.5.0.1, k = 90
If k is large, then it is optimal to approach a steady state where the state invests
the entire budget to reach the maximal possible status for minority language L,
see Table 3. This yields a maximal amount of bilingual speakers while no L-
monolinguals remain within the population. For the base case, see Figure 8, ini-
tially the state spends as much as possible for improving the status of L. For
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Figure 8: Time path for initial state XH(0) = 0.85, XL(0) = 0.05, S(0) = 0.1
(Ex. 2.5.0.1, k = 90).
similar reasons as before, XH first increases while XL and XB first decrease.
This changes after some time. Once XL has become small enough, the state can
afford to decrease efforts. However, to ensure a growth in the number of bilingual
speakers, it is necessary to increase expenditures after some time again. This is
the main difference to the case with a low k; where one would first decrease, then
increase, and then decrease the expenditures s. I.e. the later increase is apparently
necessary to reach a steady state with a proper bilingual population.
Example 2.5.0.2, k = 20
Table 3 shows that in the bilingual steady state for the parameter constellation
considered in Example 2.5.0.2 all three linguistic repertoires remain intact in the
long run. This is the major difference to Example 2.5.0.1 and is mainly due to
the much lower value of µ (µ = 0.2 in Example 2.5.0.1 and µ = 0.01 in Exam-
ple 2.5.0.2). Here with the low µ it is much less costly to keep the status at a high
level. The development of the population groups is similar to before, however,
XL only decreases for a certain time, then the status of language L is so high that
even BB couples have a small incentive to teach their children only language L.
Due to the small depreciation of S it is not necessary to spend much for keeping
the status high, so one would only invest much into the status in the beginning to
get it to a high level and then decrease control efforts over time. Example 2.5.0.2
with k = 20 is visualized in Figure 9. Note, in the long run only 3% of the budget
is used to guarantee that more than half of the population is bilingual.
2.6 Conclusions
The state aims at ensuring wide communication possibilities, while recognizing
and supporting — if this is not too costly—minority language rights. This trade-
off between a commonly spoken language and the preservation of a minority lan-
guage is approached through bilingualism. To investigate how language policies
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Figure 9: Time path for initial state XH(0) = 0.85, XL(0) = 0.05, S(0) = 0.1
(Ex. 2.5.0.2, k = 20).
can be used to preserve a minority language in a bilingual subpopulation we devel-
oped an abstract language dynamics model. The point of departure is individual
utility maximization, while here only intergenerational language transmission is
considered. Families decide to bring up their children either as monolinguals in
the majority or the minority language, or as bilinguals. This decision is based
on how they value the communicational value of each language and their emo-
tional attachment to the languages at hand. Through a continuous investment into
language policies the state can increase the status of the minority language and
thereby foster bilingual parenting in families with one or two bilingual parents. It
is assumed that the state wants to maximize the number of bilingual speakers at
minimal costs.
In Wickström (2005) it was already proven that for a constant status and proper
parameter constellations stable bilingual steady states are possible. Here we could
furthermore show that such bilingual steady states can even be optimal when costs
for language policies are taken into account. It was illustrated that for some cases
there are steady states only with monolingual speakers of the majority language
and bilinguals but without any monolingual speakers of the minority language. In
such a state all individuals within the population can - in principle - communicate
with each other while the minority can preserve its language. For other cases
we could see that small subpopulation with monolingual speakers of the minority
language survives in the long run optimal state. As one would expect, bilingual
steady states are only optimal, if bilingualism is valued high enough in comparison
to expenditures.
Whether or not a bilingual steady states is not only possible but really targeted by
the decision maker, depends on the initial distribution of speakers as well as the
initial status of the minority language. If both the status and number of speakers of
the minority language are too low, then it is not worthwhile to invest in language
maintenance in the long run, which results in a purely monolingual population. In
most of the examples considered in the numerical analysis, the initial values were
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high enough and it was illustrated how expenditures change over time to achieve
an optimal bilingual steady state in the long run.
For future research the current model will be extended. To get closer to the real-
world complexity of language acquisition and transmission within a large popu-
lation, we will add to the model language learning in formal education as well as
adult language learning. Furthermore, language policies will be investigated in
greater detail. We also intend to adjust the model to cases of new minorities, that
means minorities which are based on temporary or permanent migration.
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3 A Language Competition Model for New Minori-
ties ∗∗
3.1 Introduction
Language competition or language dynamics models are formal mathematical
models that describe how the size of certain language groups or the geographi-
cal distribution of certain languages change over time within a given territory. In
the past two decades a growing number of such models were developed. The ma-
jority of models deal with the decline and death of languages historically rooted
in specific regions. In contrast, we propose a model for minority languages pre-
dominantly spoken by migrants and their descendants, like Turkish in Germany
or – to a certain extend – Spanish in the United States.
In the literature, two main strands of research can be distinguished: one influenced
by economic theory, the other by physics and biology. Economic approaches are
characterized by individual agency: agents aim at maximizing their individual
utility when making language-related decisions. In the second strand of research,
metaphors and models from physics (e.g. interacting particles) or biology (e.g.
predator and prey) are adopted to describe language competition. We take a closer
look at a few examples from both strands of research.
Grin (1992) presented one of the first economic language dynamics models. He
considers a context with two languages. Bilingual agents can conduct various ac-
tivities in one of two languages to gain utility. The efficiency of using the minority
language depends on its linguistic vitality, which is determined by the number of
speakers and use of the language throughout the society. The author presents a
dynamic model for vitality, use and number of speakers of the minority language.
This research suggests that given a minimal amount of speakers and a positive at-
titude to use the language, the minority language can survive (stable equilibrium).
John & Yi (1996) analyzed a stylized two period model for two languages and two
locations. In the first period of their model, agents can either engage in production
in their location or learn a second language. Between periods, agents can move to
the other location, and engage in production wherever they chosen to reside in the
second period. An agent a is more productive the more producing agents there are
in the same location sharing at least one language with a. The authors demonstrate
that four different equilibrium outcomes are possible, including full assimilation
as well as geographic and linguistic isolation. In 2001 John and Yi presented a
fully dynamic version of the two-period model with successive generations. The
model developed by Tamura (2001) also considers two languages and two regions.
Both regions are monolingual and have growing but initially autarkic producing
economies. Eventually, the optimal market size maximizing per capita income
exceeds the population size of both regions, but monolingualism prevents market
integration. At the individual level, parents invest in the human capital of their
∗∗This is a manuscript of the following article: Templin, T. (2018). A language competition
model for new minorities. Rationality and Society, 31(1), 40–69. Copyright c©[2018] (Sage). The
final version is available at DOI: 10.1177/1043463118787487
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children, caring about their own consumption as well as their children’s future
income. Since language skills are part of human capital and since bilinguals can
function as translators and enable trade, educating children bilingually potentially
increases their future income but also requires higher investments. Tamura con-
cludes that over time an equilibrium is reached in which part of the region with the
smaller population is bilingual. Kennedy & King (2005) analyze a dynamic model
for a single location with three overlapping generations and a voting mechanism.
As in John & Yi (1996), an adult agent is more productive when there are more
other agents with whom she can communicate. Therefore, young adult agents
benefit from educational policies that teach the language(s) they speak to the next
generations. Kennedy and King assume that the government collects a lump-sum
tax, spends the revenue on language education programs, and that adults vote for
the size of the public language programs. Depending on the initial conditions, dif-
ferent democratic equilibria are possible. In Wickström (2005) and Templin et al.
(2016) parents decide which language(s) to pass on to their children. In addition to
their children’s economic future, parents also care about transmitting the cultural
values attached to their language to the next generation. Wickström (2005) shows
that bilingualism can be stable, and Templin et al. (2016) illustrate that preserving
the minority language can be optimal if bilingualism is valued high enough by the
policy maker. Instead of language learning and transmission, Iriberri & Uriarte
(2012) consider language use. In a context with a majority language spoken by
everybody and a second language only spoken by a bilingual minority, Iriberri and
Uriate analyze language choices of bilingual agents. Without any information on
language(s) spoken by the interlocutor, bilinguals have to decide whether to start
a conversion in the majority or in the minority language. Assuming a preference
to speak the minority languace, the authors show that the bilingual population
is optimally partitioned into two groups. Bilinguals in the first group hide their
bilingualism and always use the majority language, while bilinguals in the second
group always use the minority language.
A seminal work for the second strand of research – influenced by physics and
biology – was a short paper by Abrams and Strogatz published in 2003. They pro-
posed a simple model in which two languages compete for monolingual speakers.
The attractiveness of a language is determined by the number of its speakers as
well as its “perceived status”. Although the authors fit their model to aggregated
empirical data of endangered languages, it neglects bilinguals and predicts the ex-
tinction of one the two competing languages. Due to such shortcomings many
authors, especially from the field of (statistical) physics, revised and extended the
Abrams-Strogatz (AS) model. For example, Mira & Paredes (2005), Minett &
Wang (2008), Heinsalu et al. (2014) and others extended the AS model to con-
sider bilinguals. The role of bilinguals in language shift is crucial, since in practice
individuals normally do not change from being monolingual in one language to
being monolingual in the other language. Instead, it is more realistic to consider
transitions from monolinguals in one language to bilinguals and - in a second step
- from bilinguals to monolinguals in the other language. For such a two step tran-
sition it normally takes more than one generation. For that reason, some authors
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explicitly examined intergenerational language transmission, either with a uni-
parental model (e.g. Minett & Wang (2008)) or with a two-parents model (e.g.
Fernando et al. (2010)). Minett & Wang (2008) additionally consider horizontal
language transmission: during their lifetime monolingual adults can learn a sec-
ond language and therefore become bilingual. Other extensions of the simple AS
model add a spatial dimension (e.g. Patriarca & Leppänen (2004) and Patriarca &
Heinsalu (2009)) or introduce the idea of similarity between languages (Mira &
Paredes (2005)). Stauffer et al. (2007) and others propose micro-level versions of
the ASmodel and apply simulation techniques instead of averaging over the whole
population. Pinasco & Romanelli (2006) take a somewhat different approach to
the AS model. To model language dynamics, they employ a Lotka-Volterra type
model15. Kandler & Steele (2008) and Kandler et al. (2010) spatially extend
Pinasco and Romaneli’s model. Zhang & Gong (2013) also use a Lotka-Volterra
type model and offer an alternative to abstract status parameter that can be found
in many AS-type models.
For more extensive literature reviews, see Patriarca et al. (2012), Gong et al.
(2014) and John (2016).
In this essay we propose a model that combines aspects of both strands of re-
search. We consider a single location with monolinguals of two languages as well
as bilinguals. Adult individuals form families (two-parent model) and transmit
one or both languages to their children. Furthermore, we take two different modes
of horizontal language transmission into account. On the one hand, adult individ-
uals can learn new languages to improve their human capital. On the other hand,
children can acquire additional language skills in formal education. In contrast to
Kennedy & King (2005), we consider the education policy as an exogenous factor.
To obtain mathematical models for the different processes of language transmis-
sion and acquisition we do not use physical or biological analogies. Instead, we
conceptualize families and adult individuals as utility maximizing agents. As in
Wickström (2005), this utility-maximization approach helps derive general prop-
erties of the transmission and acquisition processes. Later on in the essay, we
propose specific functional expressions satisfying these general properties. More-
over, we offer a possible operationalization of the most often abstract and vague
status or prestige parameter used in many models that are part of the second strand
of research. Central to the present model is our assumption of a steady inflow of
new individuals speaking a new minority language. We assume that migration is
exogenous and we analyze its effect on the language dynamics.
The essay is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we discuss the main variables,
parameters and mechanisms of the language dynamics model that is presented in
Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 we suggest specific functional forms for the general
model, and in Section 3.5 we discuss steady states of the model. In Section 3.6
we consider Spanish and English in the US as a numerical example to investigate
15A set of differential equations that are used in evolutionary biology to describe the dynamics
of biological systems in which two species compete with each other, normally one as a predator
and one as a prey.
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the behavior of the model proposed and compare its projections to the real world
developments.
3.2 Towards a Multidimensional Model
This section is devoted to the main variables, parameters and mechanisms of our
language dynamics model. We start with the number of speakers as the central ob-
ject of interest. Thereafter, we discuss how the dynamics are conceptualized and
how the linguistic environment is operationalized. In conclusion, we discuss the
processes of family formation, language transmission and language acquisition in
greater detail.
3.2.1 Numbers of Speakers and Linguistic Composition
We are interested in the evolution of the distribution of certain language reper-
toires16 throughout a population or a given territory. Like the majority of models
available in the literature, we consider two languages: a locally dominant high-
status majority language, H , and a low-status minority language, L. Here, high
and low status is determined from a specific context, since L might be the domi-
nant language in another country. We consider three language repertoires: mono-
lingualism in H , monolingualism in L and bilingualism. Individuals are grouped
together according to their language repertoires. By NH we denote the number of
H-monolinguals, by NL the number of L-monolinguals and by NB the number
of bilinguals. The total population size is N = NH +NL +NB. Throughout the
essay we also use the fractions XH := NH/N , XL := NL/N and XB := NB/N .
Note, XB = 1−XH −XL. The vector X = (XH , XL) determines the linguistic
composition of the population.
3.2.2 Dynamics and linguistic environment
The linguistic composition of a population evolves due to a number of complex
processes. Since every model builds on a necessary simplification of the complex
reality, we concentrate on four key processes.
1. Population dynamics. This process comprises births and deaths within the
population as well as migration in and out of a population
2. Language transmission. Parents transmit languages to their children.
3. Education. Pupils are educated in a certain language and can learn addi-
tional languages in formal education.
16Here, we use the term ‘linguistic repertoire’ in the very narrow sense as the set of languages
a person commands, while only the two languages H and L are taken into account.
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4. Adult language learning. Adult individuals can learn new languages, im-
prove their skills in a language, or can forget a language they do not use
regularly.
While we assume population dynamics and language learning in formal education
to be exogenous, see below, we conceptualize language transmission and adult
language learning as utility maximizing decisions of parents and adults. Decisions
on which language(s) to transmit to the next generation and on whether to learn
an additional language are made within a given linguistic environment.17 From an
individual point of view, the linguistic environment is exogenous. Nevertheless,
individuals actively shape the linguistic environment through their decisions. To
put it differently, individual language-related behavior is not isolated but affected
- at least to some extent - by the behavior of the rest of the population. This is
modeled as follows. At each point in time t individuals in a population make
language-related decisions. These decisions are framed by the linguistic environ-
ment at time t. In turn, the linguistic behavior of the population, understood as
aggregated individual decisions, together with population dynamics may change
the linguistic environment at the next point in time t+1. This influence of today’s
behavior on the behavior of tomorrow reflects network effects.
We model five central elements of the linguistic environment. First and most ob-
vious, the linguistic composition of the population shapes the linguistic environ-
ment. Second, we consider spatial linguistic concentration: are the speakers of the
minority language distributed equally over the territory or concentrated in some
areas. Third, the socio-economic as well as the official status of the two languages
are important determinants of their usefulness and attractiveness and hence part of
the linguistic environment. The last two elements are the language (in) education
policy and language policies concerned with language learning by adults. In the
following paragraphs we explain how the linguistic concentration and the status
are operationalized. We discuss language education and adult language learning
later on.
3.2.2.1 Linguistic concentration
We measure concentration of speakers of language L, i.e. L-monolinguals as
well as bilinguals, by a single variable C ∈ [0, 1]. For C = 0 the language
repertoire groups are distributed equally throughout the territory of consideration
(no concentration). If C = 1, then we are dealing with a spatially segregated
population (maximal concentration). We measure concentration by the index of
dissimilarity, which measures the proportion of the minority population that has
to move to achieve an equal distribution of L’s, see Morrill (2016).
17 Linguistic environment is a “[t]heoretical construct used for analytical purposes. It subsumes
in an extensive (but obviously not exhaustive) fashion all the relevant information about the status,
in the broadest sense of the word, of the various languages present in a given polity at a certain
time. This includes the number of speakers, individual proficiency levels in the various languages,
the domains of use of each language by different types of actors (individuals, corporations, the
state, civil society organizations), and their attitudes towards the languages considered” (Grin &
Vaillancourt 1997, p. 49).
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3.2.2.2 Status variables
Status or prestige parameters can be found in many language competition models,
e.g. in Abrams & Strogatz (2003),Wickström (2005) or Minett & Wang (2008).
Most often, these parameters remain abstract and no proper interpretation of their
values is provided. Therefore, Fernando et al. (2010) rightfully asked “what were
the characteristics of a language having a prestige value, say 1.2, and what was
the sociocultural condition corresponding to the difference between two languages
having prestige values, say 1.2 and 1.3, respectively?” (p. 50). A similar criticism
is expressed in Zhang & Gong (2013). To get a more meaningful status variable,
we turn to the systematic framework first developed in Giles et al. (1977). There,
the authors suggest three categories of factors involved in language vitality: de-
mographic factors, status factors and institutional support factors. Demographic
factors are related to the number of speakers as well as their spatial distribution,
and are captured in our model by the linguistic composition and the concentration
variable. The main status factors are economic, social and symbolic status. The
economic status displays the economic standing of the language groups, the social
status is related to prestige, social standing and (political) power and the symbolic
status is related to identity and culture, cf. Baker (2011, pp. 55f). Institutional
support comprises government (services) on different levels, mass media, busi-
ness and education. For the present model we concentrate on the socio-economic
and the institutional dimension,18 proposing status variables for both dimensions.
The socio-economic position of a language is measured by the average socio-
economic status (SES) of all it’s speakers. The SES is a widely used variable in
econometric and sociological analyses and can be measured in different ways.
The main dimensions of the SES are income, education and occupation. Let
SSE(L), SSE(H) ∈ [0, 1] denote the average normalized SES of languages L
and H . As before, bilinguals are counted as speakers of L. Since we are in-
terested in the socio-economic advantage individuals gain from speaking a certain
language, we consider the relative status SSE(L) := SSE(L)/(SSE(L)+SSE(H))
and SSE(H) := 1− SSE(L)
The institutional or official status of a language is determined by official do-
mains the language can be used for.19 We denote the number of domains taken
into account by d, and make the simplifying assumption that for every domain
a language can either be used or not used. Counting the number of domains
a language l, l = H,L, can be used for and dividing this number by d, we
obtain a status variables SOF (l) with possible values in {0, 1/d, 2/d, ..., 1}. As
for the socio-economic status, we introduce the relative official status SOF (l) =
SOF (l)/(SOF (H)+SOF (L)), l = L,H . Three possible domains are: government
at national level, government at provincial level and public administration.
To simplify the formulas in the upcoming section we introduce a single status
indicator that is composed of our two status parameters. Let αSE and αOF be
18Measuring the symbolic status of a language imposes various difficulties. “The components
of non-market value [of a language] are very difficult to identify theoretically, and no less difficult
to measure empirically [...]” (Grin 2003, p. 38).
19Comparable to the graded intergenerational disruption scale (GIDS), see Fishman (1991).
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weights, i.e. αSE, αOF ∈ [0, 1] and αSE + αOF = 1. Given such weights we
define the composed status indicators
S(l) := αSE · SSE(l) + αOF · SOF (l), (3.23)
l = H,L. By construction, S(l) ∈ [0, 1], l = H,L, and S(H) = 1 − S(L). The
composed indicator S(L) reflects the relative linguistic disadvantage of speakers
of L in terms of socio-economic standing and access to public institutions and
services in their frist language. Throughout the essay we simply write S for S(L).
3.2.3 Family Formation and Intergenerational Language Transmission
Language transmission within the family context is one of the most important
factors for language vitality. We assume that families consist of two adults and
one or more children. Children are either brought up as monolinguals in H or
L, or as bilinguals. The linguistic repertoires of the parents affect which of the
two languages a child acquires. Therefore, we first model the formation of parent-
couples before dealing with the transmission of languages.
3.2.3.1 Family Formation
Not differentiating between the language repertoire of the mother and the father,
there are six possible parent-couple/family types F , where F = HH , HB, LL,
LB, BB, and HL. Family formation is assumed to be the result of a random
search and mating process: adult individuals meet randomly, some form couples
and some of these couples have children. Since both parents shall be able to com-
municate with each other, we neglect the unlikely family type HL. We are inter-
ested in the fraction of families of type F , F = HH,HB,LL, LB,BB, denoted
by ψ(F ). These fractions depend on the linguistic composition of the population
X as well as on linguistic concentration C. Hence, ψ(F ) = ψ(F ;C,X). The
higher the linguistic concentration, the lower the expected number of linguisti-
cally mixed families. The random family formation process yields the following
distribution of family types ψ:
ψ(HH;C,X) =
(
C + (1− C)XH
)
XH + (1− C)XHXL, (3.24)
ψ(HB;C,X) = 2(1− C)XHXB, (3.25)
ψ(LL;C,X) =
(
1 + C
XH
1−XH
)
X2L + (1− C)XHXL, (3.26)
ψ(LB;C,X) = 2
(
1 + C
XH
1−XH
)
XLXB, (3.27)
ψ(BB;C,X) =
(
1 + C
XH
1−XH
)
X2B. (3.28)
See Section 5.2.2 for a justification of the (3.24)-(3.28). Note, for C = 0, i.e.
no linguistic concentration, the family type distribution is the same as given in
Templin et al. (2016) and Chapter 2.
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3.2.3.2 Intergenerational language transmission
For all the theoretically possible combinations of parents’ and children’s language
repertoires we want to know how frequent they occur in a given linguistic envi-
ronment. The frequency of F -type families who decide to bring up their children
with repertoire R is denoted by qR(F ). We make three simplifying but sound
assumptions
A1: All children in one family have same language repertoire.
A2: Both parents shall be able to communicate with their children,
i.e. qL(HH) ≡ qL(HB) ≡ 0 and qH(LL) ≡ qH(LB) ≡ 0.
A3: Only those languages spoken by the parents can be transmitted,
i.e. qH(HH) ≡ qL(LL) = 1.
Since
∑
R qR(F ) = 1, we have qB(HB) = 1 − qH(HB) and qB(LB) = 1 −
qL(LB).
To specify the qR(F ), we adopt the model in Wickström (2005) where the author
assumes that parents make a rational decision on the language(s) to raise their
children in. Parents take into account the two main aspects of language: a means
of communication and a carrier of identity. On the one hand, parents want to raise
their children in a language that promises wide communication opportunities and
few communication costs (which come into play if an L and an H monolingual
individual encounter one another). We add that parents also consider the socio-
economic opportunities a language offers, see the human capital argument below.
On the other hand, due to identity related motives, parents are emotionally at-
tached to their heritage language and, therefore, gain utility from transmitting it.
Consequently, there might be a trade-off between instrumental and identity related
motives for speakers of L. Using simple utility maximization, Wickström (2005)
derives some general properties of the qR(F ). Similar, but with a slightly more
complex linguistic environment, we derive the following general properties, see
the Appendix:
P1: The higher the number of l-monoglots, the higher the incentive to transmit
l.
P1a: If XH increases, then qH and qB do not decrease and qL does not in-
crease.
P1b: If XL increases, then qL and qB do not decrease and qH does not in-
crease.
P2: The higher the status of a language, the higher the incentive to transmit it.
P2a: If S increases, then qH(HB) and qH(BB) do not increase.
P2b: If S increases, then qL(LB) and qL(BB) do not decrease .
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P3: From properties P1 and P2 it can be deduced that qH(HB) is independent
of XH and that qL(LB) is independent of XH .
Not every family is successful in transmitting the language repertoire they choose.
Transmitting a language in a region dominated by monolinguals of the other lan-
guage is especially challenging. Therefore, we introduce QR(F ), the frequency
of F -type families with R-type children. Unsuccessful transmission is modeled
as a question of linguistic concentration. We assume that given maximal concen-
tration (C = 1), LB and BB families live in L dominated neighborhoods, and
are not able to successfully transmit H to their children. Furthermore, we assume
that one half of the HB families live in H-dominated areas, while the other half
resides in L-dominated areas. Those in H dominated areas can not successfully
transmit L. Due to these considerations we define QH(HH) = qH(HH) ≡ 1,
QL(LL) = qL(LL) ≡ 1 and
QH(HB;C, S,X) = (1− C) · qH(HB;S,X) + C/2, (3.29)
QH(BB;C, S,X) = (1− C) · qH(BB;S,X), (3.30)
QL(LB;C, S,X) = (1− C) · qL(LB;S,X) + C, (3.31)
QL(BB;C, S,X) = (1− C) · qL(BB;S,X) + C. (3.32)
3.2.4 Language Learning in Formal Education
“One truth is certain: formal schooling introduces perhaps the most important
outside influence (for better or worse) on a family’s strategy to rear multi-literate/
multilingual children [...]” (Caldas 2012, p. 357). The daily language(s) of the
classroom, the foreign languages taught and the language repertoires of their peers
have a strong effect on pupils future language repertoires. If education is only
available in the majority language, then the maintenance of the minority lan-
guage is hampered. Over the years, children learn abstract ideas and concepts
and their vocabulary in the majority language grows. At some point, they can
express themselves better in the majority language, since the daily conversations
at home might not be able to compete with this enlarged vocabulary, see, e.g.,
Okita (2002, p. 125). If courses or programs in the minority language are offered,
the maintenance is much easier and someH-monolingual might acquire L during
their school career.
For the present essay, we assume that language learning at school depends only on
language education policies and the quality of language education, but not on the
linguistic composition or on the status of the minority language.20 In the model,
language learning is represented by constant parameters the sR1,R2 , R1, R2 =
H,L,B. Parameter sR1,R2 is the fraction of children entering school with lan-
guage repertoire R1 and leaving school with language repertoire R2. We assume
20Although we model education policies as being exogenous, the linguistic composition of a
democratic society can clearly affect the language dimension of these policies. This is modeled
explicitly in Kennedy & King (2005). To justify constant and exogenous policies, times scales
have to be adequate and the linguistic composition should not change drastically.
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that neither H-monolingual nor bilingual children will unlearn H through formal
education, i.e. sH,L = sB,L = 0. Hence, sH,H = 1 − sH,B and sB,B = 1 − sB,H .
Note, if sH,B > 0, then some former H-monolingual children learn L at school.
This is only possible if L is taught as a second language. If sB,H > 0, then some
children entering school as bilinguals leave the school system asH-monolinguals,
which might be the case if an H-only language policy is applied. In principle we
could include the option that L-monolingual children can get educated fully in L,
which translates to sL,L > 0. In practice, since H is a dominant majority lan-
guage, all children learn H at some point in their educational career. Therefore,
we set sL,L = 0. Hence, sL,B = 1 − sL,H . Finally, it is reasonable to assume
that bilingual children are more likely to leave school as H-monolinguals than
children entering school as L-monolinguals, i.e. sB,H > sL,H .
3.2.5 Language Learning by Adults
The majority of children growing up in an environment dominated by a single lan-
guage do acquire this language at some point. This is different for adults moving
to such an environment (temporarily or permanently) at a certain age but with little
or no proficiency in the dominant language. Even if they stay for many years, they
might never acquire the local language sufficiently to be counted as bilinguals.
Learning an additional language is an investment in one’s human capital. In an
H-dominated environment, certain skills in H can be a precondition for partici-
pation in the local job market, and with good H proficiency one can find better
jobs and/or be more productive in the job. This is especially relevant, if S(H) is
high. Furthermore, proficiency enables more efficient consumption and commu-
nication with locals and local authorities/administration, and reduces communica-
tion costs. This yields incentives to learn H . At the same time, language learning
is costly, it requires the investment of time and other resources. We assume L-
monolingual adults are rational and decide to learnH if the utility they gain (uLB)
is higher than the associated learning costs (cLB). Utility (uLB) as well as costs
(cLB) depend on the linguistic environment. Chiswick & Miller (2002) provide
valuable insight to these dependencies. Based on a human capital approach, they
analyze proficiency in H as a function of exposure to the language, efficiency in
learning the language and economic incentives (three E’s). Two of their many
theoretical and empirically backed results can be summarized as follows. Expo-
sure to H yields extra learning incentive and makes learning the language easier
and more effective. Hence, geographic concentration of speakers of the minority
language L has a negative effect on H acquisition. Moreover, the more educated
people are, the more efficient they will be at learning a language. With respect to
the linguistic environment variables and parameters described above we assume
the dependencies of (uLB) and (cLB) depicted in Table 4. Furthermore, we as-
sume the acquisition ofH can be supported by language policies, e.g. by offering
free language courses. We introduce a policy parameter 0 ≤ vH ≤ 1. A higher
vH indicates more support for the acquisition of H by L monolinguals (normally
newcomers).
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environment parameter uLB cLB
XH + -
C - +
S(H) + (-)
vH -
Table 4: Changes in uLB and cLB for an increase in environment parameters
For the macro model, we are interested in the overall numbers of L-monolingual
adults learning H , which are the aggregated result of individual decisions. We
denote the annual rate of L’s learning H by aLB . As for language transmission,
properties of aLB can be derived from the utility maximization approach, see the
Appendix. According to Table 4, aLB decreases with an increase of C, increases
with an increase of XH , increases with an increase of S(H) and increases with
an increase of vH . We also consider learning of the minority language L by the
majority and construct aHB analogously to aLB .
3.2.6 Summary
The numbersNH ,NL andNB evolve due to family formation, language transmis-
sion within the family, language education and adult language learning. There-
fore, four quantities determine the dynamics in the mathematical model. For the
mathematical model this translates into four quantities determining the dynamics:
• ψF : fraction of F -type families,
• QR(F ): fraction of F -type families raising their children with repertoire R,
• sR1,R2 : fraction of children entering school with R1 and leaving it with R2,
• al,B : rate at which l-monolingual adults become bilingual.
Note, qR, sR1,R2 and al,B can also be interpreted as probabilities: qR(F ) represents
the probability that a child growing up in an F -type family develops language
repertoire R.
3.3 General Model Formulation
Let us now combine all the pieces to built a general language dynamics model.
We start with family formation and language transmission. Given the distribution
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of language repertoires (X) in one generation and the relevant environmental pa-
rameters (the status indicator S = S(L) and the linguistic concentration C), the
fraction of the next generation equipped with the language repertoire R is given
by ∑
F
QR(F ;C, S,X) · ψ(F ;C,X). (3.33)
In the following let t be time measured in years. N(t) is the overall population
size at time t. NH(t), NL(t) and NB(t) denote the sizes of the language reper-
toire groups. The linguistic composition at time t is X(t) = (XH(t), XL(t)) =
(NH(t), NL(t))/N(t). With λ we denote the annual birth rate and µ denotes the
annual death rate. We assume that birth and death rates are the same for all lan-
guage repertoire groups. However, the model could easily be adjusted for differing
death and birth rates for the different language repertoire groups and family types.
Omitting mobility, language education and adult language learning for the mo-
ment, the dynamics of the basic model can be described by the following three
differential equations:
N˙R(t) = −µNR(t) + λN(t)
∑
F
QR(F ;C, S,X(t))ψ(F ;C,X(t)), (3.34)
R = H,L,B. The first summand represents the number of people with language
repertoire R dying at time t. The second summand represents all the children
raised with language repertoire R at time t. The overall population size changes
according to N˙(t) = (λ − µ)N(t). Note, to fully describe the dynamic system
N˙(t), N˙H(t) and N˙L(t) are sufficient, since NB = N − NH − NL. For better
readability we introduce
fR(t) :=
∑
F
QR(F ;C, S,X(t))ψ(F ;C,X(t)), R = H,L,B. (3.35)
Next, we extend the basic model step-by-step, including schooling, adult language
learning and migration.
Formal education. Recall, we assumed above that sH,L, sB,L, sL,L = 0. What is
considered is the learning of an additional language (L → B and H → B), loss
of the minority language due to exclusive schooling in H (B → H) as well as
a switch to the majority language (L → H). The basic model with education is
described by
N˙H(t) = −µNH(t) + λN(t)
(
(1− sH,B)fH(t) + sB,HfB(t) + sL,HfL(t)
)
,
(3.36)
N˙L(t) = −µNL(t) + λN(t)(1− sL,B − sL,H)fL(t). (3.37)
To simplify notation even further we introduce
gH(t) := (1− sH,B)fH(t) + sB,HfB(t) + sL,HfL(t), (3.38)
gL(t) := (1− sL,B − sL,H)fL(t). (3.39)
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Adult language learning. We only consider acquisition of an additional lan-
guage, i.e. the transition from monolingualism to bilingualsm (aH,B and aL,B).
Using the notation introduced in (3.38)-(3.39) and writing aL,B(t) for aR,B(C, S,X(t)),
we obtain the basic model with schooling and adult language learning:
N˙R(t) = −
[
µ+ (1− µ)aR,B(t)
]
NR(t) + λN(t)gR(t). (3.40)
Mobility. In most of the language competition models reviewed above the popu-
lation is constant in the sense that no new individuals enter the population (except
the ones born within the population) and that individuals do not leave the territory.
However, we explicitly model an external inflow of new individuals. We focus on
the migration of people with a heritage language that differs from the dominant
language of the host country H . The absolute number of people equipped with
language repertoire R migrating to the population at time t is denoted byMR(t).
The total number of migrants at time t is given by M(t) := MH(t) +ML(t) +
MB(t). Note, in principle MR(t) could be negative, which would indicate net
emigration of R’s. In the general case we get N˙(t) = (λ − µ)N(t) +M(t) and
hence, R = H,L,
N˙R(t) = −
[
µ+ (1− µ)aR,B(t)
]
NR(t) + λN(t)gR(t) + MR(t). (3.41)
Additionally, we define mR(t) = MR(t)/M(t), the share of R mobility. In the
following paragraphs, we consider two special cases for migration. In the first
case, we assume migration to be constant over time, i.e. every year the same ab-
solute number of migrants enter the population (e.g. 100,000 migrants per year).
In the second case, migration is constant relative to the population size. If e.g.
the government allows for an annual migration of 2% of the total population size,
then migration is constant relative to the population size.
Special case 1 (Constant absolute migration flow). MR(t) =MR is constant.
Special case 2 (Constant relative migration flow). M(t)/N(t) =: ν is constant as
well as the fractionsMR(t)/N(t) =: νR.
3.4 Specific Functional Forms
To perform numerical analysis and simulations of the model, we consider some
functional expressions for qR(F ;S,X) and aR,B(C, S,X). For intergenerational
language transmission, we use the functional expressions proposed in Templin
et al. (2016). For non-negative parameters 0 < β < δ and ε + γ < ζ < 1
consider the functions
qH(HB;S,X) := max {0, ζ(1− S)− βSXL} ,
qH(BB;S,X) := max {0, ε(1− S) + γ(1− S)XH − δSXL} ,
qL(LB;S,X) := max {0, ζS − β(1− S)XH} ,
qL(BB;S,X) := max {0, εS + γSXL − δ(1− S)XH} .
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These functions are constructed in such a way that they satisfy properties P1-P3
and if XH is sufficiently high and S is sufficiently low, then bilingual (BB) and
even mixed couples (LB) do not raise their children as L-monoglots. The param-
eters β, γ, δ, ε and ζ regulate the effects of the relative status of both languages
and the sizes of the language repertoire groups on parents’ decisions. If ε and ζ
increase, then the effect of the status of a language for it’s transmission increases.
In contrast, if β and δ increase, then negative effect of the status ofH , resp. L, on
the transition of L, resp. H , becomes stronger.
Next, we provide specifications for the functions al,B(S,C;X), l = H,L, that
satisfy the conditions outlined above. Let θ and φ be parameters between 0 and
1. Support for the acquisition of H and L for monolingual speakers of the other
language is modeled by the parameters vH and vL. We set
a˜L,B := max
{
0, θ(1− S)XH − φ(1− vH)
}
,
a˜H,B := max
{
0, θSXL − φ(1− vL)
}
.
For maximal support for the acquisition of the local languageH for L-monoglots,
i.e. νH = 1, the function a˜L,B is strictly decreasing in S andXH . This reflects that
the higher the socio-economic and communicational incentives associated withH
as well as the exposure to H , the more L-monolinguals learn H . If no support is
made available, then S(H) = 1 − S and XH have to be high enough such that
L-monoglots acquire H . Since linguistic concentration hinders learning of the
other language, we set al,B = (1 − C)a˜l,B, l = H,L. Hence, given maximal
concentration/segregation, no monolingual individuals learn the other language.
3.5 Steady States
In this section we investigate steady states of the linguistic compositionX . Steady
states are denoted by X̂H , X̂L and X̂B. We only consider the special cases with
constant absolute and constant relative migration flow and distinguish two cases
concerning the birth and death rate: λ ≥ µ and λ < µ. We assume that H
remains the dominant language, i.e. S = S(L) < 1/2 and sL,B > 0, and that
some migrants do not speak H sufficiently to count as bilinguals, i.e. ML > 0.
Therefore, we can exclude steady states with only L-monolinguals (X̂L = 1)
and steady states with a fully linguistically segregated population (X̂H , X̂L > 0
and X̂B = 0). Consequently, there are only two relevant types of steady states
left: monolingual ones with only speakers of H (X̂H = 1) and steady states with
bilinguals.
Case 1a: λ ≥ µ withM ≡ const. If λ ≥ µ, then the population size N with
N˙ = (λ − µ)N + M is always increasing. Over time, the population size N
becomes very large compared toM . Hence, over time,M is negligible and so are
the incoming monolingual speakers of the minority language L. Therefore, the
fraction of monolingual speakers of L will tend to zero (X̂L = 0). Depending on
linguistic concentration C and the model parameters governing language trans-
mission, there can be a stable monolingual equilibrium (X̂H = 1) or bilingual
steady states (X̂H , X̂B > 0).
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Case 1b: λ ≥ µ withM ≡ νN . The story is different for constant relative migra-
tion. In that case, the number of migrants increases with the population size. We
have N˙ = (λ−µ+ν)N . Therefore, every year a relevant number of speakers of L
enter the population, implying that X̂L > 0. Depending on the parameter constel-
lation, two types of steady states are possible. The most likely one is a steady state
with monolinguals of both languages and bilinguals. But if concentration is very
high and if the identity aspect is valued much more than the instrumental value of
a language, then it is possible L-speaking parents always transmit this language to
their children. As a consequence, the L-monolingual and the bilingual population
increases faster than the H-monolingual population and we have a steady state
with X̂L, X̂B > 0 and X̂H = 0.
Case 2a: λ < µ withM ≡ const. In this case the total population size N con-
verges to a steady state N̂ = M/(µ − λ). As for the linguistic composition, we
have X̂L > 0, since every year a relevant number of speakers of L enter the pop-
ulation. As in case 1b, there are two possible types of steady states, depending on
the parameter constellation. If speakers of L always transmit language L to their
children, then not only will the fraction of monolingual H-speakers tend to zero,
but the monolingual H-speaking population will die out over time, due to λ < µ.
Case 2b: λ < µ withM ≡ νN . For case 2b we have to distinguish between three
sub-cases. First, if ν < µ − λ, then the population size is always decreasing and
the population will die out in the long run. For ν = µ − λ the population size
is constant, since migration compensates for the low birth rate. Steady states for
the linguistic composition are as in case 1b. For ν > µ − λ the population size
increases, and steady states occur again as in case 1b.
3.6 Numerical Example
For our empirical example, we consider Spanish (L) and English (H) in the United
States. Being spoken by about 35 million people, Spanish is by far the largest
minority language in the US. It owes its vitality and spread to a large extend to
the continuous influx of new people from Spanish speaking countries, cf. Carreira
(2013). In this section, we do not provide an in-depth socio-linguistic analysis of
Spanish vitality in the US, but use rough parameter estimates to illustrate and test
the application of the model presented above.
Every ten years, starting in 1890, the US Census collects information on mother
tongue, language skills and use. These data are not directly comparable, since
questions asked and wording changed over time. From 1980 onward, the Cen-
sus asked the same three questions regarding language every ten years. First, the
Census asks whether a language other than English is spoken at home. Following
a positive answer to the first question, the Census inquires about what language
besides English is spoken at home and how well the person speaks English (‘very
well’, ‘well’, ‘not well’ or ‘not at all’). Since we limit our model to two languages,
we only take into account those people with English as the sole home language and
those who (also) speak Spanish at home. We count a Spanish-speaking person as
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bilingual, if the person indicates to speak English ‘very well’. All other responses
are categorized as Spanish monolinguals. Unfortunately, there is no information
on the Spanish language skills of those who only spoke English at home. There-
fore, we assume that these people do not speak Spanish ‘very well’ and count
them as English monolinguals. Moreover, we do not differentiate between differ-
ent groups of Spanish-speakers, e.g. by country of origin (of ancestors). These
definitions of English monolinguals, Spanish monolinguals and English-Spanish
bilinguals yield the numbers in Table 5.
year 1980 1990 2000 2010
N 210.247 230.446 262.375 285.797
NH 187.187 198.601 215.424 228.700
NL 5.372 8.309 13.700 16.209
NB 5.724 9.037 14.300 19.259
Table 5: Estimated linguistic compositon in the US (1980-2010).
Estimated total numbers of English monolinguals (NH), Spanish mono-
linguals (NL) and bilinguals (NB) in million. Sources: U.S. Census
(1990), Shin & Bruno (2003), Ortman & Shin (2011).
Using detailed information on the number of Spanish-speakers at the county level
(Census 2010), we estimate linguistic concentration to beC = 0.27. From 1980 to
2010, the birth rate declined from almost 16 births per 1000 people to 13 births per
1000 people. The model could be adapted to account for shrinking birth rates (use
λ(t) instead of a constant λ). However, we use a static birth rate from 1995, the
middle of our 30 year time interval. We set λ = 0.015. Despite some fluctuations,
the death rate was more stable over the years. We set µ = 0.0087. Migration
numbers also fluctuated over time. In the 1980s, about 5.6 million Hispanics
migrated to the US, in the 1990s about 8.1 million and in the 2000s about 6.5
million.21 For the model, we take the average of these three figures and assume
constant annual migration numbers ofM = 0.674million people. Only a minority
of Hispanic migrants speak English “very well” when migrating to the US, see
e.g. Espenshade & Fu (1997). We set mB = 0.07 (7% of Hispanic migrants are
bilingual).
Minority languages in the US are often lost within three generations. The first
generation learns some English but speaks the minority language at home, the
second generation is bilingual but tends to prefer English and the third generation
has little if any competences in the minority language. The dominance of English
21Cf. http://www.pewhispanic.org/2017/09/18/facts-on-u-s-latinos/#hispanic-pop
It is important to note that since 2007 migration especially from Mexico has slowed down signifi-
cantly.
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in education and the economy are two major reasons for this dynamic. Studies
also show that the shift to English occurs at a slower pace among Hispanics than
among other migrant groups, and that Spanish retention is strongest among Mex-
ican Americans, see e.g. Tran (2010). Estimating the extend of language loss
that is due to schooling and growing up in an English dominated environment –
parameters sL,B , sL,H and sB,H in the model– is difficult. For precise estimates,
detailed quantitative data, like the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study
(CILS), c.f. Portes & Rumbaut (2012), have to be analyzed. This is beyond the
scope of this essay. Instead, we use a few general figures drawn from the afore-
mentioned study. For 96% of children of Mexican descent (second generation),
Spanish was the main language spoken at home, see Rumbaut et al. (2002). For
other Latin Americans this figure is 85%. As young adults, about 63% of Mexican
Americans in the study reported to speak Spanish very well, and only 44% of other
Latin Americans. Weighting these numbers by the sizes of the respective popula-
tions, we set sL,B = 0.61 and sL,H = 0.38. To estimate sB,H , we use data on third
generation Hispanics. According to Center (2002), only 22% of third and higher
generation Hispanics report to be bilingual. With 54% of second generation His-
panics being Spanish dominant or bilingual, we set sB,H = 1−0.22/0.54 = 0.59.
Last, we turn to sH,B , that is acquisition of Spanish by monolingual speakers of
English. Spanish is the most popular second language taught in US schools. Ac-
cording to Furman et al. (2007), in 2002 about 4.5% of all students in higher
education were enrolled in Spanish language courses. Considering a 5:1 ratio of
introductory to advanced classes, we set sH,B = 0.045/5 = 0.009.
Finally, we estimate the relative status of Spanish. Despite not having a de jure
official national language, English is the de facto official language in US gov-
ernment and administration. In some states, governments provide information
and public services in Spanish as well, e.g. in New Mexico, Texas and Califor-
nia.22 Hence, in the US as a whole, the official status of L is very low. We set
SOF (L) = 0.1. Moreover, monolingual speakers of Spanish (mostly migrants)
but also bilinguals earn, on average, less than their English monolingual counter-
parts and migrants have, on average, a lower educational level, see e.g. Center
(2002). We estimate SSE = 0.4 and, weighting both dimensions equally, obtain
an estimate S(L) = 0.25. For intergenerational language transmission, i.e. for the
functions QLR(F ), we use the parameters ζ = 0.2, ε = 0.1, β = 0.8, δ = 0.9,
and γ = 0.05. In contrast to all other model parameters, these five parameters
are not estimated from empirical data. Their values are chosen in such a way that
empirical data are matched well by the projections. A change in these parameters
changes the projections produced by the model. For the present case, though, such
changes are minor. If we consider a significantly different set of parameters, say
ζ = 0.9, ε = 0.4, β = 0.2, δ = 0.5, and γ = 0.3, then our projections are not
as accurate as for the original set of parameters. But the difference between both
projections is so small that it could barely be seen in plots like the ones presented
below.
22For the empirical analysis we neglect the special case of Puerto Rico, where Spanish is an
official language spoken by the majority of the population.
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Based on these rough parameter estimates, we ran the model for 1980 to 2030. The
model projections are displayed in Figures 10 and 11. The projection in Figure
10 captures the observed population dynamics quite well, despite our use of static
birth, death and migration rates. Figure 11 depicts the evolution of the linguistic
composition. The projections produced by the model are close to the empirically
observed data, while slightly underestimating the number of bilinguals within the
population. If the current trend continues, then by 2030 around 84.8% of the US
population with English as the sole home language or with English and Spanish as
home languages is English monolingual, 6.5% is Spanish monolingual and 8.7%
is bilingual. We used rough estimates from different data sources and made some
simplifying assumptions to generate these numbers. For a more sophisticated
application of the model, more accurate data is needed. Moreover, the model
should be adapted to account for trends in birth and death rate developments as
well as migration patterns and illegal migrants.
Figure 10: Projection of the linguistic composition of the US (1980-2030)- Abso-
lute.
Numbers of English monolinguals (NH), Spanish monolinguals (NL) and
bilinguals (NB) from 1980 to 2030. The lines represent the numbers de-
rived by the model; the red circles represent the empirical data listed in
Table 5.
3.7 Conclusion and Outlook
In this essay we developed and analyzed a language dynamics model for new
minorities that includes intergenerational language transmission, formal language
education and adult language learning. Speakers of the newcomer language L
enter a society with one (main) official language H , which is spoken by most so-
ciety members. To improve their socio-economic position within the host country,
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Figure 11: Projection of the linguistic composition of the US (1980-2030) - Rela-
tive.
Fractions of English monolinguals (NH), Spanish monolinguals (NL) and
bilinguals (NB) from 1980 to 2030. The lines represent the numbers de-
rived by the model; the red circles represent the empirical data listed in
Table 5.
some of the newcomers learn H . The model includes a parameter measuring lin-
guistic concentration. The more segregated both language groups are, the lower
the exposure to the other language and thus fewer people become bilingual. Inter-
generational language transmission and language education for the descendants of
newcomers prove more important for longer-term language dynamics than adult
language learning. Individuals form families and transmit one or all of their lan-
guages to their children. Instrumental and emotional motives, and economic costs
drive the decisions for language transmission. While the locally dominant lan-
guage usually promises better socio-economic opportunities for their children,
many newcomers want to transmit their heritage language to the next generation.
Especially if children live in a social environment dominated byH , then transmit-
ting the minority language might not be successful and after two or three genera-
tions the language is lost – a well known empirical observation in socio-linguistic
studies. Therefore, linguistic concentration supports the transmission of L, but
might hinder a proper acquisition of H .
Like Fernando et al. (2010) and others, we argued that a purely abstract status
parameter limits the empirical applicability of language dynamics models. At
the same time, we emphasized the role of factors related to the socio-economic
and the institutional status for individual language related decisions. Instead of
omitting the status from the model, we suggested a measurable status parameter
composed of the socio-economic status of the language repertoire groups and the
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institutional status, which is operationalized as the number of official domains the
languages can be used for. This yields an indicator of (1) the socio-economic
opportunities related to a language, (2) the usefulness of a language in commu-
nication with state authorities and (3) the socio-economic resources available to
members of a language repertoire group. Furthermore, the model accounts for
population dynamics. The models accuracy is improved through the use of birth,
death and migration rates obtained from empirical surveys.
We applied the model to Spanish and English language dynamics in the United
States. We set model parameters according to rough estimates from empirical
data. Census data on home language use and language skills from 1980 to 2010
inform our estimates on speaker numbers. Although a number of simplifying
assumptions were made, the model could reproduce the empirical data quite well.
We see this essay as a point of departure for future research on language dynam-
ics in societies with new linguistic minorities. To get closer to the complexity of
the processes at hand, the model can be extended and refined in several ways. In
the current version of the model we only consider one language minority, while
normally one can observe a variety of minority language groups. In the case of
multiple linguistic minorities the locally dominant languageH is not only a mean
of upward social mobility, but can also function as a vehicular language used
in communication between speakers of different minority languages. Moreover,
different levels of linguistic competences or actual language use (instead of profi-
ciency) or multiple age groups could be modeled.
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4 A Framework For
Dynamic Language Policy Evaluation
4.1 Introduction
In multilingual states or regions, public authorities are required to address and
manage the existing linguistic diversity. To some extent, language policies are
unavoidable, even in seemingly monolingual contexts: public authorities have to
communicate with the public in certain languages, at least one language has to
be used in public administration and only a limited number of languages can be
used on street signs and bank notes. Other important domains in which language
policies play a crucial role are public education and migration. Language policies
can determine the language(s) of instruction in (public) schools as well as foreign
languages offered to students. Acquisition of the official/state language(s) is of-
ten an essential part of integration programs and in many countries a certain level
of proficiency in the official/state language(s) is a prerequisite for the natural-
ization of immigrants. The latter two examples in particular show that language
policies are not just sometimes unavoidable, but that they can have significant
consequences for the people subject to the policies and for society as a whole.23
Moreover, language policies normally come with certain costs. For these rea-
sons, language policies should be selected and designed carefully. Their effects
on different socio-linguistic groups as well as their implementation costs have to
be considered. This requires evaluation: “Just like any other policy, language
policies can (and should) be evaluated” (Gazzola 2014, p. 1).
Before we take a closer look at language policy evaluation techniques, we should
clarify what we mean by the term language policy. In the literature, a variety
of definitions can be found. A lucid overview of different approaches to define
language policy is provided in Cassels Johnson (2013, chapter 1). Some authors
work with a narrow and top-down definition of the term, for example Kaplan and
Baldauf. They “portray language policy as a set of laws and regulations or rules
enacted by an authoritative body (like a government) as part of a language plan”
(Cassels Johnson 2013, p. 4). Other authors, especially those with a background
in (socio-)linguistics or sociology, argue for a wider conception of the term or
look at language policies from a different and often critical perspective. Bernhard
Spolsky, for example, also includes language practices of the speech communities
as well as language beliefs and ideologies in his definition. In this case, bottom-
up initiatives by grassroots movements are also seen as language policies. For
the present essay, we adopt a definition provided in Grin (1999) that is somewhat
close to the one used by Kaplan and Baldauf. There, language policy is defined
as “a systematic, rational, theory-based effort at the societal level to modify the
linguistic environment with a view to increasing aggregate welfare. It is typically
conducted by official bodies or their surrogates and aimed at part or all of the
23For example, “language policy in education affects the supply of linguistic skills available in
a given labor market, and it can influence workers’ transitional mobility decisions [...]” (Gazzola
& Wickström 2016, p. 3)
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population living under their jurisdiction” (18). For the current essay, we mainly
think of language policies that aim at improving the status of minority languages,
e.g. by granting their speakers access to public services in their first language, or
at minority language maintenance, e.g. by acquisition planning.
Language policy evaluation
As with any public policy, language policies come with potential advantages and
drawbacks. Consider, for example, a policy that allows citizens to access public
services in both the majority and a minority language instead of just in the major-
ity language. An obvious advantage would be that native speakers of the minority
language can access public services in their first language. Typical drawbacks
are the costs associated with the policy: documents now have to be produced in
two languages and members of staff have to be trained to offer services in the
minority language as well. Another drawback might be that a second minority
language group feels even more disadvantaged after the introduction of the pol-
icy. To decide whether or not to implement a policy, or to choose between dif-
ferent policy options, potential advantages and drawbacks have to be assessed.
To this end, both have to be quantified. Economics can be particularly helpful
here, since it offers several tools and concepts to quantify, evaluate and compare
alternatives. For that reason, language policy evaluation has become an important
field within language economics. Despite the cultural nature of language, “the
closest relative of language economics is not cultural economics, but environmen-
tal economics” (Grin 2003, p. 29). One link to environmental economics stems
from the fact that advantages, and hence welfare, include non-material elements
such as identity-related language issues. Therefore, concepts and methods used in
(economic) language policy analysis are largely inspired by environmental eco-
nomics and, more generally, by classical policy analysis. Two policy assessment
methods used in language policy analysis are Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) and
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA). In CBA benefits are expressed in monetary
terms and compared to costs. In CEA benefits are not monetized but quantified
in an effectiveness measure, and the quotient of this measure and monetary costs
is considered. Both methods can take into account present as well as potential
future costs and benefits. Accounting for the latter entails estimating future costs
and benefits. Considering language policies, this task is especially delicate, since
the number of their beneficiaries often changes as a result of current trends and of
the policies themselves. So if costs and benefits of a policy depend on the number
of beneficiaries, then they can change dramatically over time. Therefore, we argue
that, for a more realistic evaluation of language policies, language dynamics have
to be taken into account. This can be achieved by combining traditional and well
established policy analysis tools such as CBA or CEA with language dynamics
models, which are discussed in the following subsection.
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Language competition models
Language competition models are mathematical models designed to analyze the
evolution of interacting languages. In this essay, our focus is models that are con-
cerned with the evolution of the number and the distribution of speakers of two
or more languages within a given territory, and hence with the number of poten-
tial beneficiaries of a language policy. Languages compete for speakers in the
sense that one language often gains speakers at the expense of another. In the
literature, we find a variety of models. Most of them are inspired by observa-
tions and models from biology, (statistical) physics and economics. This reflects
the observation that language competition shares several features with the inter-
action of biological species24 or with complex systems of interacting particles.25
Regarding economics, language competition can be theorized as the aggregated
result of individual language-related decisions of utility maximizing agents within
a given linguistic environment. Existing models are deterministic or probabilis-
tic; macroscopic and based on differential equations or microscopic and based on
computer simulations; consider only monolinguals of two languages or consider
multiple languages and bilinguals; neglect the geographical distribution of speak-
ers or explicitly describe the geographical diffusion of languages. The existing
models yield insights into the dynamics of language evolution, change and de-
cline. Moreover, several models, if well calibrated, can simulate and reproduce
observed empirical data.
We outline some relevant models in greater detail in section 4.2. For overviews
on various modeling approaches see Castellano et al. (2009), Gong et al. (2014)
and John (2016).
Combining language competition models and policy evaluation
Right from the beginning, the development of language competition models was
accompanied by the hope that these models “may be useful in the design and eval-
uation of language-preservation programs” (Abrams & Strogatz 2003, p. 900).
Some scholars even explicitly model state intervention that aim to promote mi-
nority language maintenance, see e.g. Minett & Wang (2008) and Templin et al.
(2016). Such interventions normally boil down to increasing the prestige or sta-
tus – a model parameter, i.e. a single number – of the minority language, either
directly, as in Minett & Wang (2008), or through unspecific investments in status
planning, as in Templin et al. (2016). Therefore, policy recommendations and
results derived from language competition models often remain quite general and
24“[L]anguage competition resembles the competing relation in ecology, where the rise or de-
cline of the population size of a species is influenced by the growth rate of the competing species.
This competing relation exists not only between predators and preys, but is common among vari-
ous species in the biological world” (Zhang & Gong 2013, p. 9699).
25“In social phenomena, the basic constituents are not particles but humans, and every individ-
ual interacts with a limited number of peers, usually negligible compared to the total number of
people in the system” (Castellano et al. 2009, p. 592).
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abstract. One typical result that can be found in different versions is the follow-
ing: if the status of the minority language is above a certain threshold, then the
minority language can survive. Even if a numerical value for this threshold is pro-
vided, the question remains what this value actually means in practice. To be used
for policy evaluation that goes beyond general and abstract statements, language
competition models have to be built on parameters with a clear socio-linguistic
meaning. Moreover, the parameters should be measurable in the field. This was
already pointed out by Fernando et al. (2010) and is discussed section 4.2.
In the present essay we propose a simple macroscopic model that builds on five
pivotal factors influencing the language dynamics and that only uses parameters
obtainable from empirical data. The five factors taken into account here are fam-
ily formation, intergenerational language transmission, language education, adult
language learning and migration. They can also be seen as five central elements
of the linguistic environment. The model describes how changes in such factors,
i.e. changes in the linguistic environment, affect the linguistic composition of the
society, i.e. the number of speakers of the different languages, over time. Since
changes in the factors can be brought about by language policies, the model al-
lows us to investigate the future effects of policies on linguistic composition. This
enables us not just to evaluate the current costs and benefits of a certain policy
measure, but also its future costs and benefits. Taking into account current as well
as future costs and benefits is the foundation of what we call dynamic cost-benefit
analysis. In a dynamic cost-benefit analysis, a policy yields a potential efficiency
gain if the sum of today’s benefits and (discounted) future benefits exceed the
sum of today’s costs and (discounted) future costs. Such a dynamic cost-benefit
approach was already taken in Templin et al. (2016), but the policy (investing
money in status planning) remained as abstract as the status parameter itself. The
novelty here is that policies can be evaluated in a more realistic fashion.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. In section 4.2, the language com-
petition model is motivated and described. Section 4.3 illustrates the application
of the model to a real case scenario. For this purpose we consider the case of
Spanish and Basque in the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain. In sec-
tion 4.4, we outline how the language competition model can be used to obtain a
dynamic policy evaluation framework. In section 4.5, we provide an outlook on
future research, with a particular focus on useful extensions of the basic language
competition model, and draw some conclusions.
4.2 The language competition model
In this section, the language competition model is outlined. The model presented
here stands in line with a language competition modeling tradition that started
with Abrams & Strogatz (2003) and Wickström (2005). In Abrams & Strogatz
(2003), two languages compete for monolingual speakers. The higher the number
of speakers of a language and the higher its status, the more people it attracts.
The evolution of the number of speakers is then described by a differential equa-
tion. In Wickström (2005), the language dynamics are mainly driven by family
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formation and intergenerational language transmission. First, adult individuals
form couples. Considering monolinguals of both languages as well as bilinguals,
six (linguistic) types of couples are possible. The distribution of couple types is
derived from the distribution of language repertoires within the society. Second,
parents decide which of their languages to transmit to their children. This deci-
sion is based on two rationales: they gain utility from transmitting languages with
a wide communicational range as well as from the transmission of languages to
which they are emotionally attached. In case of speakers of a small minority lan-
guage, there is a trade-off between the rather small communicational value of that
language and the emotional attachment to it. Moreover, it is theorized that the
higher the status of the language, the higher the utility parents get from transmit-
ting it. Conceptualized as utility-maximizing actors, parents choose the language
repertoire that yields the highest utility. In the literature, extensions of both of
those models can be found. In Minett & Wang (2008), for example, the authors
present an extended version of the Abrams/Strogatz model that also includes bilin-
gual speakers. Moreover, their model features horizontal language transmission.
During their lifetime, monolingual adults can learn a second language and there-
fore become bilingual. As with the status variable, the incentive to learn a second
language increases with the number of speakers of that language. An extension of
the Wickström model is provided in Templin et al. (2016). There, the status of the
minority language is a model variable that decreases over time. This decrease can
be counteracted by investments in status planning measures by the state. For the
current essay, we extend the model proposed in Wickström (2005). As in Minett
& Wang (2008), we take into account bilingual speakers and horizontal language
transmission. Moreover, we add language education in schools and migration.
As noted in the introduction, the majority of language competition models are in-
spired by models from physics, biology and economics. Most models feature one
or more numerical parameters that often lack an explicit socio-linguistic meaning.
Such parameters can have a considerable effect on the outcome of the model and
are mostly obtained by fitting the model to existing data on the evolution of the
linguistic composition of a given society. If language competition models are sup-
posed to be used for policy analysis purposes, then a policy is normally modeled
as a change of a certain, or multiple, parameters. The problem then is that a change
in a parameter with no actual socio-linguistic meaning does not correspond to any
actual policy. In some cases, vague and broad socio-linguistic interpretations of
model parameters are offered, but the questions remains how actual policies can be
quantified as changes in a certain model parameter. A frequently used parameter
is the status or prestige of a language. Although this parameter corresponds to a
socio-linguistic concept, it necessarily fails to map the complexity of this concept,
since it is boiled down to a single number in the models. As the authors in Fer-
nando et al. (2010) rightfully note: “what were the characteristics of a language
having a prestige value, say 1.2, and what was the sociocultural condition corre-
sponding to the difference between two languages having prestige values, say 1.2
and 1.3, respectively” (p. 50). As a consequence, they offer a model without a
status parameter but with parameters that are – at least theoretically – measurable
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in the field. Models are therefore often bound to general relations of the form: if
A increases, then B increases. A noteworthy exception is the approach taken in
Sabourin & Bélanger (2015) and, more recently, in Houle & Corbeil (2017). With-
out any direct reference to the existing literature on language competition model-
ing, but informed by quantitative and qualitative socio-linguistic research, as well
as literature on demolinguistic projections, Sabourin & Bélanger (2015) propose
a microsimulation model to analyze language dynamics in Canada, purely based
on available empirical information. Taking into account mother tongue and home
language, the authors consider intergenerational language shift (mothers transmit-
ting her own mother tongue) and intragenerational language shift (language used
at home differs from mother tongue). Using age and group specific birth and death
rates, a division of Canada in 13 regions and detailed (linguistic) information on
migrants, the authors analyze different possible future scenarios for the linguistic
composition of Canada (until the year 2046). The analysis of multiple future sce-
narios shall inform policy makers since, if adequately parameterized, the model
can “realise virtual social experiments” (72). While rightfully emphasizing the
role of migration, education is not included in the model directly, although edu-
cation “tends to be the single most important channel of government intervention
in the sphere of language” (Grin 2003, p. 17). Moreover, they only consider the
mother for intergenerational language transmission instead of potentially mixed
families, as done in Wickström (2005) and elsewhere.
In this essay, we offer a modeling approach that brings us closer to a practicable
framework for dynamic policy evaluation. All model parameters are obtainable
from empirical socio-linguistic data, which are already available today in some
countries. As noted above, the model here comprises five factors that are crucial
to the language dynamics in any (modern) society: 1) couple/family formation,
2) intergenerational language transmission, 3) language acquisition in formal ed-
ucation, 4) language learning by adults, including migrants and 5) migration. In
contrast to Wickström (2005), language transmission is not modeled as a function
of the strength of the language groups in the society and of the (relative) status of
the minority language. Instead, it is assumed to be constant and shall be obtained
from empirical data. This approach yields some advantages, but also limitations,
in comparison to the original model. On the one hand, we can better simulate
the actual linguistic environment in a specific context or society. Substituting the
purely theoretical functional relations between model parameters and linguistic
behavior in society with empirically obtained data allows us to analyze case sce-
narios in a more realistic fashion. On the other hand, this approach limits the time
range of the model, since a constancy of parameters can only be assumed for lim-
ited time scales.26 Furthermore, the role played by socio-economic elements of
the linguistic environment is only indirectly captured by the current model, due to
26Appropriate time scales are an underestimated issue for many language dynamics models.
Sometimes, a constancy of certain parameters is assumed for a hundred years or even longer, e.g.
in Abrams & Strogatz (2003) and Minett & Wang (2008). In Wickström (2005), time scales are
not even specified, so it remains unclear if the graphs presented there show time spans of 10, 100
or 1000 years. For the purpose of this essay, we restrict ourselves to time spans of at most 30 to
50 years.
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the omission of the status parameter. In view of the problems with status-like pa-
rameters described above, we think that for our purposes the advantages outweigh
the disadvantages.
4.2.1 Setting and Notation
We consider states or regions with two languages, a high status majority language
H and lower status minority language L. Smaller languages like the ones of re-
cent foreign migrants are omitted here. We group individuals according to their
language repertoires. Three types of individuals are defined: monolinguals of the
dominant language H , monolinguals of the minority language L and bilinguals.
Treating an individual as a monolingual in the model does not imply that the indi-
vidual only speaks one single language. It only means that the individual does not
speak the other language well enough to count as a bilingual. Following Fernando
et al. (2010, p. 53) we roughly define bilingualism as “the ability to function con-
fidently in two languages, that is, the ability to have communicative competence
in two languages”. Hence, to be treated as a bilingual in the model, an individual
has to have sufficient passive and active skills in both languages. When applying
the model to a real life scenario, we often rely on self reported data. Accord-
ingly, if people report to understand and speak both languages, they are taken as
bilinguals. See the Basque example discussed below.
Throughout the essay, we use the following notation. XH , XL and XB denote
the proportion of H-monoglots, L-monoglots and bilinguals within the society.
The two-dimensional vector X := (XH , XL) fully describes the linguistic com-
position of the society, since XB = 1 − XH − XL. Due to external migration,
the population size can change over time. Therefore, we also work with absolute
numbers. Let NH be the total number of H-monoglots, NL be the number of L-
monoglots and NB be the number of bilinguals. The total population size equals
N := NH+NL+NB. Note thatNH = N ·XH ,NL = N ·XL andNB = N ·XB.
Last, we introduce the three dimensional vector N = (NH , NL, NB).
4.2.2 Building the model
The language competition model describes in mathematical terms how NH , NL
and NB, i.e. the linguistic composition of the population, change over time as
a result of the five processes mentioned above. We measure time t in years.
N (t) is the overall population size at time t, while NR(t) is the overall number
of people having language repertoire R, R = H,L,B. Furthermore, the vector
X(t) = (XH(t), XL(t)) := (NH(t), NL(t))/N describes the relative linguistic
composition of the population at time t (relative instead of absolute numbers).
We build up the model step by step. We start with a pure population model and
add all of the five processes separately. By λ we denote the annual birth rate and
by µ the annual death rate. It is assumed that birth and death rates are the same
for all language repertoire groups. The model could easily be adjusted to cases
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of differing death and birth rates for the different language repertoire groups and
family types (just substitute µ by µR and λ by λR in (4.47)). Omitting mobility
for the moment, the overall population size changes according to N˙ (t) = (λ −
µ)N (t). Note, to fully describe the dynamic system N˙(t), N˙H(t) and N˙L(t) are
sufficient, since NB = N − NH − NL. Next, we add family formation and
intergenerational language transmission to the basic population model.
Family formation
There are six possible couple/family types F : HH (two monolingual speakers of
languageH),HB (a monolingual speaker ofH and a bilingual speaker), LL, LB,
BB andHL. Family formation is conceptualized as the result of a random search
and mating process. It is assumed that both adults are able to communicate in a
common language. Hence, families of type HL are excluded. The distribution of
family types depends on the linguistic composition of the society and on the ge-
ographical concentration of speakers of the minority language, see (4.42)-(4.46).
Linguistic concentration is measured by the index of isolation, which measures
the percentage of bilinguals in the geographical area of an average bilingual, see
Morrill (2016). No linguistic concentration is represented by C = 0 and full
concentration by C = 1. By ψ(F ;C,X) we denote the proportion of families of
type F , given concentration C and the relative linguistic composition of the whole
population X . The family formation process yields the following distribution of
family types ψ:27
ψ(HH;C,X) =
(
C + (1− C)XH
)
XH + (1− C)XHXL, (4.42)
ψ(HB;C,X) = 2(1− C)XHXB, (4.43)
ψ(LL;C,X) =
(
1 + C
XH
1−XH
)
X2L + (1− C)XHXL, (4.44)
ψ(LB;C,X) = 2
(
1 + C
XH
1−XH
)
XLXB, (4.45)
ψ(BB;C,X) =
(
1 + C
XH
1−XH
)
X2B. (4.46)
Language transmission
It is assumed that families can transmit all the languages spoken by the parents
to their children. In contrast, languages not spoken by the parents can not be
transmitted in the family context. Hence, children growing up in HH or LL
families will always be raised as H or L monolinguals. We denote the fraction
of F -type families raising their children with language repertoire R by qR(F ),
R = H,L,B and F = HH,LL,HB,LB,BB. As noted before, we assume that
the language transmission values qR(F ) are more or less constant over short- and
medium-term periods of time and can be obtained from empirical data.
27See the Appendix for a justification of (4.42)-(4.46). ForC = 0, we obtain the same formulas
as Wickström (2005).
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The product qR(F ) · ψ(F ;C,X(t)) yields the fraction of children coming from
families of type F who are raised with language repertoire R. The basic popula-
tion dynamics combined with family formation and language transmission can be
described by the following three differential equations:
N˙R(t) = −µNR(t) + λN (t)
∑
F
qR(F )ψ(F ;C,X(t)), (4.47)
R = H,L,B, where ψ(F ;C,X) is given by (4.42)-(4.46). The first summand
represents the number of people with language repertoire R dying at time t. The
second summand represents all the children raised with language repertoire R at
time t.
Language learning in schools and by adults
Language learning at school is represented by parameters sR1,R2 , R1, R2 equal to
H,L,B. The parameter sR1,R2 denotes the fraction of children entering school
with language repertoire R1 and leave school with repertoire R2. It is assumed
that children do not unlearn the majority language H . Furthermore, we assume
that due to its dominance all children can speak languageH by the end of school.
Both assumptions make the model easier. Given appropriate empirical data, the
model can also capture unlearning ofH or failing acquisition ofH by speakers of
the minority language. For the simplified version considered here, we only have
to specify sH,B , sL,B and sB,H . We use the notation
fR(X) := (1− sR,B)
∑
F
qR(F )ψ(F ;C,X) + sB,R
∑
F
qB(F )ψ(F ;C,X),
(4.48)
R = H,L. This notation shall help to improve readability. Adult language learn-
ing is represented by the parameters aH,B (H-monolinguals learning L and be-
coming bilingual). Since it is assumed that all adults speak the dominant language
H , we do not consider learning of H by L monolinguals. If there is a relevant
number of adult L monolinguals in the population, we would have to introduce a
second parameter aL,B (L-monolinguals learningH). These parameters shall also
be obtained from empirical data.
The model with family formation, language transmission, schooling and adult
language learning is described by
N˙R(t) = −
[
µ+ (1− µ)aR,B
]
NR(t) + λN (t)fR(X(t)). (4.49)
Migration
The absolute number of people equipped with language repertoire R migrating at
time t is denoted by MR(t). The total number of migrants is given byM(t) :=
MH(t) + ML(t) + MB(t). It should be noted that in principle MR(t) could be
negative, which would indicate net emigration of R’s. Including migration, the
overall population size N changes according to N˙ (t) = (λ − µ)N (t) +M(t).
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The final language competition model that includes all five processes is described
by the three differential equations
N˙R(t) = −
[
µ+ (1− µ)aR,B
]
NR(t) + λN (t)fR(X(t)) + MR(t), (4.50)
R = H,L,B. In the next paragraph, in which we apply the model to Basque and
Spanish in the Basque Autonomous Communities in Spain, we assume constant
relative external migration flow, that is, the number of migrants is a constant frac-
tion of the population size. In mathematical terms this reads asM/N ≡ const.
We denote this constant by ν.
4.3 Illustration of the model: the Basque Autonomous Com-
munities
In this section we take a look at the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC) to
illustrate how the model can be applied to a real case scenario. It should be noted
right away that we do not present an in-depth analysis of the socio-linguistic re-
ality of the BAC. For some of the model parameters, rather rough estimates are
used. The aim of this section is for the reader to get an idea about how available
data can be used to set up the model, and how the model can be used to produce
future projections or different scenarios for future developments. We have chosen
the BAC for a simple reason: it is one of the few regions of the world for which
a wide range of language-related data were collected over several decades and
are still collected today. Moreover, the BAC is a good example of a context in
which a traditional minority language (Basque/Euskera) is widespread, in which
the decline of the minority language could be decelerated and – partially – re-
versed successfully by language policies and which faced and still faces relevant
migration movements.
The Basque Country (Euskal Herria) – the historical territory where the Basque
language is spoken – comprises the BAC and Navarra in Spain and the Northern
Basque Country (Iparralde) in France. Around 73% of the total population of the
entire Basque Country live in the BAC, which is comprised of the three provinces
Alava, Biscay and Gipuzkoa. Spoken by approximately one third of the popu-
lation, Basque is a minority language within the BAC. The majority language is
Spanish (Castilian).28 On the territory of the BAC both languages have an official
status, i.e. citizens have the right to know and use both languages. Moreover, the
Spanish Constitution (1978) states that all Spanish citizens have a responsibility
to know Spanish, cf. Zalbide & Cenoz (2008). Consequently, there are almost
no Basque monolinguals in the BAC, since almost everybody can speak Spanish.
Hence, Basque speakers are normally bilinguals. Unlike some other minority lan-
guages, Basque is not a language predominantly spoken in the rural countryside.
Half of all Basque speakers live in cities.
28A few centuries ago, Basque was the majority language in all three parts of the Basque
Country. For a historical overview on the centuries long decline of Basque and its revitalization
since the 1960s see e.g. Trask (1997).
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4.3.1 Data and model parameters
Most of the data used in the following originate from the Sociolinguistic Surveys29
as well as from the 2001 Census. The Sociolinguistic Survey is a study conducted
every five years, starting in 1991. It provides a variety of data on language for
all three regions of the Basque Country. The survey covers inhabitants of the
Basque Country aged sixteen and above, i.e. about 2.5 million people. In 2006,
7200 people were surveyed by using a structured closed-ended questionnaire. In
2011, 7900 people were surveyed, 4200 in the BAC. From the Sociolinguistic
surveys we obtain data on the linguistic composition of the BAC for the years
1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016. The 2001 Census contains self-reported
data on citizen’s language knowledge, mother tongue and home language as well
as other relevant information. We use 2001 as a reference year, that is, model
parameters are estimated from data from around 2001. We have chosen 2001 for
two reasons. Firstly, to estimate all the different model parameters, various data
are needed. For most years within the time span 1991-2016, only some of the
relevant data are available. In contrast, most of parameters can be estimated from
studies from around 2001, and it is preferable to use data that all stem from one
point in time rather than using data collected over 20 years. Moreover, we assume
parameters to be constant over time. Since we do not only want to reproduce the
development of the linguistic composition between 1991-2016, but also want to
offer projections until 2040, it is reasonable to take data from a year close to the
mean of 1991 and 2016.
Linguistic composition
We start with the linguistic composition of the BAC. We restrict ourselves to (self-
reported) language competence in the two main languages, Spanish and Basque.
The Sociolinguistic Survey differentiates between full bilinguals, passive bilin-
guals and non-Basque speakers. Full bilinguals speak and understand both lan-
guages well. Passive bilinguals “understand Basque although they do not speak
it well” (Basque Government 2008, p. 17). In the current version of the model
we only differentiate between monolinguals and bilinguals. Therefore, we only
count full bilinguals as bilinguals, while passive bilinguals are counted as mono-
linguals. Moreover, we make the simplifying assumption that all non-Basque
speakers speak Spanish well, which is the case for the vast majority of them.30
Given this simplified classification in Bilinguals and Spanish monolinguals we
obtain the numbers shown in Table 6.
29Cf. Basque Government (2008), Basque Government (2013) and Gobierno Vasco et al.
(2016). Data from the first four Sociolinguistic Surveys are made available online with the
Language Indicator System of the Basque Country (EAS), see http://www1.euskadi.net/euskara_
adierazleak/indice.apl
30In future extensions of the model we will consider a wider range of language skills and more
than two languages. Although such extensions yield a more complicated and harder to handle
mathematical model, the basic idea of the current model, as well as of its application to real-life
cases, remain the same.
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Year 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
H 75.9% 72.3% 70.6% 69.9% 68.0% 66.1%
B 24.1% 27.7% 29.4% 30.1% 32.0% 33.9%
Table 6: Linguistic composition of the BAC population aged 16 and above from
1991 to 2016. H beeing Spanish monolinguals and B being bilinguals.
Based on self-reported data on language skills in the Sociolinguistic Sur-
veys. The BAC population aged 16 and above comprises about 1.8 million
people.
Population dynamics and migration
The BAC is facing a similar situation as other European states: the birth rate is rel-
atively low and the population is aging. Additionally, the BAC has a long history
of inward and outward migration. In 2001, according to the Census, 27% of the
BAC population were born outside the BAC. Many of them came from Navarra
or the rest of Spain. In recent years the proportion of migrants from outside of
Spain has increased dramatically, with many coming from south America. Dur-
ing the 1990s, the population size decreased, but since the beginning of the new
millennium, numbers have been increasing slightly again, cf. Figure 12.
Figure 12: Estimated population (constant birth, death and migration rate) plotted
against empirical population between 1990 and 2016.
Between 1991 and 2010 the annual birth rate increased from 7.7 births to 9.7
births per 1000 people, cf. Eustat (2014). Before 1990, the birth rate had been
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decreasing. For the purely illustrative purpose of this section, we assume a con-
stant birth rate. As in the remainder of this section, we use 2001 as our reference
year. In 2001 the birthrate was 8.5. Hence, we set λ to 0.0085. Due to the aging
population, the death rate also increased slightly. As for the birth rate, we feed the
model with the 2001 death rate. Hence, we set µ = 0.0088.
Within the 20 year period between 1991 and 2011 the net migration rate changed
significantly. During the 1990s, emigration outnumbered immigration, yielding a
negative rate (-2.3 per thousand in 1990). Since 2000 the rate has been positive.
The net migration rate reached its peak in 2007 (around 8 per thousand) and almost
reached zero again in 2012, cf. Eustat (2014). Again, we work with the 2001 rate
(ν = 0.0012), which is slightly bigger than the average net migration rate for the
20 year period.
Family formation and concentration
In the model, the distribution of the five family types depends on the linguistic
composition of the society in question, as well as on linguistic concentration. To
estimate linguistic concentration, we once again use data from the Sociolinguistic
Surveys that are made available online at the Language Indicator System of the
Basque Country (EAS). There we find data on the linguistic composition of each
of the 250 BAC municipalities. We use 2001 as a reference year.
To measure linguistic concentration we use the index of isolation. Given K mu-
nicipalities, this index is given by C =
∑K
k=1(NB,k ·NB,k)/(NB ·Nk), whereNB,k
is the number of bilinguals in municipality k, Nk is the number of inhabitants of
municipality k and NB is the total number of bilinguals. This index measures the
percentage of bilinguals in their own geographical area for the average bilingual
speaker. 1 − C, the index of exposure or interaction index, measures the extent
to which average bilinguals are exposed to Spanish monolinguals.31 For the BAC
we obtain C = 0.476 and hence medium linguistic concentration.
Language transmission
Data on language transmission are obtained from Gobierno Vasco (2008), a study
on the transmission of Basque in the BAC based on the 2001 Census. Children
and young people between the ages of 2 and 29, as well as their parents, are
surveyed. Only those children who still live with both of their parents are taken
into account. The Census contains information on language skills and the mother
tongue of children and their parents. It also contains information on language use
at home but, in accordance with the model, we only consider parents’ language
skills.
To set up the model, we have to specify qR(F ) – the proportion of all F -type
families that bring up their children with language repertoire R – for all family
types F and all language repertoires R. As was previously mentioned, we have
31For a detailed discussion of several concentration/segregation measures see e.g. Morrill
(2016).
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three language repertoires (L - monolingual Basque, H - monolingual Spanish
and B - bilinguals)32 and three relevant family types (HH , HB and BB). The
data presented in Table 7 was obtained from from (Gobierno Vasco 2008, p. 53).
R \F HH HB BB
L 1.7% 35.1% 88%
H 94.8% 34.8% 5.1%
B 3.1% 30.1% 6.9%
Table 7: Language transmission in the BAC based on data from the 2001 Census.
The table shows the mother tongue of the children based on their parents’
linguistic competences or language repertoires.
At first glance, some the numbers in Table 7 might be surprising. In the first col-
umn, we can see that 1.7% of allHH-type families, i.e. families with two Spanish
monolingual parents, raise their children (only) in Basque. Even more families
with one Spanish monolingual parent and one bilingual parent, namely 35.1%,
also raise their children (only) in Basque. This can partially be explained by our
definition of Spanish monolinguals. Among these Spanish monolinguals are sev-
eral people who reported to have a passive knowledge of Basque. They might also
have some active knowledge in Basque, but are not fully bilingual.33 For future
research, a finer categorization of language skills should be applied. Despite the
simple classification used here, empirical data are matched surprisingly well (see
below).
Schooling
In the BAC students have to go through 6+4 years of compulsory education. Ap-
proximately 50% of all students go to public schools, while the other 50% attend
private schools. With regard to languages, the theoretical goal of the Basque edu-
cation system is that all students should learn Spanish and Basque. To achieve this
goal, both languages are used either as the language of instruction or as a second
language. There are three basic school models.
Model A: Instruction in Spanish with Basque taught as a second language.
Model B: Instruction in both languages.
32For the linguistic composition of the adult population (aged 16 and above) we only consider
Spanish monolinguals and bilinguals. This is due to the assumption that at some point in their
life every inhabitant of the BAC learns to speak the dominant language, Spanish, sufficiently to
count as a bilingual. In case of the parents, we consider their language skills. For the children, we
consider their mother tongue. Thus, we also take into account Basque monolinguals, since parents
can communicate with their children only in Basque, so at a young age these children might be
truly Basque monolinguals.
33In Gobierno Vasco (2008) passive bilinguals are those who can speak Basque with difficulties
(“hablan en euskera con dificultad”). Full bilinguals can speak Basque well (“hablan bien en
euskera”).
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Model D: Instruction in Basque with Spanish taught as a second language.
Enrollment in each of the three models has dramatically changed over time. At
the beginning of the 1980s, almost 80% of pupils were enrolled in model A and
model X (no Basque at all) schools. In 2006 less than 25% of all students were
enrolled in model A schools, the rest being enrolled in model B and D schools.
A study of the 2004/2005 school year found that 95.7% of all students in model
B schools do not speak Basque at home, cf. ISEI-IVEI (2005). In model D this
percentage is 63.2%.
To estimate the education-related model parameters – i.e. sH,B , sL,B and sB,H
– we not only need data on enrollment, but also data on school attainment with
respect to language. Such data are provided in ISEI-IVEI (2005). In this study the
Basque proficiency of students from model B and D schools at the end of compul-
sory education was surveyed. The study investigated whether or not students had
reached a B2 level in Basque, using a written and an oral test. A pilot test showed
that even the best model A students did not achieve a B2 level in Basque. For that
reason, only model B and D schools were tested in the final study. Consequently,
we assume that no model A students – most often native speakers of Spanish –
leave school as bilinguals. Based on the written test, 32.6% of pupils from model
B schools and 68% of those from model D school reached level B2. When taking
oral test into account as well, the percentages are slightly lower. What is inter-
esting here are the results for language use at home. If Basque is not spoken at
home, 26.6% of model B students reach a B2 level. In model D schools this num-
ber is 47.5%. If Basque is spoken at home, the percentages are 47.5% in model
B schools and 74.1% in model D schools.Moreover, Basque is not used at home
by 95.7% of all model B students. In model D schools only 63.2% of all students
do not speak Basque at home. From these figures one can see that “[m]any of the
new bilinguals are Spanish-dominant bilinguals who are speakers of Basque as a
second language and have learned Basque at school” (Zalbide & Cenoz 2008, p.
7)
Taking the enrollment data from our reference year 2001 in the different models,34
and assuming that in model A schools we find no pupils who use Basque at home,
we obtain the following rough estimates: Around 20% of all pupils who do not
speak Basque at home (H-type children) leave school with a B2 level in Basque
(and could thus be counted as bilinguals→ sH,B ≈ 0.2). Equivalently, we obtain
sL,B = sB,B ≈ 0.76 and sL,H = sB,H ≈ 0.24.
Adult language learning
Estimating the rate at which adult Spanish monolinguals learn Basque (aH,B) is
difficult. To get a precise estimate we would have to evaluate longitudinal data
on adults’ language skills and language learning efforts. To our knowledge, such
data are not yet available. Therefore, we are currently only able to present very
rough estimates. As the aim of this section is to give the reader an idea on how
34Model A: ≈ 37%; model B: ≈ 10%; model D: ≈ 43%.
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the theoretical model can be applied to a real life scenario, such rough estimates
should be be sufficient. For an in-depth analysis of the language dynamics in the
BAC more accurate data are needed. Naturally, the rate aH,B has a strong impact
on the overall language dynamics. To illustrate that, consider a monolingual pop-
ulation with 1000 people. If every year 1% of the monolinguals learn a second
language, all other language dynamics aside, then after 20 years around 180 peo-
ple are bilingual. If, in contrast, every year 2% learn a second language, then after
20 years more than 330 people are already bilingual.
“Basque language teaching for adults is available through two very different routes
in the BAC, via Department of Education Official Language Schools or via the
euskaltegi (Basque language school) network under the aegis of HABE” (Gard-
ner 2002, Appendix). According to Gardner (2002), about 5000 people were
enrolled in Official Language Schools in 1999/2000 to learn Basque. During
the same year, more than 40000 people enrolled in an euskaltegi.35 Comparing
these numbers with the total number of Spanish monolinguals during that time
(about 1.26 million), we estimate that in this academic year around 3.5% of all
Spanish monolinguals took a Basque language course. We count B2 speakers,
and only consider people who reach the B2 level. If someone reaches C1 or
C2, then we could argue that he/she was already bilingual before. In Gobierno
Vasco (2003) we find that between 1993 and 2002 approximately 14.6% of the
euskaltegi students reached a B2 level. Therefore, as estimate for aH,B we take
aH,B = 0.146 · 45000/1260000 ≈ 0.005. That is, we estimate that every year
0.5% of all H-monolinguals become bilingual due to adult language learning.
4.3.2 Analysis and projections
After having specified all the model parameters we can now run the model to
(1) see whether the model outcome matches the actual data from our 20 year
period and to (2) produce projections for the future. For that purpose the model
was implemented in MATLAB, a widely used numerical computing environment
and programming language. For the numerical model, the point of departure is
the year 1991. All the model uses to calculate the projection are the linguistic
composition at that initial year and the above specified model parameters. As can
be seen in Figure 13, the projections match the empirical data remarkably well,
despite the often rough model parameter estimates. The projections furthermore
suggest that Basque will continue gaining speakers in the next 20 years. If the
trend continues, then by 2040 approximately 40% of the BAC population will be
bilingual.
It should be noted again that although the model starts from the initial 1991
linguistic composition and adequately projects the composition of the following
years (1996-2016), most of the model parameters were estimated from data from
35It is worth noting that enrollment numbers started decreasing at the end of the 1990s, espe-
cially for A1 and A2 classes in Basque, cf. Gobierno Vasco (2003). This can be correlated with
the increasing numbers of pupils in schools of model B and D.
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Figure 13: Language dynamics projections for the BAC compared to empirical
data.
Projections (solid lines) are based on composition data from 1991 as well
as the various estimations of model parameters for our reference year
2001. The circles show the actual fractions of Spanish monolinguals and
bilinguals for the years 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016.
around 2001. If parameters would have been estimated from 1991 data, then the
projections might not have been that accurate. Unfortunately, we are not able to
compare the projections for these two cases since not all of the relevant data are
available for 1991. Projections only differ if parameters change over time. So
what we can do instead is to examine how changes in model parameters affect the
projections produced by the model. This is illustrated in Table 8 and Figure 14.
In Table 8, we show how changes in a single parameter alter the distance between
projections produced by the model and the empirical data we have for the years
1991, 1995, 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016. We employ a simple quadratic distance
measure:
dist = 100 ·
√√√√ 2016∑
t=1991
(
XH(t)−XH,emp(t)
)2
,
whereXH(t) is the projected fraction of H-monolinguals at year t andXH,emp(t)
is the observed fraction. For the original set of parameters, the distance is 1.93.
As can be seen in Table 8, the parameters related to the majority language group
(sH,B and aHB) have the strongest effects. This is what one would expect. In the
simple numerical example provided in subsection 4.3.1, we could already see the
importance of adult language learning (aHB). Table 8 also shows that changes
in other parameters do not have a strong effect on the projections and that some
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changes even yield better results than our original parameter estimates.
original parameter modified parameter distance
qH(HB) = 0.348 qB(HB) = 0.5
1.82
qB(HB) = 0.301 qH(HB) = 0.149
C = 0.47 C = 0.6 1.84
sL,B = 0.76, sL,H = 0.24 sL,B = 0.9, sL,H = 0.1 2.27
sH,B = 0.2 sH,B = 0.3 3.16
aH,B = 0.005 aH,B = 0.006 3.57
Table 8: Distance between empirical observations and projections after changes
in single parameters (1991-2016).
For the original set of parameters, the distance is 1.93. The last example
(aH,B = 0.6%) is depicted in Figure 14.
Figure 14: Language dynamics projections for the BAC compared to empirical
data for aHB = 0.6%.
All other parameters are as above.
4.4 Dynamic language policy evaluation
Cost-Benefit analysis (CBA) and Cost-Effectiveness analysis (CEA) are two com-
mon methods to compare different policy options. In this section, we present a dy-
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namic versions of CBA designed for the evaluation and comparison of language
policies.36 We are interested in language policies at the state or the regional level
aiming at improving the status of the minority language. Policies can range from
putting up bilingual street signs to printing bilingual bank notes to providing pub-
lic services in the minority language. Another important example is acquisition
planning, for example, teaching the minority language to children in schools or
funding minority language classes for adults. For such policies, the overall bene-
fits often depend on the number of beneficiaries, as do, in many cases, the costs of
the policy. If policies specifically target speakers of the minority language, then,
consequently, costs and benefits change over time as the linguistic composition of
the population changes. The idea is therefore to utilize the information on changes
in the linguistic composition that we gain from the language competition model
in order to modify the standard CBA. The remainder of this section is devoted to
the formalization and illustration of this simple idea.
4.4.1 Policies in the language competition model
In the introduction, language policies were defined as “a systematic, rational,
theory-based effort at the societal level to modify the linguistic environment”.
Within the model framework, the linguistic environment is characterized by model
parameters related to linguistic concentration, language transmission, education,
adult language learning and migration. Consequently, language policies can be
modeled as a change in one or several of these parameters. Some language policy
measures of interest, such as putting up bilingual street signs or printing bilin-
gual bank notes, might not affect one of the modeled elements of the linguistic
environment directly. Nonetheless, they could have indirect effects. For example,
increasing the visibility of the minority language in the public sphere could yield
an extra incentive for adults to learn, maintain or transmit the minority language,
and hence an increase in the respective parameters.
It is important to emphasize that we can only model the (expected) effect of a pol-
icy on one or several of the model parameters, rather than the policy itself. This
shall be illustrated with two examples. First, consider the replacing of monolin-
gual street signs by bilingual ones. Obviously, there are no street signs in our
model. Hence, the model is not able to make a prediction about whether or not
bilingual signs motivate more people to learn or maintain the minority language.
If those who design the policy expect it to increase minority language learning
rates by monolingual speakers of the majority language, then this expected in-
crease is modeled as an increase in the respective parameter aH,B . If the policy
is expected to have no effect on any of the model parameters, then the parameters
do not change. As a second example, consider the introduction of bilingual edu-
cation programs. Such an acquisition planning policy directly aims to strengthen
language skills in the minority language of pupils. Therefore, if effective, such a
36The same idea can be applied to obtain a dynamic version of CEA. We therefore only present
the dynamic CBA.
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policy changes the linguistic composition, or at least counteracts the decline of the
minority language. But again, the education system is not modeled as such. What
is modeled are its effects on the language skills of pupils at the end of compulsory
education. The introduction of a bilingual education program can hence be trans-
lated into the model framework as an increase sH,B (the fraction of pupils entering
school as H-monolinguals and leaving school as bilinguals) and/or a decrease of
sB,H (the fraction of students entering school as bilinguals and (partially) losing
their skills in the minority language until they leave school). The estimation of
the effects of a policy has to be provided by experts from the respective fields, e.g.
language education, or has to be drawn from ex post policy analysis of similar
policies in comparable contexts.
In the following, we denote policies by p. Moreover, we denote the status quo,
i.e. if everything stays as it is today, by p0. For every policy p, including p0, we
have, as just explained, a set of parameters param(p). If a policy does not change
any of the parameters, then param(p) = param(p0). If policy p is applied and
if we have an initial linguistic composition N(0), then the linguistic composition
N(p; t) = (NH(p; t), NL(p; t), NB(p; t)) evolves according to
NR(p, t+ 1) = NR(p, t)−
[
µ+ (1− µ)aR,B(p)
]
NR(p, t)
+ λN (p, t)fR(p,X(p, t)) + MR(p, t). (4.51)
Formula (4.51) is a discrete version of the differential equation (5.98), describing
the evolution of the sizes of the language repertoire groups on an annual basis.
The dependency of the model parameters on policy p is captured in this formula
by aR,B(p), fR(p, ·) andMR(p, t). In principle, the birth and the death rate (λ and
µ) could also depend on p.
As a first step of dynamic policy evaluation one has to derive the projections
N(p, t) for t = 0, 1, ..., T and all the policies p that will be investigated. Final
year T is the end of the time horizon during which one wants to evaluate the
policy.37
4.4.2 Dynamic CBA
To compare benefits b and costs c of a policy p with CBA, both have to be spec-
ified. Benefits at the societal level are simply the sum of all individual benefits
(or propensities to pay) of the policy in question. That is, b(p) =
∑
i b
i(p), where
bi(p) is the propensity to pay of individual i for a change from the status quo p0
to policy p. To streamline the following presentation of static and dynamic CBA,
we make the simplifying assumption that the benefit of a policy is the same for
all individuals with the same language repertoire. In our two languages setting,
the overall benefits of a policy measure p are then fully determined by the three
quantities bH(p), bL(p) and bB(p), where bR(p) is the benefit of policy measure
37Final time T could also be set to infinity. Since parameters are assumed to be constant, a
finite horizon is preferable.
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p for an individual having language repertoire R. Depending on the policy to be
analyzed, bR(p) can be a constant or change with the linguistic composition of the
society, represented by the vector N = (NH , NL, NB).38 Then, the aggregated
benefit of policy p is given by
b(p,N) = NH · bH(p,N) + NL · bL(p,N) + NB · bB(p,N). (4.52)
If, for example, only monolingual speakers of the minority language (L’s) benefit
from policy measure p and if benefits do not depend on the linguistic composition,
then the aggregated benefit of p is proportional to the number of L-monolinguals.
Next, we specify costs. When speaking of costs, we mainly think of public expen-
ditures like costs for policy design, implementation costs and costs for monitoring
and evaluation. In addition to these, the costs of a policy measure can come in the
form of negative impacts of the policy for certain (linguistic types) of individuals.
As for the benefits, we make the simplifying assumption that this second kind of
costs, if there are any, are the same for every individual with the same language
repertoire. Hence, these costs have the same form as the benefits in equation
(4.52). For the first type of costs, we can distinguish costs that are independent
of the linguistic composition (fixed costs cf ) and costs that vary with the number
of people affected by the policy (variable costs cv).39 Typical fixed costs are costs
for policy design and monitoring.40 Since different fixed costs might emerge at
different points in time, we allow cf to depend on time, denoted by t. In the above
example, variable costs would include salaries for teachers and expenditure for
teaching materials for all the students subject to the policy. We assume that the
variable costs are given by number of individuals subject to the policy multiplied
by per capita costs. To summarize, costs at some time t are given by
c(p, t, N) = cf (p, t) + cv(p,N). (4.53)
Denoting the per-capita variable costs for an individual with language repertoire
R for a policy measure p by cvR(p), we obtain
c(p, t, N) = cf (p, t) + NH · cvH(p) + NL · cvL(p) + NB · cvB(p). (4.54)
Both costs and benefits, are specified with respect to the existing status quo. Policy
p is a potential improvement of the status quo, if societal benefits exceed societal
38 Take, for example, a policy strengthening education in the minority language. If effective,
such a policy reduces language loss among the minority language group. Moreover, being profi-
cient in the minority language enables communication in that language with other speakers. Thus,
it would be reasonable to assume that the communicative value of speaking the minority language
and hence the individual benefit from the policy depend on the number of speakers of that minor-
ity language, and hence that the individual benefits are changing endogenously. Therefore, not
implementing such a policy can negatively affect acquisition of the minority language as well as
the future evaluation of policies in favor of the minority language by its speakers.
39Additionally, costs of a policy could depend on the geographical distribution of its beneficia-
ries, see e.g. Wickström et al. (2018).
40 Other fixed costs could, e.g., emerge from the design of text books and other learning mate-
rial in the minority language.
75
costs, i.e. b(p,N) > c(p,N). It is an improvement in the allocative sense of
Pareto efficiency: those who gain from policy p could, theoretically, fully com-
pensate those who lose and would still be better off. If different policy options are
available for which benefits exceed costs, the policy maker should, from a purely
allocative point of view, choose the one with the highest difference between costs
and benefits.41 To also account for costs and benefits in the future, we have to
calculate the net present value (NPV) of a policy. Measuring time in years and
assuming an annual discount rate r, the NPV of language policy p is given by
NPV (p) =
T∑
t=0
b(p,N)− (cf (p, t) + cv(p,N))
(1 + r)t
, (4.55)
where T is some final time horizon.
Although costs and benefits at different points in time can be accounted for in
the classical discounted cost-benefit analysis, potential changes in the number of
people affected by the policy are neglected.42 Such changes can be caused by
policy itself or can be the result of a more general trend, for example, the steady
decline of the minority language that has been observed over the past few decades.
If these dynamics are neglected, then costs and/or benefits might be over- or un-
derestimated. Therefore, for the dynamic cost-benefit analysis, we work with the
projections N(p, t), t = 0, 1, ..., T , provided by the language competition model,
cf. formula (4.51), instead of the constant numbers used in the classical CBA.
Accordingly, we obtain the dynamic net present value
DNPV (p) =
T∑
t=0
b(p,N(p, t))− (cf (p, t) + cv(p,N(p, t)))
(1 + r)t
, (4.56)
where the initial N(0) is given and where N(p; t) evolves according to (4.51).43
The DNVP can then be used as the NPV in standard CBA to decide whether
aggregated benefits of a policy exceed aggregated costs or to rank different policy
options according to their DNPV.
As was shown for CBA, a dynamic version of CEA can be obtained by using the
projections derived from the language dynamics model instead of working with
stationary population.
4.4.3 Illustration: dynamic CBA
To illustrate the computation of the dynamic NPV of a policy measure, we use
our earlier numerical example: the Basque Autonomous Communities (BAC).
41In practice, compensation payments are often not or only partially feasible. For a more
detailed discussion of allocative efficiency and compensation payments see e.g. Boardman et al.
(2010, p. 26-33) and Wickström (2013).
42This is why in formula (4.55) theN does not depend on time, it equalsN(p, 0) in the dynamic
notation for all years.
43A similar approach was proposed in Wickström (2013), but without offering a specific model
for the language dynamics.
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The parameters of the status quo were provided in subsection 4.3.1. We assume
that in our reference year, 2001, policy makers consider launching a new televi-
sion channel to extend the range of the public broadcasting service.44 This new
channel shall offer a program in Basque for children and young people in the
BAC.45 It is assumed that annual fixed costs are 5 million Euro. 46 Neglecting
revenue from advertising, costs do not depend on the number of people watching
the channel. Hence, we set cf (p, t) = 5, 000, 000 and cv(p, t) = 0. We assume
that the policy makers assign an annual per capita benefit of bB(p) Euro, and that
only speakers of Basque profit from this channel. Hence, bH(p) = 0. As po-
tential viewers, children can profit from the channel directly. Adult speakers of
Basque, although probably not consuming the new channel themselves, can still
value its existence, since it strengthens the Basque language among the younger
generation. Considering a twenty year time horizon (T = 20) and a 5% discount
rate (r = 0.05), we obtain overall discounted costs of about 65 million Euros. In
the classical CBA, discounted benefits are bB(p) multiplied by 6.7 million Euros.
Including the language dynamics, discounted benefits are estimated to be bB(p)
multiplied by 7.7 million Euros. The difference is due to the projected increase of
Basque speakers. Taking, for example, an annual per capita benefit of 10 Euros,
we get NPV (p) = 150, 00 and DNPV (p) = 1.2 million. Despite obtaining this
notable difference, we do not assume a positive effect of the policy on Basque
revitalization so far. Assuming such a positive effect would make the dynamic
NPV even higher. If annual per capita benefits are only 9 Euros, then we even get
NPV (p) = −500, 000 and DNPV (p) = +400, 000. In the latter example, the
classical CBA suggests not implementing the program, while the dynamic CBA
suggests the opposite. This is due to the fact that the classical CBA does not
account for conceivable changes in the linguistic structure of the population.
4.4.4 Efficiency, equality and normative implications
As the purpose of this section is to illustrate how our language dynamics model
can be employed to enhance existing policy analysis techniques for the evaluation
of language policies, we only present a simple CBA with homogeneous propen-
sities to pay within the language repertoire groups combined with the potential
44In 1982/83, ETB 1, the first television channel of the BAC’s public broadcasting service
EiTB was established. It provides programs exclusively in Basque. In 1986, ETB 2 was launched,
a channel broadcasting in Spanish.
45In 2008, such a channel started broadcasting, called ETB 3. Here, we do not provide an
evaluation of the introduction of ETB 3. The aim of this subsection is to use the numerical data
we have found for the BAC to illustrate the dynamic cost-benefit analysis. The introduction of an
ETB 3 like channel in 2001 shall function as an arbitrary but realistic example.
46Since no separate budget information is available for ETB3, we derived this estimate from
EiTB budget information for 2007 and 2009. Between 2007 and 2009, the overall ETB budget
increased by about 10 million Euros, mainly due to higher personnel and production costs, cf.
Casado del Río & Miguel de Bustos (2015). One reason for this increase was the introduction
of the new channel ETB3 in 2008. Therefore, we estimate annual additional costs for ETB 3 to
be around 5 million Euros. For an in depth policy analysis, more detailed budget estimates are
necessary.
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Pareto efficiency decision rule. Both the analysis and the decision rule can be
extended and adapted in several ways without affecting the basic dynamic policy
analysis idea. For example, in standard CBA only efficiency is taken into ac-
count: as long as one person is better off after the introduction of a policy and
nobody loses, a policy is deemed to be an improvement. The distributive effects
of the policy are irrelevant in this regard. If inequalities matter – if, for example,
policy makers want to support the least well-off–, then different (groups of) in-
dividuals can be weighted differently in the analysis, e.g. in a welfare function.
If we want to achieve actual and not just potential Pareto improvements, then we
could restrict the analysis to a politically and institutionally feasible set of trans-
fer payments. Moreover, we omitted questions such as who is actually bearing
the costs of the policy in question (only the minority language community or the
entire society) or whether the costs and benefits for future generations should be
accounted for by the analysis. Such aspects related to distributive effects of lan-
guage policies, equality and feasibility can be included in the analysis, but we
are not going into this detail here.47 One way in which our approach is restricted
is linked to the operationalization of benefits. To account for future benefits, we
have to specify how they alter with changes in the linguistic environment. In the
simplest cases, individual benefits of a policy are homogeneous within the lan-
guage repertoire groups and constant, i.e. bR(p,N) = bR(p) ≡ const, which is a
reasonable assumption for restricted time horizons. In this case, overall benefits
are proportional to the number of beneficiaries. If individual benefits depend on
the number of speakers of the minority language – as in the example in footnote
38 –, then this dependence has to be formalized, for example by a specification of
bR(p,N) as a function of the vector N . An assessment of individual benefits or
propensities to pay (bi(p) for every individual i or at least for a representative sam-
ple), for example by contingent valuation, can be problematic, since at the time of
assessment (t = 0) we do not have any information of propensities to pay for the
same individuals at later times or even for the next generation of individuals.48
Concerning general normative statements, the approach presented here is limited.
The underlying language dynamics model provides a computable– if sufficient
data are available – approximation of actual macro level language dynamics. In
combination with language policy analysis methods, we get an applicable tool to
analyze specific policy options for a specific state or region at a specific time.
From an analysis with this tool we cannot derive any general normative impli-
cations, such as whether or at which threshold a minority language should be
supported. The tool is designed for statements of the kind: policy p in favor of
language l should (not) be implemented or policy p is to be favored over policy
q. If the outcome of the analysis is that a policy in favor of the minority language
should not be implemented, then this could clearly weaken this language.49 In
47Most of these aspects are well illustrated and discussed in Wickström (2013).
48See e.g. Wickström et al. (2018) for a discussion of feedback mechanisms, endogenity,
indirect effects and other difficulties when evaluating individual benefits of a language policy.
49“It can be efficient to introduce fewer minority rights than a simple static analysis would
imply. We can find an “efficient discrimination” of minorities” (Wickström 2013, p. 336, emphasis
in the original).
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many cases, a normative assessment at a more general level is exogenous. This
is particularly apparent in CEA, when desirable outcomes and effectiveness have
to be defined before the actual numerical analysis. For CBA, the decision maker
could be the person who assigns the values of bR(p) administratively or who de-
cides on the weights given to the different language groups. Since the policy mak-
ers’ decisions are part of the political process and are affected by voting behavior,
it can be argued that they indirectly reflect actual propensities to pay.
4.5 Conclusions and outlook
In this essay we presented a novel framework for the evaluation of language pol-
icy measures. This framework was motivated by two observations. On the one
hand, classical policy evaluation techniques, such as cost-benefit analysis or cost-
effectiveness analysis, do not consider changes in the linguistic composition of
the population affected by a policy measure. Hence, classical techniques poten-
tially overstate or undervalue the actual benefits and/or costs of a policy measure.
On the other hand, existing language dynamics models that aim to describe and
sometimes explain changes in the linguistic composition are only of limited use
for the analysis of specific language policy measures. Due to their abstract nature,
most of these models are only suitable for the derivation of abstract or general
results and policy recommendations. To facilitate the evaluation of specific policy
measures for a specific context in a dynamic fashion, we proposed a new language
competition model and illustrated how this model can be applied to improve ex-
isting policy evaluation techniques.
The model that takes into account five processes that are pivotal for changes in the
linguistic composition of a population: population dynamics (birth, death and mi-
gration), family formation, language transmission, language education and adult
language learning. In contrast to the vast majority of language dynamics models
available in the literature, the proposed model operates on model parameters that
can be estimated from empirical data. At the same time, the model is designed
in a general fashion so it can be applied to states or regions with two languages,
as long as the necessary data are available. Parameter estimation and the applica-
tion of the model are illustrated by the case of Basque and Spanish in the Basque
Autonomous Communities in northern Spain. Starting in 1990, projections for
the (relative) numbers of Spanish monolinguals and bilinguals were derived for
50 years. Although parameters were derived from data from a single year (2000-
2001) and kept constant for the entire time period, the projections match empirical
data on the number of speakers from 1990 to 2016 remarkably well. To test the
strength of the model beyond the Basque case, further empirical evidence for other
contexts is needed.
Due to the neglect of changes in the numbers of beneficiaries and costs in language
policy analysis, we proposed a combination of established policy evaluation tech-
niques and the new language dynamics model. A dynamic version of the classical
cost-benefit analysis was outlined. This essay illustrated how a non-dynamic cost-
benefit analysis might underestimate the long-term benefits of a policy measure
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from which speakers of a growing minority population profit.
The aim of this essay was to show how established techniques used for language
policy evaluation can be enhanced by explicitly taking into account language dy-
namics. While only illustrated for cost-benefit analysis, the basic idea can also be
applied to cost-effectiveness analysis or other evaluation techniques. This is one
reason why we consider this essay to be a starting point for further research on dy-
namic language policy analysis. Furthermore, the underlying language dynamics
model can be extended to yield a more realistic depiction of the complex reality
at hand. For example, one could consider different age groups, regions within
the territory or more than two language groups. Moreover, certain model param-
eters could be different for different age or language groups (e.g. birth and death
rates) or could change over time. All such extensions would make the model
more realistic, but harder to handle. Although the model would become more
complicated, the basic principles of the model itself as well as of the dynamic
policy evaluation approach would remain the same. Furthermore, for all of these
extensions, one would need even more empirical data on language knowledge,
use and transmission, which are already scarce for most contexts, the Basque Au-
tonomous Communities being an exception. Therefore, the model can be used to
make an additional argument for a more detailed collection of language-related
data in census-like surveys.
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5 Extensions with generations, cohorts and multiple
minority languages
5.1 Introduction
In Templin (2018),50 we developed a simple language dynamics model with one
majority language and one minority language. The population is divided into
three language groups: monolinguals of the majority language, monolinguals of
the minority language, and bilinguals. The model describes how the sizes of the
three language groups change over time. It treats all individuals of a language
group equally, independent of their age. In this essay, we refer to this model with
one minority language and a single age group as a 1G-1L model.51 In Templin
(2019),52 we argued that language dynamics models such as the 1G-1L model can
be used to analyze costs and benefits of certain language policies. If language
policies only target a certain age group within the population, e.g. pupils, or if
there are multiple relevant language minorities within the society and a policy is
only directed at one minority, the 1G-1L model might not be sufficiently complex
to analyze such policies satisfactorily. Therefore, we present here two possible
extension of the 1G-1L model.
The first extension introduces an age dimension.53 We consider two models:
• In the 3G-1L model, we consider three generations: children, young adults
and old adults.
• In the 10G-1L model, we divide the population into 10 age groups or co-
horts.
The second extension is concerned with the case of multiple relevant minority
languages.54
• In the 1G-nL model, we consider the case of a majority language and n
minority languages, with n ≥ 1.
Before developing the extensions, we present a slightly generalized version of
the basic 1G-1L model in Section 5.2. Thereafter, we discuss one possible way
to extend the 1G-1L model to account for several age groups. In Section 5.4,
we introduce an extension of the 1G-1L model to n minority languages, n ≥ 1.
Last, we compare the extensions to the original 1G-1L model numerically by
50Section 3 in this thesis.
51In the general introduction and the general conclusions of this thesis I refer to this model as
model E1.
52Section 4 in this thesis.
53In the general introduction and the general conclusions of this thesis I refer to this extension
as model E2mG.
54In the general introduction and the general conclusions of this thesis I refer to this extension
as model E2nL.
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considering two empirical cases studied in Templin (2018) (English and Spanish
in the United States) and in Templin (2019) (Spanish and Basque in the Basque
Autonomous communities in Spain).
5.2 Model with one generation and oneminority language (1G-
1L)
In this section we revisit the basic model with two languages and without age-
differentiation (1G-1L) presented in Templin (2018). The model describes how
the linguistic composition of a population changes over time. The linguistic com-
position is determined by the distribution of language repertoires throughout the
population. In the 1G-1L model, three repertoires R are relevant: monolinguals
in a dominant languageH , monolinguals in a minority language L and bilinguals.
To obtain a realistic but manageable mathematical model, we take into account
four key processes:
• Population dynamics. This comprises births, deaths, and inward and out-
ward migration.
• Intergenerational language transmission. Adult individuals form cou-
ples, have children and transmit one or all of the languages they speak to
the next generation.
• Language education. Pupils are educated in certain language(s) and learn
additional languages in school.
• Adult language learning. Adult individuals learn additional languages or
forget languages they do not use.
These processes are affected by the linguistic environment and shape the linguistic
environment at the same time. To formulate a mathematical model, we first oper-
ationalize the linguistic environment. Thereafter, we formalize the four processes
above and specify how they depend on the linguistic environment.
5.2.1 Linguistic environment
The linguistic environment is a theoretical construct. “It subsumes in an extensive
(but obviously not exhaustive) fashion all the relevant information about the status,
in the broadest sense of the word, of the various languages present in a given polity
at a certain time” (Grin & Vaillancourt 1997, p. 49). For our language dynamics
model, we consider five dimensions of the linguistic environment:
1. Linguistic composition. For the 1G-1L model, the linguistic composition
of a population is determined by the number of adult monolinguals of the
dominant language H , NH , the number of adult monolinguals of the mi-
nority language L, NL and the number of adult bilinguals, NB. The total
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population size is N = NH + NL + NB. We also consider the fractions
XR := NR/N , R = H,L,B.
2. Linguistic concentration. Concentration of speakers of the minority lan-
guage is measured by a single concentration parameter C1 ∈ [0, 1]. For
C1 = 0 speakers of L are distributed equally throughout the territory, and
for C1 = 1 all speakers of L are concentrated in certain areas. To derive C1,
we use the index of dissimilarity, which can be interpreted as the propor-
tion of speakers of L who have to move such that all areas have the same
proportion of speakers of L, see Morrill (2016).55 It is derived as follows.
Assume that the territory can be subdivided inK regions. For k = 1, ..., K,
Nk denotes the number of people living in region k, NH,k is the number of
H monolinguals in region k, and Nk −NH,k = NL,k +NB,k is the number
of speakers of L in region k. We set
C1 :=
1
2
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣NL,k +NB,kNL +NB − NH,kNH
∣∣∣∣ . (5.57)
Moreover, we consider concentration of monolingual speakers of L with
respect to bilinguals. Analogously to C1, we introduce
C2 :=
1
2
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣NL,kNL − NB,kNB
∣∣∣∣ . (5.58)
By C we denote the vector C = (C1, C2)′. Note, in Templin (2018) we only
considered C1, implicitly assuming C2 = 0.
3. Status of both languages. The relative status of a language in society com-
prises two aspects that are weighted to get a single status parameter S:
(a) Socio-economic status. We consider the average socio-economic sta-
tus of H-monolinguals, SSE(H), and the one of speakers of L, that
is L-monolinguals and bilinguals, SSE(L). We are interested in the
socio-economic advantage individuals gain from speaking a certain
language and hence consider the relative status SSE(H) = SSE(H)/
(SSE(H) + SSE(L)) and SSE(L) = 1− SSE(H).
(b) Institutional status. The institutional/official status of a language is
determined by the number of domains from a given list of domains a
language can be used in. For a total number ofD domains, the official
status of L, SOF (L), has as possible values {0, 1/D, 2/D, ..., 1}. The
relative official statuses are given by SOF (L) = SOF (L)/(SOF (H) +
SOF (L)) and SOF (H) = 1− SOF (L).
To obtain a single status parameter S(L), we weight the socio-economic
and the institutional aspect by weight αSE and αOF :
S(L) := αSE · SSE(L) + αOF · SOF (L). (5.59)
55For alternative concentration measures see also Morrill (2016).
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By construction, S(L) ∈ [0, 1] and S(H) = 1 − S(L). The status variable
S(L) is a measure for the relative disadvantage of speakers of L in the so-
ciety. Since H is the dominant language, we normally have 0 < S(L) <
1/2 < S(H) < 1.
4. Language education policy. It is assumed that language education poli-
cies determine which languages are learned in schools. These policies are
exogenous. Policies are not modeled as such, but only their effects on lan-
guage learning. In the model, this is represented by parameters sR1,R2 ,
R1, R2 = H,L,B, the fraction of children entering school with language
repertoire R1 and leaving school with language repertoire R2. We make
the simplifying assumptions that sH,L = sB,L = sL,L = 0, since H is the
dominant language, and that sB,H > sL,H .
5. Adult language learning support. The acquisition of the majority lan-
guage can be supported by language policy measures. This is reflected by
a policy parameter vH ∈ [0, 1]. The higher vH , the more the acquisition of
H by L-monolinguals is supported. Similarly, support for the acquisition of
the minority language is represented by a parameter vL.
6. Population statistics. The birth rate λ and the death rate µ affect the speed
at which language change occurs. Moreover, migration numbers affect the
inflow and/or outflow of speakers of H and L. Throughout the essay, M
denotes the annual net number of migrants (for negative M we have net
emigration). MH ,ML andMB are the number of H monolingual, L mono-
lingual and bilingual migrants,M =MH +ML +MB.
Now that we operationalized the linguistic environment, we come back to the four
key processes that drive the language dynamics in our model. Population dynam-
ics is already described by the birth and death rates as well as by the migration
numbers. Similarly, language education is modeled by the exogenous parame-
ters sR1,R2 , R1, R2 = H,L,B. This leaves us with intergenerational language
transmission and adult language learning. Their dependence on the linguistic en-
vironment is modeled in the following two subsections.
5.2.2 Family formation
The formation of families is modeled as a 2-step random search and mating pro-
cess. In step 1, individuals meet randomly and form couples. In step 2, some
couples successfully form families (produce offspring). Others are unsuccessful
due to communication barriers and split up again. Who meets and forms cou-
ples depends on the distribution of speakers as well as on linguistic concentration.
Which couples become families depends on the linguistic composition of the cou-
ple. After step 2, some individuals are already part of a family. All the remaining
individuals start a second round of couple and family formation. This is repeated
until all individuals are part of a family. Given the three language repertoire types
H , L and B, there are six possible couple or family types F :
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• F = HH: two H monoglots
• F = HL: one H monoglot and one L monoglot
• F = HB: one H monoglot and one bilingual
• F = LL: two L monoglots
• F = LB: one L monoglot and one bilingual
• F = BB: two bilinguals
We make the simplifying assumption that the population sizeN is large and even,
and that the population consists of N/2 female and N/2 male individuals. This
results in N/2 families at the end of the formation process. We assume that lan-
guage repertoires are distributed equally among males and females. For every
family type F , ΨF denotes the fraction of the N/2 families that are of type F . In
the following we derive formulas for the fractions ΨF .
5.2.2.1 Family formation - monolingual case
To develop a mathematical model for family formation with mono- and bilinguals
as well as two dimensions of concentration, we start with the easier case where
there are no bilinguals (NB = 0). In this simple case, there are only three relevant
couple/family types, namelyHH ,HL and LL. To derive formulas forΨHH ,ΨHL
and ΨLL, we first model couple formation. The probability, that a certain type of
couple forms, depends on the distribution of speakers as well as on the linguistic
concentration C1, as defined in (5.57).
Let us start with one randomly chosen pair consisting of a female Y and a male
Z. Furthermore, let R1 and R2 be two language repertoires. We have
P[Y = R1, Z = R2] = P[Y = R1]P[Z = R2 |Y = R1],
where P[· | ·] denotes the conditional probability. To shorten notation we write
P[R1] instead of P[Y = R1] and P[R2 |R1] instead of P[Z = R2 |Y = R1]. The
first factor on the right hand side, P[R1], depends only on the fraction of people in
the population with language repertoire R1. Hence,
P[R1] = XR1 . (5.60)
For C1 = 0, L-speaking individuals are distributed equally througout the territory.
This translates to
PC1=0[R2 |R1] = P[R2] = XR2 . (5.61)
For C1 = 1, minority speakers only form couples with other minority speakers.
Hence,
PC1=1[R2 |R1] =

1 : R1 = R2
0 : R1 ̸= R2
. (5.62)
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Tomodel probabilities forC1 between 0 and 1, we use linear interpolation. Choos-
ing R1 ̸= R2, this yields
P[R1 |R1] = C1 + (1− C1)XR1 , (5.63)
P[R2 |R1] = (1− C1)XR2 . (5.64)
Based on these conditional probabilities, we can derive the probabilities that a
certain kind of pair is chosen. If R1 ̸= R2, then a pair of type R1R2, is ob-
tained either by Y = R1; Z = R2 or by Y = R2; Z = R1 (for the family
type we do not take the gender of the parents into account). Hence, the proba-
bility of obtaining a pair of type R1R2 is given by P[R1R1] = P[R1]P[R1 R1],
and P[R1R2] = P[R1]P[R2 R1] + P[R2]P[R1 R2], if R1 ̸= R2. This yields the
following distribution of couple types, which are denoted by ψF for type F :
ψHH = X
2
H + C1XHXL (5.65)
ψHL = 2(1− C1)XHXL (5.66)
ψLL = X
2
L + C1XHXL. (5.67)
To estimate the distribution of family types, Wickström (2005) takes a different
approach. He offers a model without any concentration parameter – implicitly
assuming C1 = 0 – in which couples of type HL have a lower probability to
become a family. All unsuccessful couples split up again, and a second round
of couple and family formation begins. Somewhat surprising, he obtains similar
results. If HH and LL couples have success probability 1 and HL couples have
success probability ρ, Wickström (2005) derives formulas (5.65)-(5.67) withC1 =
1− 2ρ/(1 + ρ).
As noted earlier, we also apply a two-step model for family formation. The fam-
ily type distribution is denoted by Ψ. It is easy to see that if all couple types have
the same success probability, then the distribution of family types equals the dis-
tribution of couple types, that is ΨHH = ψHH , ΨHL = ψHL and ΨLL = ψLL,
where the ψF are given by (5.65)-(5.67). The formulas are more complicated if
linguistic concentration C affects couple formation in step 1 and if, additionally,
communication barriers result in lower success probabilities p for HL couples.
Theorem 5.2.2.1. If couples form according to (5.65)-(5.67), we obtain the family
type distribution
ΨHH = X
2
H + (1−D(1− C1))XHXL (5.68)
ΨHL = 2D(1− C1)XHXL (5.69)
ΨLL = X
2
L + (1−D(1− C1))XHXL, (5.70)
for D = 1− (1− p)(1 + C1)/(2− (1− p)(1− C1).
A proof is provided in the Appendix. We have D = 0 for p = 0 and D = 1 for
p = 1. As one would expect, for p = 0 we obtain ΨHH = XH , ΨLL = XL and
ΨHL = 0.
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5.2.2.2 Bilingual case
Previously, we considered the monolingual case to illustrate how we model family
formation. In this section, we also take into account bilinguals. As before, the
parameter C1 is a measure for the concentration of (mono- and bilingual) speakers
of L. As in the monolingual case, we start with couple formation. The population
can be divided into speakers of L,XL+XB = 1−XH , and monolingual speakers
of H . In view of (5.65)-(5.67), we set
ψHH = X
2
H + C1XH(1−XH) (5.71)
ψHL = 2(1− C1)XHXL (5.72)
ψHB = 2(1− C1)XHXB (5.73)
ψLL + ψLB + ψBB = (1−XH)2 + C1XH(1−XH). (5.74)
We also consider the possibility that L-monolinguals are geographically concen-
trated with respect to bilinguals, measured by C2. One reason for such concentra-
tion could be that L-monolinguals are newcomers (migrants), residing in specific
areas, while bilinguals already spent some years in the new environment or were
born there, and are spread out over the entire territory. For maximal concentra-
tion, i.e. C2 = 1, the fraction ψLB is zero. For C2 < 1 we derive ψLB similar
to the monolingual model. Let YL = XL − ψHL/2 = XL(1 − (1 − C1)XH)
denote the fraction of the population that is monolingual in L and not in a cou-
ple with an H-monolingual. By the same token, consider YB = XB − ψHB =
XB(1− (1−C1)XH). Let Y := YL+YB = (1−XH)2+C1XH(1−XH) denote
the fraction of couples that are of type LL, LB or BB. In view of (5.65)-(5.67),
we set
ψLL = Y
(
Y 2L
Y 2
+ C2
YL
Y
YB
Y
)
=
(
1 + C1
XH
1−XH
)(
XL + C2XB
)
XL (5.75)
ψLB = Y
(
2(1− C2)YL
Y
YB
Y
)
= 2
(
1 + C1
XH
1−XH
)
(1− C2)XLXB (5.76)
ψBB = Y
(
Y 2B
Y 2
+ C2
YL
Y
YB
Y
)
=
(
1 + C1
XH
1−XH
)(
C2XL +XB
)
XB.
(5.77)
As for the monolingual case, we assume that due to communication barriers some
of the HL couples are unsuccessful with probability 1 − p. They split up again
and form new couples. Analogously to the monolingual case, the distribution of
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family types is given by
ΨHH = X
2
H + C1XH(1−XH) + (1− C1)(1−D)XHXL (5.78)
ΨHL = 2D(1− C1)XHXL (5.79)
ΨHB = 2(1− C1)XHXB (5.80)
ΨLL =
(
1 + C1
XH
1−XH
)(
XL + C2XB
)
XL (5.81)
ΨLB = 2
(
1 + C1
XH
1−XH
)
(1− C2)XLXB + (1− C1)(1−D)XHXL
(5.82)
ΨBB =
(
1 + C1
XH
1−XH
)(
C2XL +XB
)
XB. (5.83)
In the above formulas, D is the same as in the monolingual case, i.e. D = 1 −
(1− p)(1 + C1)/(2− (1− p)(1− C1).
5.2.3 Language transmission
Within families, languages are transmitted from parents to children. By qR(F ) we
denote the fraction of F -type families who decide to bring up their children with
repertoire R. As in Templin (2018), we make three assumptions:
A1: All children in one family have same language repertoire.
A2: Both parents shall be able to communicate with their children,
i.e. qL(HH) ≡ qL(HB) ≡ 0 and qH(LL) ≡ qH(LB) ≡ 0.
A3: Only those languages spoken by the parents can be transmitted,
i.e. qH(HH) ≡ qL(LL) = 1.
Since
∑
R qR(F ) = 1, we have qB(HB) = 1 − qH(HB) and qB(LB) = 1 −
qL(LB). Conceptualizing individual families as utility maximizing actors, we
derive the following properties of the fractions qR(F ), cf. Section 3,
P1: The higher the number of l-monoglots, the higher the incentive to transmit
l.
P1a: If XH increases, then qH and qB do not decrease and qL does not in-
crease.
P1b: If XL increases, then qL and qB do not decrease and qH does not in-
crease.
P2: The higher the status of a language, the higher the incentive to transmit it.
P2a: If S increases, then qH(HB) and qH(BB) do not increase.
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P2b: If S increases, then qL(LB) and qL(BB) do not decrease.
P3: From properties P1 and P2 it can be deduced that qH(HB) is independent
of XH and that qL(LB) is independent of XH .
Moreover, we assume that not all families are successful in transmitting the reper-
toire they want to transmit. Linguistic concentration is seen as the main obstacle
here. As in Templin (2018), we therefore assume that the fraction of F -type fam-
ilies who successfully transmit repertoire R to their children is given by QR(F ),
where QH(HH) = qH(HH) ≡ 1, QL(LL) = qL(LL) ≡ 1 and
QH(HB;C, S,X) = (1− C1) · qH(HB;S,X) + C1/2 (5.84)
QH(BB;C, S,X) = (1− C1) · qH(BB;S,X) (5.85)
QL(LB;C, S,X) = (1− C1) · qL(LB;S,X) + C1 (5.86)
QL(BB;C, S,X) = (1− C1) · qL(BB;S,X) + C1. (5.87)
In Templin (2018), we suggested a specific functional form for the fractions qR(F )
that satisfies all the conditions above. For parameters 0 ≤ γ1, γ2, δ1, δ2, δ3 ≤ 1,
satisfying 0 < γ2 < δ3 and δ1 + δ2 < γ1, these functional expressions are
qH(HB;S,X) := max {0, γ1(1− S)− γ2SXL}
qH(BB;S,X) := max {0, δ1(1− S) + δ2(1− S)XH − δ3SXL}
qL(LB;S,X) := max {0, γ1S − γ2(1− S)XH}
qL(BB;S,X) := max {0, δ1S + δ2SXL − δ3(1− S)XH} .
In case of only one minority language, this specific functional form works per-
fectly fine. Extending this version to the case of multiple minorities, which is
done later on, we run into problems with qLR(BiBj), where Bi and Bj are bilin-
guals speaking different minority languages (Li and Lj). Therefore, we present a
second version of functional expressions for qLR(F ;S,X).
For x, s ∈ [0, 1], let h(x, s) be a function with values in [0, 1], non-decreasing
in x and s and with h(0, 0) = 0 and h(1, 1) = 1. For h one could e.g. think
of h(x, s) = x · s, h(x; s) = (x + s)/2 or h(x, s) = (x + s)2/4. Given h and
non-negative parameters 0 ≤ ε1, ε2, ζ1, ζ2, we define
qH(HB;S,X) = ε1
(
1− h(XL, S(L))
)
+ ε2S(H) (5.88)
qH(BB;S,X) = ζ1
(
1− h(XL, S(L))
)
+ ζ2h(XH , S(H)) (5.89)
qL(LB;S,X) = ε1
(
1− h(XH , S(H))
)
+ ε2S(L) (5.90)
qL(BB;S,X) = ζ1
(
1− h(XH , S(H))
)
+ ζ2h(XL, S(L)) (5.91)
with ε1 + ε2 = 1, ζ2 ≤ ζ1 and ζ1 + ζ2 ≤ 1.
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5.2.4 Language dynamics model
In this subsection, we put everything together and present the 1G-1L language
dynamics model. Time is measured in years and denoted by t. The number of
individuals with repertoire R at time t is denoted by NR(t), while the fraction is
XR(t). For the dynamic model, we assume that linguistic concentration parame-
ters C1, C2 and the status parameters S(L), S(H) are constant.
5.2.4.1 Basic model with language transmission
For the basic model, we only consider population dynamics, family formation
and language transmission. The language dynamics can be described by three
differential equations
N˙R(t) = −µNR(t) + λN(t)
∑
F
QR(F ;X(t))Ψ(F ;C,X(t)), (5.92)
R = H,L,B. The first summand represents the number of people with language
repertoire R dying at time t. The second summand represents all the children
raised with language repertoire R at time t.
5.2.4.2 Basic model with language learning
Next, we add language acquisition and adult language learning to the model. Re-
call, language education is captured by the parameters sR1,R2 , see Section 5.2.1.
To improve readability, we introduce the functions
fR(X) :=
∑
F
QR(F ;X)Ψ(F ;C,X) (5.93)
and
gR(X) := (1− sR,B)fR(X) + sB,R · fB(X), (5.94)
R = H,L. These functions are related to children that leave school with mono-
lingual language repertoire L or H . Moreover, we take into account adult lan-
guage learning. By aR,B , R = H,L, we denote the annual rate at which R-
monolinguals become bilingual. aR,B is assumed to depend on the linguistic com-
position, linguistic concentration and relative status of both languages. Hence,
aR,B = aR,B(S(L), C;X). In Templin (2018) we offer a functional form for the
aR,B:
aL,B(S(L), C;X) = (1− C1)max{0, θS(H)XH − φ(1− vH)}, (5.95)
aH,B(S(L), C;X) = (1− C1)max{0, θS(L)XL − φ(1− vL), (5.96)
where φ, θ are parameters between 0 and 1, and S(H) = 1 − S(L). Writing
aR,B(t) for aR,B(S(L), C;X(t)), the dynamics of NH and NL are described by
N˙R(t) = −
[
µ+ (1− µ)aR,B(t)
]
NR(t) + λN(t)gR(X(t)). (5.97)
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5.2.4.3 Final model with migration
Last, we add migration. The absolute number of people equipped with language
repertoire R migrating at time t is denoted by MR(t). Including migration, the
overall population sizeN changes according to N˙(t) = (λ−µ)N(t)+M(t). The
final 1G-1L language competition model that includes transmission, learning and
migration is described by the two differential equations, R = H,L,
N˙R(t) = −
[
µ+ (1− µ)aR,B
]
NR(t) + λN(t)gR(X(t)) + MR(t). (5.98)
Applying the quotient rule to XR = NR/N , we also obtain
X˙R(t) = −
[
µ+ (1− µ)aR,B
]
XR(t) + λgR(X(t))
+MR(t)/N(t)−
(
λ− µ+ M(t)
N(t)
)
. (5.99)
5.2.4.4 Special case: constant migration flow
As a special case, we consider a constant migration flow, that is MR(t) ≡ MR.
For λ < µ the population size N converges to N(∞) = M/(µ − λ). Plugging
this into (5.99), we obtain at the steady state population size
X˙R(t) = −
[
µ+ (1− µ)aR,B
]
XR(t) + λgR(X(t)) + (µ− λ)MR(t)/M(t).
(5.100)
If λ ≥ µ andM > 0, then the population size diverges (N(t)→∞). In this case
we get in the limit that
X˙R(t) = −
[
λ+ (1− µ)aR,B
]
XR(t) + λgR(X(t)). (5.101)
5.2.5 Comparison to earlier models
To a large extend, the 1G-1L model presented in this section was developed in
Templin (2018). The two novelties in the above presentation concern family for-
mation and language transmission. For family formation, we added the possibility
that L-monolinguals are spatially concentrated with respect to bilinguals. In con-
trast, in Templin (2018) we assumed C2 = 0. Moreover, in Templin (2018) we
assumed that HL-couples are never successful in becoming families, i.e. p = 0.
Here, HL families can form but with a lower success probability p than all other
couple types. For language transmission, we offered here an alternative functional
form for the qR(F ) that is suitable for a model with multiple minority languages.
All other formulas can already be found in Templin (2018) and are hence pre-
sented only very briefly here.
5.3 Models with multiple age groups (3G/10G-1L)
In the 1G-1L model, we do not differentiate between individuals who share the
same language repertoire. When deriving the distribution of family types, for
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example, we consider the total number of mono- and bilinguals. But are all in-
dividuals within the population under consideration actually equally relevant for
the formation of new families and childbearing? If we ask this question with re-
spect to the age of individuals, the answer is clearly no. Predominantly, young
and medium aged adults are the most relevant part of the population for family
formation in the above sense. Hence, introducing an age dimension to the 1G-1L
model would make the model more sensible to real life dynamics. Including an
age dimension could also bring about other advantages. One such advantage is
that we can explicitly consider children. In the 1G-1L model we only consider
adults. Adults have children, who are equipped with a certain language repertoire
by their parents and who expand their repertoire in school. After finishing school,
they become part of the adult population. In contrast to reality, though, this does
not take 15 or 20 years, but happens in the model – at least implicitly – within a
single year. Therefore, changes in the linguistic environment can develop faster
(or slower) in the model projections compared to real changes. Another aspect not
taken into account by the 1G-1L model is that not all individuals are equally rel-
evant for language learning and language transmission decisions. When deciding
on whether to transmit or to learn a language, families and individuals consider
its communicative and cultural value as well as learning costs. For example, the
benefit of being able to communicate with other people might not be same for all
people in the population.56
In this section, we present two extensions of the basic 1G-1L model that have
an age dimension. We propose a model with three age groups (3G-1L) and a
model with 10 age groups (10G-1L). In the 3G-1L model we think of generations
(children, younger adult and older adults), while in the 10G-1L model we rather
consider 10-year cohorts. In the following, both models are outlined and steady
state dynamics are analyzed. Numerical comparisons to the 1G-1L model are
presented in Section 5.5.
5.3.1 Model with three generations (3G-1L)
For the three-generation extension of the basic one-generation model we subdi-
vide the population into three age groups. We consider children (aged 19 and
below), younger adults (between 20 and 49 years of age) and older adults (50
years of age and above). As in the 1G model, each age group is subdivided along
the three language repertoires. For repertoires R = H,L,B we introduce the
following notation:
56Kennedy & King (2005) provide a simple but illustrating example for that. They develop a
model with three overlapping generations and a voting mechanism. They assume that the govern-
ment collects a lump-sum tax and spends the revenue on language education programs, and that
adults vote for the size of the public language programs. From a purely communicative perspec-
tive, older adults are not relevant for the voting decision of young adults. In their model, people
only live for three generations, so when children of young adults finally reach adulthood them-
selves, the former old generation has died already. Since languages not only have communicative
but also identity value, in our model the repertoires of older adults are taken into account when
parents make decisions concerning language transmission.
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• nR: number of children with repertoire R,
• NR: number of younger adults with repertoire R,
• NR: number of older adults with repertoire R.
By n = nH + nL + nB we denote the total number of children. Analogously,
N denotes the total number of younger adults, and N the total number of older
adults. Furthermore, we introduce the fractions
• xR := nR/n: fraction of children having language repertoire R,
• XR := NR/N : fraction of younger adults having language repertoire R,
• XR := NR/N: fraction of older adults having language repertoire R.
The corresponding vectors are x = (xH , xL), X = (XH ,XL) and X = (XH ,XL).
5.3.1.1 Family formation and language transmission
As in the original model, it is assumed that individuals form couples and families,
have children and transmit languages to the next generation. Which languages
are transmitted depends – among other aspects of the environment – on the dis-
tribution of family types. The distribution of family types, in turn, depends on
the distribution of repertoires throughout the adult population. In the 1G model,
we always considered the whole population. But are all people within the popu-
lation actually relevant for family formation? At a certain age, people might find
new partners and form new couples, but do not have new children anymore. If
this is not taken into account and if language repertoires are distributed heteroge-
neously along the age dimension, the model can produce unrealistic projections.
Consider, for example, a scenario in which the minority language L is only spo-
ken by older adults, while all younger people are monolingual in H . For family
formation, these L speaking older adults are treated the same way as the younger
H-monolingual adults. The model therefore assumes that some parents transmit
L to their children although parents with young children do not speak L anymore.
For the 3G model, we therefore assume that only younger adults (between 20 and
49 years of age) form new families. Children and older adults are not taken into
account. Based on (5.78)-(5.83) and setting p = D = 0, we have
ΨHH = X 2H + C1XH(1−XH) + (1− C1)XHXL (5.102)
ΨHL = 0 (5.103)
ΨHB = 2(1− C1)XHXB (5.104)
ΨLL =
(
1 + C1
XH
1−XH
)(XL + C2XB)XL (5.105)
ΨLB = 2
(
1 + C1
XH
1−XH
)
(1− C2)XLXB + (1− C1)XHXL (5.106)
ΨBB =
(
1 + C1
XH
1−XH
)(
C2XL + XB
)XB. (5.107)
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Language transmission within the family is basically modeled as in the 1G case.
It is affected by linguistic concentration, the status of the minority language and
the linguistic composition of the population. Younger adults might weight the
distribution of repertoires among different age groups differently. If they want to
choose a repertoire that enables wide communication and future job opportunities
for their children, parents might not care so much about the language skills of the
old generation. If they want to preserve cultural heritage, the skills of the old gen-
eration might be especially relevant. Hence, we introduce weights pix (children),
piX (younger adults), and piX (older adults). We require pix + piX + piX = 1. Based
on these weights, we define the weighted distribution of language repertoires
χR(x,X ,X) := pixxR + piXXR + piXXR,
R = H,L,B. Let χ = (χH , χL). For example, if only younger adults are con-
sidered relevant, then piX = 1 and χ = X . This weighted distribution then deter-
mines which languages are transmitted. That means we set
QR(F ) = QR(F ;C, S, χ), (5.108)
where QR(F ;C, S, ·) is defined by (5.84)-(5.87) and (5.88)-(5.91). So instead
of the distribution of repertoires in the whole population X , we work with the
weighted distribution χ.
5.3.1.2 Language dynamics
Language dynamics in the 3G model are similar to those in the basic 1G model.
One major difference is that only younger adults are assumed to form new families
and produce offspring. To capture the effect of family formation and language
transmission we define analogously to (5.93),
fR(x,X ,X) :=
∑
F
QR
(
F ;χ(x,X ,X)) ·Ψ(F ;C,X ). (5.109)
In the 3G model, the dynamics of the three generations have to be described sep-
arately. We assume that individual age is equally distributed in each of the three
age groups. That means that there are as many two year old children as there
are 18 year old children, and as many 25 year old younger adults as 45 year old
younger adults. Moreover, we make the simplifying assumption that death occurs
only among older adults. The death rate in this age group is denoted by µX and is
higher than the overall death rate µ in the 1G model. By λX we denote the birth
rate among younger adults, which is higher than the overall birth rate λ in the
1G model. The basic dynamics without schooling, adult language learning and
migration are given by the following six differential equations:
n˙R(t) = −nR(t)
20
+ λXN (t)fR(x(t),X (t),X(t)) (5.110)
N˙R(t) = −NR(t)
30
+
nR(t)
20
, (5.111)
N˙R(t) = −µXNR(t) + NR(t)
30
, (5.112)
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R = H,L. The numbers 20 and 30 correspond to the age-span of children and
younger adults. Next, we add schooling, adult language learning and migration.
We assume that only younger adults learn additional languages. As before, the
more people speak a language, the more attractive it is to learn this language. For
language transmission we already argued that not all individuals in the population
are equally relevant for parents’ decisions. The same holds true for adult language
learning. Hence, instead of X in the 1G model, adults consider the weighted
distribution χ for their learning decisions. We hence use
aL,B(S(L), C;χ) = (1− C1)max{0, θS(H)χH − φ(1− vH)} (5.113)
aH,B(S(L), C;χ) = (1− C1)max{0, θS(L)χL − φ(1− vL). (5.114)
To shorten the formulas, we define fR(t) = fR(x(t),X (t),X(t)) and
aR,B(t) = aR,B(S(L), C;χ(t)). We denote the number of children migrating to
the population in year t by m(t), the number of younger adults byM(t) and the
number of older adults by M(t). The language dynamics of the 3G model are
described by
n˙R(t) = −nR(t)
20
+ λXN (t)fR(t) +mR(t), (5.115)
N˙R(t) = −1 + 29aR,B(t)
30
NR(t) + (1− sR,B)nR(t) + sB,RnB(t)
20
+MR(t),
(5.116)
N˙R(t) = −µXNR(t) + NR(t)
30
+MR(t), (5.117)
R = H,L.
5.3.1.3 Special case: constant migration flow
As for the 1G model, we consider the special case of a constant migration flow,
i.e. m(t) ≡ m, M(t) ≡ M andM(t) ≡ M. Consequently, the overall annual
number of migrants M = m +M +M is constant as well. We introduce the
notation q := m/M , Q := M/M and Q := M/M . Moreover, we assume that
the distribution of the newcomers’ language repertoires is the same for all age
groups, i.e. mR/m =MR/M =MR/M =: QR.
Again, we want to calculate the dynamics of the distribution of repertoires if the
population size is at a steady state. We know that the sizes of the age groups
evolve according to
n˙(t) = − 1
20
n(t) + λXN (t) +m(t), (5.118)
N˙ (t) = − 1
30
N (t) + 1
20
n(t) +M(t), (5.119)
N˙(t) = −µXN(t) + 1
30
N (t) +M(t). (5.120)
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Lemma 5.3.1.1. For λX < 1/30 the dynamic system described by (5.118)-(5.120)
is asymptotically stable. The steady states are given by
n∞ = 20
(
λX
1−Q
1/30− λX + q
)
M =: w∞M, (5.121)
N∞ = 1−Q
1/30− λXM =:W∞M, (5.122)
N∞ =
1
µX
(
1−Q
1− 30λX +Q
)
M =:W∞M. (5.123)
The proof of this lemma can be found in the Appendix. For λX ≥ 1/30, the
overall population size grows to infinity over time, as do the absolute sizes of the
three age groups. In the next lemma we consider the relation between the sizes of
the three age groups.
Lemma 5.3.1.2. Let λX ≥ 1/30. Then,
WN/n := lim
t→∞
N (t)
n(t)
=
1
120λX
+
√
1
(120λX )2
+
1
20λX
, (5.124)
Wn/N := lim
t→∞
n(t)
N (t) = 1/LN/n, (5.125)
WN/N := lim
t→∞
N (t)
N(t)
= 30µX − 1 + 3
2
Ln,N . (5.126)
This lemma is proven in the Appendix.
With the help of the last two lemmas, we now look at the distribution of language
skills when the population sizes are at their steady states or steady state fractions.
Applying the quotient rule, we get
x˙R(t) = λX
(
fR(t)− xR(t)
)N (t)
n(t)
+
(
QR − xR(t)
)qM(t)
n(t)
(5.127)
X˙R(t) = −29
30
aR,B(t)XR(t) + 1
20
[
(1− sR,B)xR(t) + sB,RxB(t)−XR(t))
] n(t)
N (t)
+
(
QR −XR(t)
)QM(t)
N (t) (5.128)
X˙R(t) =
1
30
(XR(t)− XR(t))N (t)
N(t)
+
(
QR − XR(t)
)QM(t)
N(t)
(5.129)
In the case of λX < 1/30, the steady states of the system (n(t),N (t),N(t)) are
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given by (5.121)-(5.123). Plugging these in, we get in the steady state that
x˙R(t) = λX
(
fR(t)− xR(t)
)W∞
w∞
+
(
QR − xR(t)
) q
w∞
, (5.130)
X˙R(t) = −29
30
aR,B(t)XR(t) + 1
20
[
(1− sR,B)xR(t) + sB,RxB(t)−XR(t))
] w∞
W∞
+
(
QR −XR(t)
) Q
W∞ , (5.131)
X˙R(t) =
1
30
(XR(t)− XR(t))W∞
W∞
+
(
QR − XR(t)
) Q
W∞
. (5.132)
Using Lemma 5.3.1.2, we have for λX ≥ 1/30 that
x˙R(t) = λX
(
fR(t)− xR(t)
)
WN/n, (5.133)
X˙R(t) = −29
30
aR,B(t)XR(t)
+
1
20
[
(1− sR,B)xR(t) + sB,RxB(t)−XR(t))
]
Wn/N , (5.134)
X˙R(t) =
1
30
(XR(t)− XR(t))WN/N. (5.135)
5.3.2 Model with 10 age groups
For the 10G model, we distinguish not between three generations, but between 10
age groups. For R = H,L,B and i = 1, ..., 10, we denote by Ni,R the number
of people with language repertoire R aged between 10(i − 1) years and 10i − 1
years. For example, N3,H is the number of H-monolinguals between 20 and 29.
Furthermore, for i = 1, ..., 10, Ni denotes the number of all individuals between
10(i − 1) and 10i − 1 years of age. The relative sizes of the language repertoire
and age groups are denoted by Xi,R := Ni,R/Ni. Here, we also use the notation
introduced for the 3G model:
nR := N1,R +N2,R, (5.136)
NR := N3,R +N4,R +N5,R, (5.137)
NR := N6,R +N7,R +N8,R +N9,R +N10,R, (5.138)
and
xR :=
∑2
i=1Ni,R∑2
i=1Ni
, (5.139)
XR :=
∑5
i=3Ni,R∑5
i=3Ni
, (5.140)
XR :=
∑10
i=6Ni,R∑10
i=6Ni
. (5.141)
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As before, x = (xH , xL), X = (XH ,XL) and X = (XH ,XL). Concerning lan-
guage learning and family formation, we make the same assumptions as in the 3G
model: only younger adults, i.e. individuals between 20 and 49 (age groups 3-
5), learn additional languages outside of formal education and form new families.
Moreover, we again assume that ages are equally distributed in each age group,
i.e. there are as many 25 year old younger adults as there are 29 year old younger
adults. Last, we assume that only older adults (age groups 6-10) die.
5.3.2.1 Family formation and language transmission
Family formation and language transmission are modeled as in the 3G case. Using
N as defined in (5.137), the fractions of families of type F , ΨF = ΨF (F ;C,X ),
are determined by (5.102)-(5.107). Using the weighted distribution
χR(x,X ,X) := pixxR + piXXR + piXXR
and χ = (χH , χL), we assume that the fraction of F -type families bringing up
their children with repertoire R is QR(F ;C, S, χ), cf. (5.108). We hence use the
same short notation
fR(t) = fR
(
C, x(t),X (t),X(t))
=
∑
F
QR
(
F ;χ(x(t),X (t),X(t))) ·Ψ(F ;C,X (t)),
aR,B(t) = arB
(
S(L), C;χ(x(t),X (t),X(t))).
5.3.2.2 Language dynamics
Despite some differences, the dynamics of the 10G model are comparable to those
of the 3G model. In the 10G model, the repertoires of the two youngest age
groups are affected by schooling. To differentiate between primary and secondary
education, we use two sets of schooling parameters: s1,R,B and s2,R,B . The pa-
rameter s1,R,B denotes the fraction of children raised with language repertoire R,
R = H,L, who become bilingual due to primary education (to be more precise:
children raised with R that are bilingual at the age of 10). The parameter s2,R,B
corresponds to secondary education: it denotes the fraction of children that are
monolingual at the age of 10 and acquire an additional language until the age
of 20. As in the 3G model, we make the simplifying assumption that the death
rate µX is the same for all older adults. Moreover, we assume that people are
not getting older than 99 years. We denote the number of people migrating with
repertoire R to age group i at time t byMi,R(t). For i = 4, 5 and j = 7, ..., 10, the
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dynamics are given by
N˙1,R(t) = − 1
10
N1,R(t) + λXN (t)fR(t) +M1,R(t), (5.142)
N˙2,R(t) =
(−N2,R(t) + (1− s1,R,B)N1,R(t) + s1,B,RN1,B(t))/10 +M2,R(t),
(5.143)
N˙3,R(t) = −
(
1 + 9aR,B(X (t))
)
N3,R(t)/10 + (1− s2,R,B)N2,R(t)/10
+ s2,B,RN2,B(t)/10 +M3,R(t), (5.144)
N˙i,R(t) =
(
− (1 + 9aR,B(X (t)))Ni,R(t) + (1− aR,B(X (t))Ni−1,R(t))/10
+Mi,R(t), (5.145)
N˙6,R(t) =
(
− (1 + 9µX)N6,R(t) +
(
1− aR,B(X (t)
)
N5,R(t)
)
/10 +M6,R(t),
(5.146)
N˙j,R(t) =
(
− (1 + 9µX)Nj,R(t) + (1− µX)Nj−1,R(t)
)
/10 +Mj,R(t).
(5.147)
5.3.2.3 Special case: constant migration flow
Again, we take a closer look at the language dynamics in case of a constant mi-
gration flow. So Mi(t) ≡ Mi for all t. By qi we denote the fraction Mi/M . As
before, we assume thatMi,R/Mi =: QR is the same for all i. The overall sizes of
all ten age groups evolve according to
N˙1 = −N1/10 + λXN +M1, (5.148)
N˙i = −Ni/10 +Ni−1/10 +Mi, (5.149)
N˙6 = −(µX + (1− µX)/10)N6 +N5/10 +M6, (5.150)
N˙j = −(µX + (1− µX)/10)Nj + (1− µX)Nj−1/10 +Mj, (5.151)
where i = 2, 3, 4, 5 and j = 7, 8, 9, 10. Note, for i ≥ 2 the above differential
equations are of the form
N˙i = −AiNi +BiNi−1 +Mi,
for constant coefficients Ai, Bi.
As for the 3G model, we want to analyze steady states of the system. We have
to consider the convergent case λX < 1/30 and the divergent case λX ≥ 1/30
separately. The two following lemmas hold true.
Lemma 5.3.2.1. For λX < 1/30, the dynamic system described by (5.148)-
(5.151) is dynamically stable. To express the steady states of the system, we define
D1 = 1, E1 = 0 and for i = 2, ..., 10,
Di :=
i∏
j=2
Bj
Aj
, Ei :=
qi
Ai
+
i−1∑
k=2
(
i∏
j=k+1
Bj
Aj
)
qk
Ak
.
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Moreover, we define D = D3 + D4 + D5 and E = E3 + E4 + E5. The steady
states can be expressed as, i = 1, ..., 10,
Ni,∞ =
[
Di
10
1− 10λXD
(
λXE + q1
)
+ Ei
]
M =: Fi,∞M (5.152)
A proof is provided in the Appendix. Consequently, the number of younger adults
in the steady state is
N∞ =M
5∑
i=3
Fi,∞ =: F∞M. (5.153)
Next, we derive the differential equations for the distribution of the language
repertoires for each age group in the steady state population. To do so, we once
more apply the quotient rule, i.e.
X˙i,R(t) =
d
dt
(
Ni,R(t)
Ni(t)
)
=
N˙i,R(t)
Ni(t)
−Xi,R(t). N˙i(t)
Ni(t)
. (5.154)
In detail, this yields for i = 4, 5 and j = 7, 8, 9, 10,
X˙1,R(t) = λX
(
fR(t)−X1,R(t)
)N (t)
N1(t)
+ q1
(
QR −X1,R(t)
) M
N1(t)
, (5.155)
X˙2,R(t) =
1
10
(
(1− s1,R,B)X1,R(t)−X2,R(t)
)
N1(t)
N2(t)
+ q2
(
QR −X2,R(t)
) M
N2(t)
, (5.156)
X˙3,R(t) = −9aR,B(X (t))
10
X3,R(t) +
1
10
(
(1− s2,R,B)X2,R(t)−X3,R(t)
)
N2(t)
N3(t)
+ q3
(
QR −X3,R(t)
) M
N3(t)
, (5.157)
X˙i,R(t) = −9aR,B(X (t))
10
Xi,R(t)
+
1
10
(
(1− aR,B(X (t)))Xi−1,R(t)−Xi,R(t)
)
Ni−1(t)
Ni(t)
+ qi
(
QR −Xi,R(t)
) M
Ni(t)
, (5.158)
X˙6,R(t) =
1
10
((
1− aR,B(X (t))
)
X5,R(t)−X6,R(t)
)
N5(t)
N6(t)
+ q6
(
QR −X6,R(t)
) M
N6(t)
, (5.159)
X˙j,R(t) =
1− µX
10
(
Xj−1,R(t)−Xj,R(t)
)
Nj−1(t)
Nj(t)
+ qj
(
QR −Xj,R(t)
) M
Nj(t)
.
(5.160)
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In the case of λX < 1/30, we can plug in Ni,∞ = Fi,∞M for Ni(t), i = 1, ..., 10,
cf. (5.152) and (5.153) to obtain the dynamics of the linguistic composition in the
steady state. For λX ≥ 1/30, all Ni tend to infinity as t → ∞. Hence, the last
term qk(QR −Xk,R(t))M/Nk(t) vanishes in the limit. To handle the first term(s)
in equations (5.155)-(5.160), we have to investigate the limits Nk(t)/Nk+1(t) as
t→∞.
Lemma 5.3.2.2. Consider Nk, k = 1, ..., 10, as defined by (5.148)-(5.151). Let
λX ≥ 1/30 and let W∞ be the unique positive real solution of the polynomial
equation 0 = W 5∞ − 10λX (W 2∞ + W∞ + 1). Then, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and j =
6, 7, 8, 9, we have
lim
t→∞
Ni(t)
Ni+1(t)
= W∞, (5.161)
lim
t→∞
N5(t)
N6(t)
= W∞ + 9µX, (5.162)
lim
t→∞
Nj(t)
Nj+1(t)
=
W∞ + 9µX
1− µX . (5.163)
As for λX < 1/30, we can now plug in these limits and obtain differential equa-
tions for the evolution of the relative sizes of the language repertoire groups in the
limit. Note, for λX = 1/30 we haveW∞ = 1 and thatW∞ increases with λX .
5.4 A model with several minority languages (1G-nL)
In this section, we present a version of the 1G model with multiple minorities. We
consider a majority language H (the official local language) and n minority lan-
guages, denoted by Li, i = 1, .., n. We denote the set of indexes {i i = 1, ..., n}
by I . We assume that every individual is either monolingual in H , monolingual
in one of the minority languages Li, or speaks H and additionally a minority lan-
guage. A bilingual speaker of H and Li is denoted by Bi. For the model, we
neglect the case that individuals could speak multiple minority languages. By R
we denote the set of all “relevant” language repertoires, i.e.
R = {H,L1, ..., Ln, B1, ..., Bn}.
All together we have #R = 1 + 2n relevant language repertoires. Next we intro-
duce some notation. Let R ∈ R. We define
• N : overall population size,
• NR: Number of people with repertoire R,
• NL := NL1 + ... + NLn : Number of monolingual speakers of minority
languages,
• NB := NB1 + ...+NBn : Number of bilinguals.
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We also consider the fractions XR = NR/N , XL = NL/N and XB = NB/N .
Moreover, we introduce the column vector
X := (XH , XL1 , ..., XLn , XB1 , ..., XBn)
′.
Status parameters
For the models with two languages, we only had to consider the status of the
majority language and the status of the single minority language. Here, we have
to take into account the status of all the minority languages. Let SH be the status
of the majority language and SLi the status of minority language Li. We consider
the relative status of languages l, l = H,L1, ...., Ln:
Sl =
Sl
SH + SL1 + ...+ SLn
. (5.164)
By construction,
SH +
n∑
i=1
SLi = 1.
Let SL denote the vector (SL1 , ..., SLn)
′ and S denote the vector
(SH , SL1 , ..., SLn)
′.
Concentration parameters
For the nL model, we work with n pairs of concentration parametersC1,i, C2,i, i =
1, ..., n. The parameter C1,i measures the concentration of speakers of minority
language Li (with respect to H monolinguals), and the parameter C2,i measures
the concentration of Li monolinguals with respect to bilinguals speaking H and
Li. As before, let the territory be divided in K regions. Analogously to the 1L
model, we consider
C1,i =
1
2
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣NLi,k +NBi,kNLi +NBi − NH,kNH
∣∣∣∣ , (5.165)
C2,i =
1
2
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣NLi,kNLi − NBi,kNBi
∣∣∣∣ , (5.166)
and the matrix
C =
 C1,1 ... C1,n
C2,1 ... C2,n
 .
5.4.1 Family formation
Family formation and language transmission are modeled comparably to the case
of only two languages (1G-1L). Couples and families consist of two individuals.
Considering all possible combinations of repertoires, we define different sets of
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family types:
FHL := {HLi | i ∈ I}, (5.167)
FHB := {HBi | i ∈ I}, (5.168)
FLL := {LiLj | i, j ∈ I}, (5.169)
FBB := {BiBj | i, j ∈ I}, (5.170)
FLB := {LiBj | i, j ∈ I}. (5.171)
The set of all possible family types F is the given by F = {HH} ∪ FHL ∪ FHB ∪
FBB ∪ FLL ∪ FLB . Hence, the number of family types is given by
#F = 1 + n+ n+
n(n+ 1)
2
+
n(n+ 1)
2
+ n2 = 1 + 3n+ 2n2.
For n = 1 we get #F = 6 and for n = 2 we already have #F = 15.
Lemma 5.4.1.1. In the 1G-nL model, couples are distributed as follows:
ψHH = X
2
H +XH
n∑
j=1
C1,jXj, (5.172)
ψHLi = (1− C1,i)(1 +XH)XLi −XLi
n∑
j=1
(1− C1,j)Xj,
(5.173)
ψHBi = (1− C1,i)(1 +XH)XBi −XBi
n∑
j=1
(1− C1,j)Xj,
(5.174)
ψLiLj = (2− C1,i − C1,j)XLiXLj , (5.175)
ψLiBj = (2− C1,i − C1,j)XLiXBj , (5.176)
ψBiBj = (2− C1,i − C1,j)XBiXBj , (5.177)
ψLiLi + ψLiBi + ψBiBi = Xi
[
C1,i + (1− C1,i)Xi
]
. (5.178)
Defining Ei := C1,i + (1− C1,i)Xi, we further have
ψLiLi = Ei(XLi + C2,iXBi)
XLi
Xi
, (5.179)
ψLiBi = 2Ei(1− C2,i)
XLiXBi
Xi
, (5.180)
ψBiBi = Ei(XBi + C2,iXLi)
XBi
Xi
. (5.181)
A derivation of the couple distribution in the 1G-nL model is provided in the Ap-
pendix. For n = 1, the above formulas yield the exact same couple distribution
we derived for the 1G-1L model. Given this couple type distribution, one can now
derive the family type distribution. The procedure is as before. Individuals form
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couples. Those couples with a common language (HH,HBi, LiLi, LiBi, BiBj)
are assumed to be always successful, i.e. become a family. All those couples with-
out a common language split up again (p = 0), due to communication barriers.
They enter a new round of couple and family formation. This is repeated until all
individuals are part of a family. Since formulas are more complex for the nL case
than for the 1L case, we do not provide lengthy derivations and formulas for the
family distribution Ψ for the nL model. Instead, for an application of the model,
the family type distribution is approximated numerically. In Table 9, we provide
a numerical example to compare the results of the random family formation pro-
cess for a 1L and 2L model. For the 1G model, we set XH = 0.7, XL = 0.1
and XB = 0.2. For the 2G model, we consider two examples matching the num-
bers of the 1G model. As a first example, we consider the symmetric example
XH = 0.7, XL1 = XL2 = 0.05 and XB1 = XB2 = 0.1. As a second example,
we consider a case with a larger and a smaller minority language: XH = 0.7,
XL1 = 0.08, XL2 = 0.02 and XB1 = 0.16, XB2 = 0.04. We set for the concentra-
tion measures C1,1 = C1,2 = 0.5 and C2,1 = C2,2 = 0. This results in the family
type distributions shown in Table 9.
5.4.2 Language transmission
As before, parents can raise their children as monolinguals (R = H,L1, ..., Ln)
or as bilinguals (R = B1, ..., Bn). For F ∈ F, we consider qR(F ), the fraction of
F -type families who decide to bring up their children with language repertoire R.
Before introducing functional expressions for the q-functions, we use the utility
maximization approach to derive general properties of those functions. As for the
1L case, we make the following assumptions:
A1: All children in one family have same language repertoire.
A2: Both parents shall be able to communicate with their children,
i.e. qLi(HH) ≡ qLi(HBi) ≡ qLi(HBj) ≡ qLi(LjBj) ≡ qLi(BjBj) ≡ 0
and qH(LiLi) ≡ qH(LiBi) ≡ 0.
A3: Only those languages spoken by the parents can be transmitted,
i.e. qH(HH) ≡ qLi(LiLi) ≡ 1.
Assumptions A2 and A3 yield, i, j = 1, .., n, i ̸= j,
1 = qH(HBi) + qBi(HBi),
1 = qLi(LiBi) + qBi(LiBi),
1 = qH(BiBi) + qLi(BiBi) + qBi(BiBi),
1 = qH(BiBj) + qBi(BiBj) + qBj(BiBj).
Using the utility maximization approach, we obtain general properties of the func-
tions qR(F ) depicted in Table 10. A justification for the properties is provided in
the Appendix.
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1L model 2L model
Example 1 & 2 Example 1 Example 2
ΨHH 0.6300 ΨHH 0.6288 0.6292
ΨHL 0
ΨHL1 0 0
ΨHL2 0 0∑
0 0
ΨHB 0.1400
ΨHB1 0.0712 0.1128
ΨHB2 0.0712 0.0289∑
0.1424 0.1416
ΨLL 0.0567
ΨL1L1 0.0292 0.0458
ΨL2L2 0.0292 0.0119
ΨL1L2 0 0∑
0.0583 0.0577
ΨLB 0.0867
ΨL1B1 0.0417 0.0684
ΨL2B2 0.0417 0.0161
ΨL1B2 0 0
ΨL2B1 0 0∑
0.0834 0.0846
ΨBB 0.0867
ΨB1B1 0.0385 0.0662
ΨB2B2 0.0385 0.0143
ΨB1B2 0.0101 0.0064∑
0.0871 0.0869
Table 9: Numerical comparison of family type distributions.
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∂/∂XH ∂/∂XLi ∂/∂XBi ∂/∂XBj ∂/∂XLj
qH(HBi) 0 ≤ 0 0 0 0
qH(BiBi) ≥ 0 ≤ 0 0 ≥ 0 0
qH(BiBj) 0 ≤ 0 0 0 ≤ 0
qLi(LiBi) ≤ 0 0 0 ≤ 0 0
qLi(BiBi) ≤ 0 ≥ 0 0 ≤ 0 0
qBi(HBi) 0 ≥ 0 0 0 0
qBi(LiBi) ≥ 0 0 0 ≥ 0 0
qBi(BiBi) ≥ 0 ≥ 0 0 ≥ 0 0
qBi(BiBj) 0 ≥ 0 0 0 ≤ 0
Table 10: Signum of the partial derivatives of qL(F ) for the nL model.
As for the other models, we assume that not all families are successful in their
transmission efforts. Let QR(F ) denote the fraction of all F -type families who
successfully transmit repertoire R to their children. We have
QH(HH) = QLi(Li, Li) = 1,
and, analogously to the 1L models,
QH(HBi;C, S,X) = (1− C1,i) · qH(HBi;S,X) + C1,i/2, (5.182)
QH(BiBi;C, S,X) = (1− C1,i) · qH(BiBi;S,X), (5.183)
QLi(LiBi;C, S,X) = (1− C1,i) · qLi(LiBi;S,X) + C1,i, (5.184)
QLi(BiBi;C, S,X) = (1− C1,i) · qLi(BiBi;S,X) + C1,i. (5.185)
Moreover, in the case of families with bilinguals speakers of different minority
languages we set
QH(BiBj;C, S,X) =
2− C1,i − C1,j
2
qH(BiBj;S,X), (5.186)
QBi(BiBj;C, S,X) =
2− C1,i − C1,j
2
qBi(BiBj;S,X) +
C1,i
2
, (5.187)
QBj(BiBj;C, S,X) =
2− C1,i − C1,j
2
qBj(BiBj;S,X) +
C1,j
2
. (5.188)
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For C1,i = C1,j = 0, we have QLR(BiBj) = qLR(BiBj). For C1,i = C1,j =
1, both minorities are fully segregated with respect to the H-speaking majority
population, and bilinguals do not raise their children as H-monolinguals. Since
only concentration with respect to the majority language is taken into account (C1
but not C2), in this case half of the couples raise their children as Bi’s and the
other half raise their children as Bj’s.
5.4.2.1 Functional form
Next, we offer a functional form of the qR(F ) functions similar to the functional
expressions presented for the 1L model. Let h : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] be a non-
decreasing function in both dimensions with h(0, 0) = 0 and h(1, 1) = 1, and
ε1, ε2, ζ1, ζ2 be constants between 0 and 1 satisfying ε1 + ε2 = 1, ζ2 ≤ ζ1 and
ζ1 + ζ2 ≤ 1. For the functional expressions we consider
qH(HBi;S,X) = ε1
(
1− h(XLi , Si)
)
+ ε2SH , (5.189)
qH(BiBi;S,X) = ζ1
(
1− h(XLi , Si)
)
+ ζ2h
(
XH +
∑
j ̸=i
XBj , SH
)
, (5.190)
qLi(LiBi;S,X) = ε1
(
1− h
(
XH +
∑
j ̸=i
XBj , SH
))
+ ε2SLi , (5.191)
qLi(BiBi;S,X) = ζ1
(
1− h
(
XH +
∑
j ̸=i
XBj , SH
))
+ ζ2h(XLi , Si),
(5.192)
qH(BiBj;S,X) =
1
2
(
1− h(XLi , Si)
)
+
1
2
(
1− h(XLj , Sj)
)
. (5.193)
Note, qBi(HBi), qBi(LiBi) and qBi(BiBi) are fully determined by the above spec-
ifications, while qBi(BiBj) + qBj(BiBj) = 1− qH(BiBj). We set
qBi(BiBj) =
h(XLi , Si)
h(XLi , Si) + h(XLj , Sj)
(1− qH(BiBj)) = h(XLi , Si)
2
.
These q-functions satisfy the conditions derived from the utility maximization
approach, cf. Table 10.
5.4.3 Language dynamics
In the nL model, we have sets of n parameters for schooling and adult language
learning. Consider
• sH,Bi : fraction of children entering school as H monolinguals who leave
school as Bi’s,
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• sLi,Bi : fraction of children entering school as Li monolinguals who leave
school as Bi’s,
• sBi,H : fraction of children entering school as Bi’s who leave school as H
monolinguals,
• aH,Bi : annual rate at which H monolinguals become Bi’s,
• aLi,Bi : annual rate at which Li monolinguals become Bi’s.
As before, cf. (5.95)-(5.96), a possible functional form for aR1,R2 is given by
aH,Bi(S,C;X) = (1− C1,i)max{0, θSiXLi − φ(1− vLi), (5.194)
aLi,Bi(S,C;X) = (1− C1,i)max
{
0, θSH
(
XH +
∑
j ̸=i
XBj
)
− φ(1− vH)
}
.
(5.195)
To describe the dynamics in the nL model, we again use functions fR and gR. For
R = H,L1, ..., Ln we define
fR(X) =
∑
F
QR(F ;C, S,X)Ψ(F ;C,X)
and
gH(X) =
(
1−
n∑
i=1
sH,Bi
)
fH(X) +
n∑
i=1
sBi,HfBi(X), (5.196)
gLi(X) = (1− sLi,Bi)fLi(X), (5.197)
gBi(X) = (1− sBi,H)fBi(X) + sH,BifH(X) + sLi,BifLi(X). (5.198)
The language dynamics is described by the differential equations
N˙H(t) = −
[
µ+ (1− µ)
n∑
i=1
aH,Bi(t)
]
NH(t) + λN(t)gH(X(t)) +MH(t),
(5.199)
N˙Li(t) = − [µ+ (1− µ)aLi,Bi ]NLi(t) + λN(t)gLi(X(t)) +MLi(t), (5.200)
N˙Bi(t) = −µNBi(t) + (1− µ)aH,BiNH(t) + (1− µ)aLi,BiNLi(t)
+ λN(t)gBi(X(t)) +MBi(t), (5.201)
N˙(t) = (λ− µ)N(t) +M(t). (5.202)
5.4.3.1 Special case: constant migration flow
For λ < µ, the population sizeN converges toN(∞) =M/(µ−λ). In the steady
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state we obtain
X˙H(t) = −
[
µ+ (1− µ)
n∑
j=1
aH,Bj(t)
]
XH(t) + λgH(X(t))
+ (µ− λ)MH(t)/M(t), (5.203)
X˙Li(t) = − [µ+ (1− µ)aLi,Bi(t)]XLi(t)
+ λgLi(X(t)) + (µ− λ)MLi(t)/M(t), (5.204)
X˙Bi(t) = −µXBi(t) + (1− µ)aH,BiXH(t) + (1− µ)aLi,BiXLi(t)
+ λgBi(X(t)) + (µ− λ)MBi(t)/M(t). (5.205)
If λ ≥ µ andM > 0, then the population size diverges (N(t)→∞). In this case
we get in the limit that
X˙H(t) = −
[
λ+ (1− µ)
n∑
j=1
aH,Bj(t)
]
XH(t) + λgH(X(t)), (5.206)
X˙Li(t) = − [λ+ (1− µ)aLi,Bi(t)]XLi(t) + λgLi(X(t)), (5.207)
X˙Bi(t) = −λXBi(t) + (1− µ)aH,BiXH(t)
+ (1− µ)aLi,BiXLi(t) + λgBi(X(t)). (5.208)
5.5 Numerical comparison
In this section we compare the four models (1G-1L, 3G-1L, 10G-1L, 1G-nL)
numerically. We consider numerical examples to illustrate similarities and dif-
ferences between the models. We only consider the special case of a constant
migration flow and use the functional expressions suggested in the previous sec-
tions. All models were implemented in MATLAB, and the numerical results are
depicted in tables and figures.
5.5.1 Models with a single minority language
We want to compare projections for comparable scenarios produced by the four
different models. To do so, we use the empirical examples studied in Templin
(2018) and Templin (2019). In Templin (2018), we studied English (H) and Span-
ish (L) in the United States and in Templin (2019) Spanish (H) and Basque (L)
in the Basque Autonomous Communities (BAC) in Spain. In both essays, we
roughly estimated parameters from empirical data and applied a 1G-1L model
to analyze both cases. The parameters and the numerical characterization of the
linguistic environment for 1G-1L models are displayed in Table 11.
Not all the parameters displayed in Table 11 do actually appear in Templin (2018)
and Templin (2019). In Templin (2018), we used a different functional form to
model the language transmission fractions qR(F ). In Templin (2019), these frac-
tions were even considered to be constant. Here, we use the new functional form
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Example 1 Example 2
Parameters / Environment US BAC
Rates
λ 0.015 0.0085
µ 0.0087 0.0088
Status
SH 0.75 0.6
SL 0.25 0.4
Transmission
ε1; ε2 0.6; 0.4 0.5; 0.5
ζ1; ζ2 0.6; 0.3 0.6; 0.3
Concentration
C1 0.27 0.47
C2 0 0
Schooling
sL,B 1 1
sH,B 0.009 0.2
sB,H 0.59 0.24
Adult learning
θ; φ 0.095; 0.2 0.095; 0.2
vH ; vL 0.8; 0 0.8; 0.5
Migration
MH 0 2,300
ML 626,000 0
MB 47,000 0
Initial composition
NH(0) 187,187,000 1,605,700
NL(0) 5,372,000 0
NB(0) 5,724,000 509,800
Table 11: Model parameters for the two examples (1G-1L).
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for qR(F ) proposed in Section 5.2.3 and with new values for ε1, ε1, ζ1, ζ2. More-
over, adult language learning rates aR1,R2 were also assumed to be constant in
Templin (2019). Here, we use the functional form for aR1,R2 that we outlined
above, cf. Section 5.2.4.2 and that was also applied in Templin (2018). For the
second example, we copy the values for θ, φ, vH from first one, but set vL = 0.5,
since the learning of Basque (L) is supported by language policies in the BAC.
Furthermore, there are no status variables in Templin (2019). We set SL = 0.4
in the second example. Lastly, we assumed constant relative migration in Tem-
plin (2019) – i.e. M(t)/N(t) ≡ const – instead of constant absolute migration –
M(t) ≡ const – considered here. To get constant migration numbers, we use the
migration numbers at the middle of the time span analyzed in Templin (2019), i.e.
M(t) ≡ M(T/2), where T/2 corresponds to the year 2001. The aim of this sec-
tion is not to analyze English/Spanish competition in the US or Spanish/Basque
competition in the BAC. We just build on the empirical case studies in Templin
(2018) and Templin (2019) to obtain two realistic numerical examples, which we
can analyze to compare the different models.
Naturally, for the three 1L models (1G-1L, 3G-1L, 10G-1L), almost all model
parameters are identical. One difference concerns population dynamics. In the
1G model, the annual birth rate λ and the annual death rate µ concern the whole
population. So if N denotes the overall population size, then within one year λN
children are born and µN people die. In the 3G and 10G model, we assume that
only younger adults have children and that only older adults die. Accordingly, the
rates λX and µX only concern younger adults, resp. older adults. Within one year,
λXN children are born and µXN people die, N and N denoting the number of
younger and older adults. Therefore, we have to have λX > λ and µX > µ, so that
the number of births and deaths is similar and hence the models are comparable.
Additional to that, we can not use the same death rates for the 3G-1L and the
10G-1L model, if both are to be compared. The reason for that is that due to the
construction of both models, in the 3G-1L model every year µXN people die. In
contrast, in the 10G-1L model every year µXN+(1−µX)N10/10 people die, since
we do not consider individuals older than 100 years of age. Therefore, the death
rate in the 10G-1L model has to be lower, such that in both models a comparable
fraction of the population dies.
In the 1G model, we do not consider the age of migrants. To compare the different
models, we have to assume thatMR = mR +MR +MR and mR =
∑2
i=1Mi,R,
MR =
∑5
i=3Mi,R, MR =
∑10
i=6Mi,R, for R = H,L,B. For simplicity, we
set M1,R = M2,R = mR/2, M3,R = M4,R = M5,R = MR/3 and M6,R =
... = M10,R = MR/5. Last, we have to adapt the initial composition at time
t = 0. As the aim of this chapter is to compare the different models and not to
analyze the actual developments in the US and the BAC, we use rough estimates
of the age distribution for both cases.57 We assume that the age distribution is the
same for all three language repertoire groups. For the US, we set nR = 0.25NR,
NR = 0.40NR and N = 0.35NR. For the BAC, we set nR = 0.2NR, NR =
57Estimates are based on estimated data for 2017, see
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2010.html
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0.43NR and N = 0.37NR. As for migration, we set N1,R = N2,R = nR/2,
N3,R = N4,R = N5,R = NR/3 and N6,R = ... = N10,R = NR/5.
5.5.1.1 Numerical projections
We compare model projections for a time-span of T = 50 years. We consider
the evolution of the linguistic composition as projected by the different models.
Figures 15-16 display projections for the parameter constellations of Example 1
defined above. Figure 17 shows projections for Example 2. In Tables 13, 14 and
15 we compare the projections at different points in time. Note, in Example 1,
the overall population size tends to∞, while in Example 2, the overall population
size tends towards a finite steady state.
Example 1
It can be seen in Figures 15 and 16 that the 1G-1L, the 3G-1L and the 10G-1L
model produce comparable projections for the first 50 years. The overall popula-
tion grows fastest in the 10G-1L model and slowest in the 1G-1L model. At the
same time, the highest number of people speaking the minority language Spanish
is projected in the 3G-1L model. In the 1G-1L model, the number of Spanish
monolinguals is lower than in the 10G-1L model at t = 50, while the number
of bilinguals is higher in the 1G-1L model compared to the 10G-1L model. But
absolute numbers are to handle with caution, at least in the above examples. One
reason for that are the birth and death rates. First of all, we assumed that only
younger adults have children, although some children are also born to parents
younger than 20 years of age and older than 50 years of age. Although we adapted
the birth rates accordingly, this distorts the actual dynamics, since the rate λX only
concerns the number of younger adults, but not the number of older children (15-
19). If the age structure changes significantly, then the estimated and adapted rates
do not yield proper results anymore. We have a similar problem with the assump-
tion that only older adults die. Moreover, we made the simplifying assumption
of an equal death rate for all older age groups in the 10G-1L model. It would be
more realistic to work with specific death rates for each of the age groups, since
death rates are higher for people in their nineties than for people in their fifties.
For even more realistic 3G-1L and 10G-1L models, one should use specific birth
and death rates for all age groups.
Considering relative instead of absolute numbers, we can see that the difference
between the three projections is more moderate. After 50 years, 85.5% of the
population is monolingual in H in the 1G-1L projection, 83.4% in the 3G-1L
projection and 85.6% in the 10G-1L projection. So over a relatively long time
span, differences are in the range of just 2%. This is not to say that 2% of a
population of several hundred million people is not a relevant number. For a time
span of 25 years the projections are even closer to one another, especially the
3G-1L and the 10G-1L projection. For both models, the projected fractions of
bilinguals is equal and the fraction of Spanish monolinguals only differs by 0.3%,
cf. Table 14. Since we assumed the same birth rate for all younger adults and
the same death rate for all older adults, this similarity between the 3G-1L and
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Example 1 Example 2
Parameters / Environment US BAC
Rates
λX 0.0417 0.0198
µX 0.0249 0.0238
Migration
H
mH 0 575
MH 0 1,725
MH 0 0
L
mL 156,500 0
ML 469,500 0
ML 0 0
B
mB 11,750 0
MB 35,250 0
MB 0 0
H
nH(0) 46,796,750 321,140
NH(0) 74,874,800 690,451
NH(0) 65,515,450 594,109
L
nL(0) 1,343,000 0
Initial NL(0) 2,148,800 0
composition NL(0) 1,880,200 0
B
nB(0) 1,431,00 101,960
NB(0) 2,289,600 219,214
NB(0) 2,003,400 188,626
Table 12: Model parameters for the two examples (3G-1L).
Note, 0.015/(0.4 · 0.9) = 0.0417, 0.0085/0.43 = 0.0198, 0.0087/0.35 =
0.0249 and 0.0088/0.37 = 0.0238. Migration numbers were obtained via
mR = 1/4 ∗MR andMR = 3/4 ∗MR, i.e. for the examples it is assumed
that only children and younger adults migrate. The rates λX are additionally
adapted: In 2016, though, about 10% of all children in the US were born to
mothers younger than 20 years of age. In Spain this number is negligible. Cf.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/241533/birth-rate-by-age-of-mother-in
-the-us/
and
https://www.statista.com/statistics/449605/number-of-births-in-spain-by
-age-of-mother/
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t = 0 t = 10 t = 25 t = 50
1G-1L
NH(t) 187,187 200,087 221,882 265,763
NL(t) 5,372 9,591 14,292 19,500
NB(t) 5,724 8,380 13,977 25,574
3G-1L
nH(t) 46,796 53,476 60,585 72,338
NH(t) 74,874 75,235 80,082 93,607
NH(t) 65,515 73,245 82,832 98,532
NH(t) 187,187 201,957 223,500 264,479
nL(t) 1,343 2,818 4,867 7,497
NL(t) 2,148 5,017 7,440 9,274
NL(t) 1,880 2,541 4,423 7,719
NL(t) 5,372 10,377 16,731 24,491
nB(t) 1,431 1,967 3,389 6,140
NB(t) 2,289 3,868 7,222 13,383
NB(t) 2,003 2,442 3,984 8,706
NB(t) 5,724 8,278 14,596 28,230
10G-1L
nH(t) 46,796 54,496 62,761 77,741
NH(t) 74,874 74,475 80,385 100,342
NH(t) 90,473 74,261 87,232 108,207
NH(t) 212,145 203,234 230,379 286,292
nL(t) 1,343 2,099 2,923 3,529
NL(t) 2,148 4,893 6,708 7,420
NL(t) 2,596 2,699 5,605 10,990
NL(t) 6,088 9,693 15,237 21,940
nB(t) 1,431 2,483 4,446 6,763
NB(t) 2,289 3,694 6,022 9,057
NB(t) 2,766 2,444 4,025 8,599
NB(t) 6,487 8,622 14,494 24,420
Table 13: Projections for Example 1 – 1G-1L, 3G-1L and 10G-1L. Numbers are
given in thousends.
114
(a) 1G-1L model (b) 3G-1L model
(c) 10G-1L model (d) 1G-2L model
Figure 15: Projections for Example 1 – Evolution of the numbers of monolingual
and bilingual speakers.
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t = 0 t = 10 t = 25 t = 50
1G-1L
XH(t) 0.944 0.918 0.887 0.855
XL(t) 0.027 0.044 0.057 0.063
XB(t) 0.029 0.038 0.056 0.082
3G-1L
xH(t) 0.944 0.918 0.880 0.841
XH(t) 0.944 0.894 0.845 0.805
XH(t) 0.944 0.936 0.908 0.857
XH(t) 0.944 0.915 0.877 0.834
xL(t) 0.027 0.048 0.071 0.087
XL(t) 0.027 0.060 0.079 0.080
XL(t) 0.027 0.032 0.048 0.067
XL(t) 0.027 0.047 0.066 0.077
xB(t) 0.029 0.034 0.049 0.071
XB(t) 0.029 0.046 0.076 0.115
XB(t) 0.029 0.031 0.044 0.076
XB(t) 0.029 0.038 0.057 0.089
10G-1L
xH(t) 0.944 0.922 0.895 0.883
XH(t) 0.944 0.897 0.863 0.859
XH(t) 0.944 0.923 0.885 0.840
XH(t) 0.944 0.914 0.880 0.856
xL(t) 0.027 0.036 0.042 0.040
XL(t) 0.027 0.059 0.072 0.064
XL(t) 0.027 0.043 0.068 0.088
XL(t) 0.027 0.047 0.063 0.069
xB(t) 0.029 0.042 0.063 0.077
XB(t) 0.029 0.044 0.065 0.078
XB(t) 0.029 0.033 0.047 0.072
XB(t) 0.029 0.039 0.057 0.075
Table 14: Linguistic composition for Example 1 – 1G-1L, 3G-1L and 10G-1L.
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(a) 1G-1L model (b) 3G-1L model
(c) 10G-1L model (d) 1G-2L model
Figure 16: Projections for Example 1 – Evolution of the linguistic composition.
117
the 10G-1L model is what one would expect. In the 1G-1L model, the fraction
of Spanish monolinguals after 25 years is almost 1% lower than in the 3G-1L
model. One reason for that is the assumption that Spanish monolingual migrants
are assumed to be children or younger adults in the 3G model. That implies that
they are part of the population for a while until they finally grow old and die. In
the 1G-1L model their age is not taken into account and so they could potentially
die shortly after migrating.
Example 2
In Example 2, the most obvious difference between the projections of the 1G-1L
model on the one hand and the 3G-1L and the 10G-1L model on the other hand is
the existence of Basque monolingual speakers in the latter two. It can be seen in
Table 15 that all Basque monolinguals are children. Some Basque speaking par-
ents only speak Basque at home and so their children can be counted as Basque
monolinguals, at least for the first years in their life. At the latest when reaching
adulthood, they have acquired Spanish and are hence not monolingual anymore.
Since the 1G-1L model only considers adults, these Basque monolingual chil-
dren do not appear in the projections. If these children are considered as future
bilinguals, the 1G-1L and the 3G-1L model yield almost identical projections. In
contrast,the 10G-1L model projects higher fractions of bilinguals and hence lower
fractions of Spanish monolinguals. The difference to the 1G-1L and 3G-1L model
increases over time, but is still within a 2% range after 25 years.
Summary
To summarize, it can be said that for moderate time spans the simple 1G-1L model
yields a useful approximation for the more complex but also more realistic 3G-1L
and 10G-1L model. If absolute numbers are relevant – e.g. for the estimation of
costs and benefits of language policy measures –, then the age structure should
be taken into account to obtain more realistic projections. Moreover, if sufficient
data are available, one should use age group or cohort specific birth and death rate
to obtain even more realistic projections with the 10G-1L model.
5.5.2 1G-1L vs. 1G-2L
In this section, we investigate the effects of a second minority language on the
dynamics. We consider the numerical Example 1 from the previous section, and
consider two cases. In case A, both minority languages (L1 and L2) have identical
features, i.e. same status, same size, same concentration, etc. In case B, we have
a bigger minority language with a higher status and a smaller minority language
with a lower status. Most of the associated parameters are displayed in Table 16.
Parameters for language transmission (ε1, ε1, ζ1, ζ2) and adult language learning
(θ, φ, vH) as well as birth and migration rates are identical to those in the 1G-1L
model. We assume that vL1 = vL2 . All other parameters and environment char-
acteristics are displayed in Table 16. The status values were obtained as follows.
Assume that the absolute status values in the 1L case are SH = 6 and SL = 2.
Then the relative status values are SH = 0.75 and SL = 0.25, as in Example 1
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t = 0 t = 10 t = 25 t = 50
1G-1L
XH(t) 0.759 0.754 0.747 0.737
XL(t) 0 0 0 0
XB(t) 0.241 0.246 0.253 0.263
3G-1L
xH(t) 0.759 0.778 0.789 0.790
XH(t) 0.759 0.744 0.728 0.712
XH(t) 0.759 0.757 0.751 0.741
XH(t) 0.759 0.756 0.750 0.740
xL(t) 0 0.034 0.067 0.096
XL(t) 0 0 0 0
XL(t) 0 0 0 0
XL(t) 0 0.006 0.010 0.011
xB(t) 0.241 0.188 0.144 0.114
XB(t) 0.241 0.256 0.272 0.288
XB(t) 0.241 0.243 0.249 0.259
XB(t) 0.241 0.238 0.241 0.250
10G-1L
xH(t) 0.759 0.742 0.722 0.691
XH(t) 0.759 0.736 0.694 0.649
XH(t) 0.759 0.759 0.749 0.717
XH(t) 0.759 0.748 0.729 0.696
xL(t) 0 0.029 0.049 0.066
XL(t) 0 0 0 0
XL(t) 0 0 0 0
XL(t) 0 0.001 0.007 0.008
xB(t) 0.241 0.229 0.229 0.244
XB(t) 0.241 0.264 0.306 0.351
XB(t) 0.241 0.241 0.251 0.283
XB(t) 0.241 0.247 0.264 0.296
Table 15: Linguistic composition for Example 2 – 1G-1L, 3G-1L and 10G-1L.
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(a) 1G-1L model (b) 3G-1L model
(c) 10G-1L model
Figure 17: Projections for Example 2 – Evolution of the linguistic composition.
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above. Now we introduce a second minority language, with S2 = 2 in case A and
S2 = 1 in case B. Then we obtain the relative status values shown in Table 16.
5.5.2.1 Numerical Projections
As before, we compare model projections for a time-span of T = 50 years. We
look at the evolution of the linguistic composition as projected by the 1G-1L and
the two 1G-2L models. In Tables 17 and 18 we compare the projections at differ-
ent points in time. The evolution of the absolute and relative numbers is depicted
graphically in Figure 18.
Only differentiating between those who speak a minority language and those who
do not, Figure 18 shows that the 1G-1L and both 1G-2L models behave similarly.
At every point in time, the overall population size is the same in all three models.
Moreover, the sizes of all language groups increase for the first fifty years in all
three models, cf. Table 17. What differs slightly are the relative sizes of the
different language groups, see Table 18. After 25 years, the fractions XH , XL
and XB only differ by at most 0.5%, and the 1G-1L model projects the highest
fraction of monolingual speakers of the majority language English. After 50 years,
this number is 1% higher in the 1G-1L model compared to the two 1G-2L models.
One reason for that is that in the 1G-1L example the relative status of English is
higher than in the two cases with two minority languages. For the same reason,
the fraction of monolingual speakers of a minority language XL = XL1 +XL2 is
higher in 1G-2L models.
It can also be seen that in the symmetrical case A, both minority languages evolve
identically. This is exactly what one would expect, since both minority languages
have the exact same features. In the asymmetrical case B, the weaker minority
language L2 gains speakers as the stronger minority language L1 – at least for the
first fifty years –, but at a lower pace. Moreover, there are more bilinguals than
monolinguals after 50 years in both languages in both cases, but in case B the
difference is higher. This is due to the fact that in case B fewer L2 monolinguals
migrate to the population and that fewer families solely transmit the low status
language L2 to their children.
As for the models with several age groups, we can say that the 1G-1L models
yields a useful approximation for the more complicated case of several minority
languages. Nonetheless, if one wants to analyze language policies directed at
single linguistic minorities, a model that accounts for the full linguistic diversity
of the population is called for.
5.6 Conclusions
In this essay, we presented and analyzed extensions of a basic language dynamics
model developed in previous research. For a majority languageH and a single mi-
nority language L, the original model describes how the numbers of monolingual
speakers ofH and L as well as the number of bilinguals change over time. It mod-
els five central processes of language change, namely population dynamics (birth,
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Example 1
Parameters / Environment Case A Case B
Status
SH 0.6 2/3
SL1 0.2 2/9
SL2 0.2 1/9
Concentration
C1,1 0.27 0.27
C2,1 0 0
C1,2 0.27 0.27
C2,2 0 0
Schooling
sL1,B1 1 1
sH,B1 0.0045 0.009
sB1,H 0.59 0.39
sL2,B2 1 1
sH,B2 0.0045 0
sB2,H 0.59 0.79
Migration
MH 0 0
ML1 313,000 469,500
MB1 23,500 35,250
ML2 313,000 156,500
MB2 23,500 11,750
Initial composition
NH(0) 187,187,000 187,187,000
NL1(0) 2,686,000 4,029,000
NB1(0) 2,862,000 4,293,000
NL2(0) 2,686,000 1,343,000
NB2(0) 2,862,000 1,431,000
Table 16: Model parameters for the two examples (1G-2L).
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(a) 1G-1L model (b) 1G-1L model
(c) 1G-2L model, Case A (d) 1G-2L model, Case A
(e) 1G-2L model, Case B (f) 1G-2L model, Case B
Figure 18: Projections for Example 1, Case A and Case B.
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t = 0 t = 10 t = 25 t = 50
1G-1L
NH(t) 187,187 200,087 221,882 265,763
NL(t) 5,372 9,591 14,292 19,500
NB(t) 5,724 8,380 13,977 25,574
NH(t) 187,187 199,790 220,809 262,721
NL1(t) 2,686 5,101 8,056 11,740
1G-2L NL2(t) 2,686 5,101 8,056 11,740
- NL(t) 5,372 10,202 16,112 23,480
Case A NB1(t) 2,862 4,033 6,615 12,318
NB2(t) 2,862 4,033 6,615 12,318
NB(t) 5,724 8,066 13,230 24,637
NH(t) 187,187 199,754 220,736 262,635
NL1(t) 4,029 7,445 11,461 16,244
1G-2L NL2(t) 1,344 2,468 3,762 5,212
- NL(t) 5,372 9,913 15,224 21,457
Case B NB1(t) 4,293 6,397 10,931 20,770
NB2(t) 1,431 1,994 3,258 5,976
NB(t) 5,724 8,391 14,190 26,746
Table 17: Projections for Example 1, Case A and Case B. Numbers in thousends.
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t = 0 t = 10 t = 25 t = 50
1G-1L
XH(t) 0.944 0.918 0.887 0.855
XL(t) 0.027 0.044 0.057 0.063
XB(t) 0.029 0.038 0.056 0.082
1G-2L Case A
XH(t) 0.944 0.916 0.883 0.845
XL1(t) 0.014 0.023 0.032 0.038
XL2(t) 0.014 0.023 0.032 0.038
XL(t) 0.027 0.047 0.064 0.076
XB1(t) 0.014 0.018 0.026 0.040
XB2(t) 0.014 0.018 0.026 0.040
XB(t) 0.029 0.037 0.053 0.079
1G-2L Case B
XH(t) 0.944 0.916 0.882 0.845
XL1(t) 0.020 0.034 0.046 0.052
XL2(t) 0.007 0.011 0.015 0.017
XL(t) 0.027 0.045 0.061 0.069
XB1(t) 0.022 0.029 0.044 0.067
XB2(t) 0.007 0.009 0.013 0.019
XB(t) 0.029 0.038 0.057 0.086
Table 18: Projections for Example 1, Case A and Case B.
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death and migration), family formation, language transmission within the family,
language education and adult language learning. To do so, several aspects of the
linguistic environment are taken into account, for example the linguistic composi-
tion of the population, the status of the languages in question, spatial concentration
of speakers of the minority language and language education policies.
The essay starts with a presentation of a slightly generalized version of the basic
model. The generalized basic model treats all individuals with the same language
repertoire equally. For the first two extensions of the basic model, we differenti-
ate individuals with the same language repertoire along an age dimension. Since
no such differentiation can be found in the basic model, it is called 1G-1L (one
generation - one minority language). For a first age sensitive extension, we consid-
ered a model with three generations (3G-1L): children (0-19 years), young adults
(20-49 years) and old adults (≥50 years). For a second extension, we considered
ten 10-year age groups or cohorts. Both models were presented and steady states
were analyzed. For a second type of extension of the basic 1G-1L model, we
considered the case of a majority language H and multiple minority languages
L1, ..., Ln. It is shown how the formulas have to be adapted to account for more
than one minority language, getting the 1G-1L model as a special case.
For a numerical comparison, all three extension as well as the basic model it-
self were implemented in MATLAB. We compared the models for two empirical
cases studied in previous research: English and Spanish in the United States were
studied in Templin (2018), and Spanish and Basque in the Basque Autonomous
Communities studied in Templin (2019). We produced projections for both cases
and all four models for a time span of 50 years. The numerical comparison il-
lustrated two results. First, it showed that the easier 1G-1L model yields a useful
approximation of the more complicated 3G-1L, 10G-1L and 1G-2L models. For
moderate time spans, e.g. 25 years, the differences in the projections produced by
the 1G-1L on the one hand and the 3G-1L and 10G-1L model on the other hand
are – depending on what the model shall be used for – in an acceptable range. The
difference increases over time, but stays within a 2% range after 25 years. And
25 years is a time span for which the assumption of constant model parameters,
e.g. birth rates and migration numbers, could be acceptable, depending on the
empirical case the model is used for. It could also be seen that the 1G-1L model
captures the aggregated dynamics of a situation with two minority languages quite
well, at least for moderate time spans. On the other hand, it could be seen with
the 3G-1L and 10G-1L model projections, that the linguistic compositions of the
different generations or cohorts evolve differently. If the models shall be used
to estimate costs and benefits of language policies, cf. Templin (2019), targeting
only certain age groups – e.g. language education policies –, then an age sensitive
model yields a clear advantage over the simple 1G-1L model. Similarly, the pro-
jections produced by the 1G-2L model illustrate that different minority languages
evolve differently. So if language policies only target one of the minority language
groups, then for the estimation of costs and benefits of such policies the 1G-2L is
to be preferred over the simple 1G-1L model.
In this essay, we made several simplifying assumption to streamline the mathe-
126
matical models and their presentation. To obtain even more realistic projections,
some model improvements are worthy to be taken into account. First, one could
use age and language group specific birth and death rates, instead of assuming
that the rates are the same for all groups. Furthermore, these rates do not have
to be constant over time. If there are estimations on how the rates will evolve in
the future, then such estimates, i.e. dynamic rates, could be incorporated in the
models. A similar argument can be made for migration numbers. Moreover, the
rate of adult language learning might depend on the age of adults or a spatial di-
mension that goes beyond concentration. For the 1G-nL model, we assumed that
individuals can only speak one minority language. This could be extended to sev-
eral minority languages so that the model can account for multilingual people. All
such details could be incorporated in the models presented above. One major ob-
stacle for for complex versions of the models presented above is their application
to real life case studies, since they require more detailed empirical information.
This is already the case for the presented extensions in comparison to the simple
basic model. For many countries and regions in this world, empirical language re-
lated data are scarce. Even setting up the basic model is currently not possible in
many cases. So there is a trade-off between model complexity and applicability.
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6 General summary and outlook
The aim of the research presented in this thesis was to improve the analysis of
language policies. Costs and/or benefits of language policies most often depend
on the linguistic composition of the population subject to the policy. This linguis-
tic composition is in constant flux. Consequently, costs and benefits of language
policies are not constant but change over time with changes in the linguistic com-
position. These changes can be significant, but standard policy analysis methods
do not account for them. Therefore, my research combines established policy
analysis tools like cost-benefit analysis with models for language dynamics. Lan-
guage dynamics models can produce projections of the future development of the
linguistic composition. These projections can then be used to estimate future costs
and benefits of the policy in question. Discounting the estimated future costs and
benefits yields a more realistic estimation of the net present value of the policy
than a net present value that is based on constant future costs and benefits.
The main ingredient of the dynamic language policy analysis approach is the
mathematical model that produces future projections of the linguistic composi-
tion. Therefore, I dedicated a large part of this thesis to the design and analysis
of adequate models. What is considered adequate depends on the type of analysis
and the kind of policy statements one is interested in. There is, for example, a
difference between an analysis at a general and abstract level, and an analysis of a
particular policy in a real life scenario. Accordingly, the corresponding model is
more abstract in the former case and has to be more specific in the latter. Indepen-
dent of the application, models that ought to be used for dynamic language policy
analysis have to satisfy two basic conditions: They should be able to reproduce
observed historical data, and they should allow to model language policies in a
meaningful way.
In all four essays presented in this thesis, I used different versions and extensions
of the language competition model proposed in Wickström (2005). I called this
modelW . It mainly focuses on language transmission from one generation to the
next. Parents are conceptualized as utility maximizing actors. On the one hand,
they want to raise their children in a language with a wide communicative range.
On the other hand, they gain utility from transmitting their heritage language.
Hence, if they are speakers of a minority language in an environment dominated
by a majority language, they have to weigh the communication aspect against the
identity aspect. I extended modelW in two ways.
First, I added several sociolinguistic processes relevant for language dynamics to
the original model. The resulting model E1 presented in Chapter 3 includes inter-
generational language transmission, language education, adult language learning
and migration. These are all crucial areas for policy intervention with respect to
language. With E1 I developed a model that can reconstruct and project empirical
language dynamics more accurately and that enables an analysis of the effects of
language policies on the linguistic composition.
The second extension concerns the number of minority languages as well as the
age structure of the population. In model W as well as in the first extension E1,
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only one minority language is considered, and no differentiation is made with re-
spect to the age of individuals. In Chapter 5, I therefore presented a model with
multiple minority languages (E2nL) as well as a model with multiple age groups
(E2mG). These two models are to be preferred over the previous models if one
wants to analyze language policies that target only one of several minority lan-
guage groups or policies that only aim at certain age groups. The model with
multiple age groups (E2mG) can also yield an advantage over a single age group
model (e.g. E1) if language skills are distributed unequally among age groups.
This is, for example, the case if a declining minority language is mainly spoken
by older people within a population. I also showed that model E1 yields a useful
approximation for the more complex models E2nL and E
2
mG, if all minority lan-
guage groups are comparable in size and status, and if the distribution of language
skills is distributed homogeneously with respect to age.
Wickström (2005) showed that stable bilingual steady states are possible in his
basic modelW , as long as the status of the minority language is sufficiently high.
In Chapter 2, my coauthors and I considered the case of a declining minority lan-
guage with a decreasing status (model W˜ ). The state can counteract the decrease
through investments into status planning. We proved that it is not only possible
to reverse the decline of the minority language, but that this can even be optimal,
as long as the state is interested in preserving the minority language at reasonable
costs. We showed that if the objective is to maximize the number of bilinguals
at lowest possible costs, then the optimal investment strategy can lead to a stable
bilingual equilibrium. We also analyzed steady states for the extended model E1
that incorporates inter-generational language transmission, language education,
adult language learning, and migration. It could be shown that monolingual and
bilingual stable steady states are possible. The status of the minority language as
well as the relation between birth, death and migration rates prove to be crucial
in this matter. The same kind of statements on steady states can be made for the
second more complex extensions E2mG and E
2
nL.
The second ingredient of the dynamic language policy analysis approach is cost-
benefit (or cost-effectiveness) analysis. To perform the dynamic analysis, it has
to be specified how costs and benefits depend on the linguistic composition of
the population. In Chapter 2, we assumed benefits to be proportional to the num-
ber of bilinguals. Costs increase with the amount of resources invested in status
planning. They can also increase with the number of speakers of the minority
language in a concave fashion. This way, different kinds of policies can be inves-
tigated. Since at every point in time the state can alter the size of the investment,
the dynamic approach yields a non-trivial deterministic optimal control problem.
We showed that if the minority language is valued high enough by the policy
maker, then the optimally controlled language dynamics can tend to a bilingual
steady state. We also solved the control problem numerically for a specific case
to illustrate this behavior.
In Chapter 4, I explored the possibility of applying dynamic language policy anal-
ysis to specific policies in a real life context. If one wants to analyze real policy op-
tions, I argue, then the underlying language dynamics model has to be sufficiently
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complex and realistic. This was my main motivation to develop extensions E1,
E2mG and E
2
nL. To perform cost-benefit analysis, it has to be specified how both
costs and benefits depend on the linguistic composition. What distinguishes the
analysis in Chapter 4 from the more abstract one in the previous chapter is the
way language policies are modeled. In Chapter 2, the state could decide on the
amount of resources it invests into status planning at every point in time. The in-
vestment is a control or policy variable in the model. The model in Chapter 4 does
not contain any explicit policy variable. There, I modeled language policies as a
change in corresponding model parameters. Policies can range from increasing
the number of languages on bank notes or street signs, introducing different lan-
guage education programs, supporting language courses for migrant newcomers
or putting up a new television program in a minority language. Language edu-
cation policies, for example, are likely to alter the linguistic outcome of public
education. Therefore, they can be modeled as a change in those parameters that
correspond to language education in public schools. Hence, to apply dynamic
language policy analysis, estimates on the effects of a policy under scrutiny on
the model parameters have to be provided. I designed the model in such a way
that its parameters reflect measurable statistical figures, so that experts and policy
makers from the respective field can produce such estimates. I illustrated the ap-
plication of dynamic language policy analysis to the case of a policy concerning
the introduction of a Basque TV program in the Basque Autonomous Communi-
ties in northern Spain. I showed that a non-dynamic analysis can underestimate
the future benefits of the policy, while the dynamic analysis yields a more accu-
rate estimate. The difference between the non-dynamic and the dynamic analysis
can be significant to the point where the non-dynamic analysis yields a negative
net present value (do not implement the policy), while the more accurate dynamic
analysis yields a positive net present value (implement the policy).
The analysis of the Basque TV program demonstrates the potential practical rel-
evance of dynamic language policy analysis. I implemented the language com-
petition model and estimated all model parameters from empirical macro data on
Basque and Spanish in the Basque Autonomous Communities available online.
Much of the data stem from Census like surveys or special surveys on minor-
ity language issues. Similarly, the majority of model parameters for the analysis
of Spanish and English in the United States could be estimated from US Census
data. I showed that in both empirical cases, the extended models (E1 and E1const)
equipped with parameters estimated from empirical data can reproduce past dy-
namics of the linguistic composition of the Basque Autonomous Communities and
the US. I also demonstrated that projections for future dynamics can be utilized to
evaluate actual empirical policy options, as long as policy makers and experts can
specify the structure of costs and benefits and provide estimates on the effects of
the policy on relevant model parameters. Hence, if implemented in an accessible
way, dynamic language policy analysis can function as a practical tool for policy
makers to inform their language policy decisions.
Amajor obstacle for the application of dynamic language policy analysis to empir-
ical policies is the availability of data. To run the extended models one needs data
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on births and deaths, migration, language education and its performance. For the
extended model with only empirically estimated parameters (model E1const), one
additionally needs data on language transmission in families and adult language
learning. I analyzed two cases for which such data could be found. For many other
countries, comparable information is not available. If Census surveys in a country
do not ask for languages at all or just for the mother tongue or first language, it is
difficult to even get a realistic picture of the current linguistic composition of the
country, let alone its future development. Such a lack of empirical information
makes it almost impossible to perform sensible analysis of policies that possibly
target millions of people. I therefore hope that the dynamic approach can provide
additional arguments for states and statistical agencies to collect more data on lan-
guage skills in multiple languages and other relevant sociolinguistic information.
This thesis can be seen as a point of departure for further application of and re-
search on dynamic language policy analysis. On the one hand, the dynamic mod-
els can be applied to more case studies for which data are available. Researchers
and practitioners can investigate the future evolution of the linguistic composi-
tion they are interested in, and compare the (welfare) effects of competing policy
options. They are not bound to evaluate policies on the basis of cost-benefit anal-
ysis, but can also compare the cost-effectiveness in a similar dynamic fashion. On
the other hand, future research can improve the mathematical models further to
improve the accuracy and reliability of the projections they provide. Throughout
the thesis, I assumed crucial model parameters to be constant. If these parame-
ters themselves change over time, the constancy assumption limits the time span
for which meaningful projections can be derived. The birth and death rates as
well as migration numbers are especially relevant in this regard. Future research
can develop models that incorporate increasing or decreasing rates. Such models
would require additional empirical information. It is out of the scope of a single
researcher to gather all necessary information on socio-linguistic processes, gen-
eral population dynamics and migration to set up the model. It is the theoretical
and empirical research from scholars from sociolinguistics, sociology, migration
studies, demography and econometrics which informed the theoretical design of
the models I developed and that makes their application possible. Language policy
analysis is an interdisciplinarity endeavor. My research showed that the contribu-
tion of applied mathematics and welfare economics to this endeavor are rigorous
frameworks for combining quantitative information from multiple sources to in-
form policy decisions.
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Appendices
A Appendix Section 2
Now, all N pairs are chosen randomly after one another. The total expected num-
ber of R1R2-type pairs equals N · P[R1R2] and hence the expected fraction of
R1R2-type pairs is P[R1R2]. After this first step we have N pairs with 2NXHXL
of them being of typeHL. Recall, we assume that parents shall be able to properly
communicate with each other, and therefore we exclude HL families. Splitting
these HL pairs again and repeating the random selection we obtain new pairs of
types HH , LL and HL. This procedure is repeated until only HH and LL pairs
are left. This way, half of the 2NXHXL pairs of typeHLwill be transformed into
HH pairs, while the other half will form LL pairs. As a result, we obtain the num-
bers presented in Table 1. Note, due to the law of large numbers (N is assumed to
be large), the realized number of R1R2-type of pairs can be approximated by the
expected number.
A.1 Partial derivatives
Given the definition of gH and gL, their partial derivatives are given by
∂gH
∂XH
= (1− S) [2ζ − (ε+ γXH) + (1−XH)γ]− 1
∂gL
∂XH
= −qL(BB)− δ(1− S)(1−XH)1{qL(BB)>0}
∂gH
∂XL
= − [S(2βXH + δXB) + (1− S)(ε+ γXH)]
∂gL
∂XL
= 2qL(LB)− qL(BB) + γS(1−XH)1{qL(BB)>0} − 1
∂gH
∂S
= −2ζXH − (ε+ γXH)(1−XH)
∂gL
∂S
= (1−XH)(ε+ δXH)1{qL(BB>0)}.
Note, if XH ≥ X∆H , then qL(CC) = 0 and hence ∂gL/∂XH = ∂gL/∂S = 0.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.3.1.2
Since η = 0, every constellation with XH +XL = 1, which implies XB = 0, is a
steady state (X˙H = X˙L = 0). In the following we investigate their stability. Let
fll denote the matrix
fll =
∂X˙H∂XH ∂X˙H∂XL
∂X˙L
∂XH
∂X˙L
∂XL

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and define a := XH(1− 2qH(HB)) and b := XL(1− 2qL(LB)). ForXB = 0 the
matrix fll equals
(
a a
b b
)
and has eigenvalues λ1 = 0 and λ2 = a + b. If XH = 1
and hence XL = 0 the non positivity of a+ b = a is equivalent to S ≤ 1− 1/2ζ .
If in contrast XH = 0 and XL = 1 we need for stability that a + b = b ≤ 0.
This is equivalent to S ≥ 1/2ζ and can not be true since S < 1/2 and ζ ≤ 1. If
XH , XL > 0 we have
a+ b = 1− 2(XHqH(HB) +XLqL(LB)).
For x ∈ [0, 1], consider the function
h(x) = xqH(HB;x, 1− x, S) + (1− x)qL(LB;x, 1− x, S).
Then stability, i.e. a + b ≤ 0, is equivalent to h(XH) ≥ 1/2. We will investigate
the four possible cases seperately. If qH(HB) = qL(LB) = 0, then h = 0. So
we can except this first case. As a second case let qH(HB) = 0 and qL(LB) > 0.
Then,
f(x) = (1− x)(ζS − β(1− S)x) ≤ (1− x)ζS < 1/2, (0.209)
since S < 1/2 and (1 − x), ζ < 1. Thus, we can exclude this case as well. As a
third case let qH(HB) > 0 and qL(LB) = 0. Here,
f(x) = (1− x)(ζ(1− S)− βS(1− x) = xζ − S(xζ + βx(1− x)).
To get f(XH) ≥ 1/2 we need XH ≥ 1/2. Then, f(XH) ≥ 1/2 yields
S ≤ XHζ − 1/2
XHζ + βXH(1−XH) .
The right hand side of the last inequality is increasing in XH for XH ≥ 1/2.
Hence, to achieve f(XH) ≥ 1/2 we need at least
S ≤ ζ − 1/2
ζ
= 1− 1
2ζ
.
In case 4 we have qH(HB), qL(LB) > 0. Here, f is a convex function in x:
f(x) = ζS + (ζ − 2ζS − β)x+ βx2.
Hence, for all 0 < x < 1, f(x) ≤ max{f(0), f(1)}. We have f(0) = ζS < 1/2
and f(1) = ζ(1 − S). For S > 1 − 1/2ζ , f(1) < 1/2. Summarizing we can see
that in the first two cases no stable steady state exists, while in the last two cases
a necessary condition for stability is given by S ≤ 1− 1/2ζ .
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.4.1.1
For S ∈ (S,min{S, S˜}] let XH = X∗H(S), while XL = 0.
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Case 1: S ≤ S˜
Set S = S. The stationarity of λH yields
0 =
(
r − θXB ∂gH
∂XH
)
λH + k − ξ
(1−XH)1−ξ .
Note that for XH = X∗H(S) it is easy to check that ∂gH/∂XH ≤ 0. To achieve
stationarity of λS , we have to find a λS ≥ 22ν+µνµ (1−XH)ξ such that
0 = λ˙S = −θXBλH ∂gH
∂S
+ λS(r + µ+ 2ν).
Since λH < 0 increases in k and ∂gH∂S < 0, the solution to the above linear equation
is sufficiently large, if k is sufficiently large.
Case 2: S˜ < S
Here the stationarity of λH yields
0 =
(
r − θXB ∂gH
∂XH
)
λH + k − ξ
(1−XH)1−ξ s
∗(S),
and λS = λS(S) is given by (2.20). We seek for a proper S such that λ˙S = 0 holds,
cf. (2.22), where ∂gL/∂S = 0. If the first summand of (2.22) is denoted by f1(S)
and the second one by f2(S), then we aim to solve −f1(S) = f2(S). It is easy to
check that at S (note, X∗H(S) = 1) we have f1(S) = 0. Depending on ξ it holds
f2(S) > 0 (for ξ = 0) or f2(S) = 0 (for ξ > 0). Furthermore, f2(S) → ∞ for
S → 1/2, while−f1 is bounded. Since f2 is independent of the parameter k while
−f1 is growing linearly in k, we get for sufficiently large k that −f1(S) > f2(S)
for some relevant S. Summarizing we have for sufficiently large k: −f1(S) ≤
f2(S), −f1(S) > f2(S) for some S ∈ (S, 1/2), f2(1/2) = ∞, −f1(1/2) < ∞
and f1, f2 are continuous functions on (S, 1/2). Hence, there exists at least one
intersection between the two functions in the interval (S, 1/2).
B Appendix Section 3
Families gain utility from transmitting cultural identity as well as transmitting lan-
guage(s) with high practical communication advantage (φ) and status advantage
(ω). We number families by an index i, and denote the family type of family i
by Fi. Let IF := {i | Fi = F} be the set of all families of type F . Based on
the approach taken in Wickström (2005), we assume the utility of family i from
transmitting repertoireR to be of the form ui(F ;R) = ui(F ;R, φ(R), ω(R)) with
∂u/∂φ > 0 and ∂u/∂ω > 0. Preferences are randomly distributed and the pref-
erence structure is assumed to be stable and stationary over time and generations.
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We further specify
ω(R) :=

g(2S) : R = L
g(1) : R = H,B
(0.210)
φ(R) :=

h(1−XH) : R = L
h(1−XL) : R = H
h(1) : R = B
(0.211)
g and h being some monotonously increasing functions. Note, we use 2S since
S ≤ 1/2. This captures the communication and the status advantage. To obtain
assumptions A2 and A3, we set ui(HH,L) = ui(HB,L) = 0, ui(LL,H) =
ui(LB,H) = 0, ui(HH,B) = 0 and ui(LL,B) = 0.
Parents choose the language repertoire R that maximizes their utility.
To get the distribution of language repertoires among all children (the next gen-
eration), we need to aggregate over i. For repertoires R1, R2, R3 ∈ H,L,B with
R1 ̸= R2 ̸= R3 consider
ξR1(F ) := # {i ∈ IF ui(F ;R1) > ui(F ;R) ∀R ̸= R1} (0.212)
ξR1,R2(F ) := #
i ∈ IF
ui(F ;R1) = ui(F ;R2) ∧
ui(F ;R1) > ui(F ;R) ∀R ̸= R1, R2
 (0.213)
ξR1,R2,R3(F ) := # {i ∈ IF ui(F ;R1) = ui(F ;R2) = ui(F ;R3)} , (0.214)
where # denotes the relative measure. By construction, 1 =
∑
G ξG(F ), for
G ∈ {H,L,B,HL,HB,LB,HLB}. We define qLR(F ) via
qH(F ) := ξH(F ) +
1
2
(
ξH,L(F ) + ξH,B(F )
)
+
1
3
ξH,L,B(F ), (0.215)
and qL(F ), qB(F ) analogously. Note, in formulas (0.212)-(0.215) we suppressed
the dependencies on φ and ω, or X and S(L) respectively. From the construc-
tion of qR(F ) and (0.210)-(0.211) one can deduce properties P1-P2 stated above
(simply by counting).
C Appendix Section 4
Consider a population of size N , where N is large. We assume that half of the
population is female and that the distribution of language repertoires is identical
for both sexes. Then, NR/2 is the number of female individuals with language
repertoire R. The distribution of repertoires is given by XH = NH/N , XL =
NL/N and XB = NB/N .
135
Family formation is conceptualized as a repeated random procedure of choosing
pairs. Let us start with one such pair consisting of a female Y and a male Z.
The probabilities that a certain pair is chosen depend on the numbers of speakers
as well as on linguistic concentration. For maximal concentration, i.e. C = 1,
H monolinguals only meet other H monolinguals and speakers of L only meet
other speakers of L. For C = 0 meeting probabilities only depend on the sizes of
the language groups. In between these two boundary cases we simply use linear
interpolation. First, we derive the relevant conditional probabilities. In terms of
conditional probability C = 0 translates to stochastic independence of Y and Z.
Let R,R′ ∈ {L,B}. We obtain
P[Z = H Y = H] = C + (1− C)P[Z = H] = C + (1− C)XH (0.216)
P[Z = R Y = H] = (1− C)P[Z = R] = (1− C)XR (0.217)
If both speak the minority language, things are slightly more complicated. For
C = 0 we have P[Z = R Y = R′] = P[Z = R] = XR. For C = 1 we
get P[Z = R Y = R′] = P[Z = R]/P[Z = L,B] = XR/(1 − XH). Linear
interpolation yields
P[Z = R Y = R′] = XR
(
1 + C
XH
1−XH
)
(0.218)
Next, we use that P[Y = R1, Z = R2] = P[Y = R1]P[Z = R2 Y = R1] and
that P[Y = R1] = XR1 , R1 and R2 being any of the three language repertoiresH ,
L or B. Note that a family type R1R2, R1 ̸= R2, is obtained either by Y = R1,
Z = R2 or by Y = R2; Z = R1 (for the family type we do not take the sex of
the parents into account). Hence, the probability to obtain a pair of type R1R2,
denoted by P[R1R2] is given by P[Y = R1, Z = R2], if R1 = L′2, and by 2P[Y =
R1, Z = R2], if R1 ̸= R2.
All N/2 pairs are chosen randomly after one another. The total expected number
of RR′-type pairs equalsN/2 ·P[R1R2] and hence the expected fraction of R1R2-
type pairs is P[R1R2]. We assume that all couples of types other than HL form
families. As was previously mentioned, we assume that parents shall be able to
properly communicate with each other, and therefore we exclude HL families.
Hence, after this first step we haveN/2 pairs withN(1−C)XHXL of them being
of type HL. Splitting these HL pairs again and repeating the random selection
we obtain new pairs of types HH , LL and HL. This procedure is repeated until
only HH and LL pairs remain. This way, half of the N(1 − C)XHXL pairs of
type HL will be transformed into HH pairs, while the other half will form LL
pairs. As a result, we obtain the numbers presented in equations (4.42)-(4.46).
Note, due to the law of large numbers (N is assumed to be large), the realized
number of R1R2-type of pairs can be approximated by the expected number.
D Appendix Section 5
D.1 1G-1L model
Proof of thoerem 5.2.2.1
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We prove (5.68)-(5.70) by a formalization of the repeated (multiple rounds) 2-
step couple/family formation process. Prior to the first round, the distribution of
repertoires among all individuals who are not part of a couple is given by Y0 :=
(Y0,H , Y0,L) = (XH , XL). Next, all individuals become part of a couple. The
distribution of couple types after step 1 of round 1 is given by
ψ1,HH = Y
2
0,H + CY0,HY0,L (0.219)
ψ1,HL = 2(1− C)Y0,HY0,L (0.220)
ψ1,LL = Y
2
0,L + CY0,HY0,L. (0.221)
By assumption all HH and LL couples are successful but a fraction p of all HL
couples. The remaining 1 − p HL couples enter a second round of couple and
family formation. With respect to the total population, (1−p)ψ0,HL of all couples
split up again. After round one we thus have the following family distribution
Ψ1,HH = X
2
H + CXHXL (0.222)
Ψ1,HL = 2p(1− C)XHXL (0.223)
Ψ1,LL = X
2
H + CXHXL (0.224)
Ψ1,non = 2(1− p)(1− C)XHXL (0.225)
Half of these individuals who are not part of a family (Ψ1,non) areH monolinguals,
the other half are L monolinguals. In round 2, they again form couples, so that
ψ2,HH = (1 + C)/4 (0.226)
ψ2,HL = (1− C)/2 (0.227)
ψ2,LL = (1 + C)/4. (0.228)
Again, p of all these HL couples form families, the others split up. This process
is repeated over and over again. After round i+ 1 we have the distribution
Ψi+1,HH = Ψi,HH +
1 + C
4
Ψi,non (0.229)
= Ψ1,HH +
1 + C
4
Ψ1,non
i−1∑
j=0
(
(1− p)(1− C)
2
)j
(0.230)
Ψi+1,HL = Ψi,HL + p
1− C
2
Ψi,non (0.231)
= Ψ1,HL + p
1− C
2
Ψ1,non
i−1∑
j=0
(
(1− p)(1− C)
2
)j
(0.232)
Ψi+1,LL = Ψi,LL +
1 + C
4
Ψi,non (0.233)
= Ψ1,LL +
1 + C
4
Ψ1,non
i−1∑
j=0
(
(1− p)(1− C)
2
)j
(0.234)
Ψi+1,non = (1− p)1− C
2
Ψi,non (0.235)
=
(
(1− p)(1− C)
2
)i
Ψ1,non (0.236)
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Considering the limit i → ∞ and plugging in (0.222)-(0.225), we obtain the
results stated above.
D.2 3G-1L model
Proof of Lemma 5.3.1.1
To see that these steady states are stable, we express the differential equation
(5.118)-(5.120) by η˙(t) = Fη(t) + u, with column vectors
η(t) = (n(t),N (t),N(t))′ and u = (m,M,M)′, and matrix
F =

−1/20 λX 0
1/20 −1/30 0
0 λX −µX
 .
The Eigenvalues of F are −µX and (−5 ±
√
1 + 720λX )/120. For λX < 1/30
all three eigenvalues are negative, and hence the system is asymptotically stable.
Solving Fη + u = 0 we obtain the steady states from the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5.3.1.2
For the sake of the this proof we write λ for λX and µ for µX. We have
(d/dt)(n(t) +N (t)) = (λ− 1/30)N (t) +M.
Hence, for λ ≥ 1/30, n(t) +N (t) goes to infinity as t→∞. From this is can be
seen from the structure of the system that n(t),N (t),N(t) all tend to infinity.
In the proof of Lemma 5.3.1.1 we used that η(t) = (n(t),N (t),N(t))′ evolves
according to η˙(t) = Fη(t) + u, where F is a matrix with real Eigenvalues r1 =
−µ < 0, r2 = (−5 −
√
1 + 720λ)/120 < 0 and r3 = (−5 +
√
1 + 720λ)/120.
For λ > 1/30 the Eigenvalue r3 is positive and for λ = 1/30 we have r3 = 0. For
λ < 1/30 and µ ̸= r2 we have three distinct eigenvalues and the solution η is of
the form
η(t) = C1v1e
r1t + C2v2e
r2t + C3v3e
r3t + c4,
whereC1, ..., C3 ∈ R, c4 ∈ R2 and Eigenvectors v1, ..., v3. For µ = r2 the solution
has a comparable form and for λ = 1/30 there are additional linear terms at + b.
Since r1, r2 < 0, we can conclude from the general form of η(t), that n(t)/N (t),
N (t)/N(t), n˙(t)/N˙ (t) and N˙ (t)/N˙(t) converge as t → ∞. Hence, we can use
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l’Hospital and calculate the limits as follows:
lim
t→∞
N (t)
n(t)
= lim
t→∞
N˙ (t)
n˙(t)
= lim
t→∞
−N (t)/30 + n(t)/20 +M
λXN (t)− n(t)/20 +m
= lim
t→∞
−N (t)/(30n(t)) + 1/20
λXN (t)/n(t)− 1/20
=
1
20
− 1
30
limt→∞
N (t)
n(t)
− 1
20
+ λX limt→∞
N (t)
n(t)
The only non-negative solution to this equation is LN/n. Moreover,
lim
t→∞
N (t)
N(t)
= lim
t→∞
N˙ (t)
N˙(t)
= lim
t→∞
−N (t)/30 + n(t)/20 +M
N (t)/30− µXN(t)M
= lim
t→∞
−1/30 + (1/20)n(t)/N (t)
1/30− µXN(t)/N (t)
and hence
−µX + LN ,N/30 = −1/30 + Ln,N/20.
D.3 10G-1L model
Proof of Lemma 5.3.2.1
The system is of the form v˙(t) = F · v(t) + u, where v is the column verctor
(N1, ..., N10)
′. The eigenvalues of the matrix F are −(1 + 9µ)/10 and all five
solutions z of the polynomial equation h(z) = 0 with
h = 1−30λ+(50−300λ)z+(1000−1000λ)z2+10000z3+50000z4+100000z5.
Using the corresponding Routh-Hurwitz table, see e.g. Golnaraghi & Kuo (2017),
we show that all the roots of h have a negative real part.
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105 104 50− 300λ
105/2 (1− λ)103 1− 30λ
b1 b2 0
c1 c2 0
d1 0 0
e1 0 0
with
b1 = 10
4 − 2(1− λ)103 b2 = 48− 240λ
c1 =
[
(1− λ)107 − 2(1− λ)2106 − (24− 120λ)105
]
/b1 c2 = 1− 30λ
d1 = (c1b2 − b1c2)/c1
e1 = 1− 30λ
Since λ > 0, we have b1 > 0. Due to λ < 1/30, we get b1 · c1 > 29/30 · 107 − 2 ·
106 − 24 · 105 > 0. Going even futher we have c1 > 4 · 102. Moreover, b2 > 40,
b1 < 10
4 and c2 < 1. Hence, c1b2 − b1c2 > 1.6 · 104 − 104 > 0. Since all entries
in the first column have a positive sign, all the (real and complex) eigenvalues of
F have negative real part. As a result, the system is stable.
We continue with deriving the actual steady states. For i = 2, ..., 10, the above
differential equations are of the form
N˙i = −AiNi +BiNi−1 +Mi,
where Ai and Bi are positive constants. For i = 2, ..., 5 we have Ai = Bi = 1/10,
for i = 6 we have Ai = µ + (1 − µ)/10 and for i = 7, ..., 10 we have Ai =
µ+ (1− µ)/10 and (1− µ)/10. Solving N˙i = 0 for i = 2, ..., 10, we get
Ni,∞ =
(
i∏
j=2
Bj
Aj
)
N1,∞ +
i−1∑
k=2
(
i∏
j=k+1
Bj
Aj
)
Mk
Ak
+
Mi
Ai
. (0.237)
To derive N1,∞, we first express N∞ :=
∑5
i=3Ni∞ in terms of N1,∞. We have,
qi =Mi/M ,
N∞ =
(
5∑
i=3
i∏
j=2
Bj
Aj
)
N1,∞ +
5∑
i=3
[
i−1∑
k=2
(
i∏
j=k+1
Bj
Aj
)
qk
Ak
+
qi
Ai
]
M
= DN1,∞ + E ·M. (0.238)
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Due to ·N1 = −N1/10 + λN +M1 we obtain
N1,∞ =
10
1− 10λD
(
λEM +M1
)
. (0.239)
Using Di and Ei as defined in the lemma, we obtain the proposed steady states.
Proof of Lemma 5.3.2.2
This proof is analogous to the proof of the analogous lemma for the 3G model.
Hence, we only provide a short version of the proof. Let
Wi,i+1 := lim
t→∞
Ni(t)
Ni+1(t)
.
Using the l’Hospital, we get for i = 2, 3, 4 that
Wi,i+1 = lim
t→∞
−Ni(t) +Ni−1(t) + 10Mi
−Ni+1(t) +Ni(t) + 10Mi+1 =
−1 +Wi−1,i
−W−1i,i+1 + 1
Hence,Wi,i+1 = Wi−1,i. Next, we considerW1,2:
W1,2 = lim
t→∞
−N1(t) + 10λN + 10M1
−N2(t) +N1(t) + 10M2
= lim
t→∞
−N1(t)/N2(t) + 10λ
(
N3(t)/N2(t) +N4(t)/N2(t) +N5(t)/N2(t)
)
−1 +N1(t)/N2(t)
=
−W1,2 + 10λ
(
W−11,2 +W
−2
1,2 +W
−3
1,2
)
−1 +W1,2 .
Hence,W1,2 is a solution of the polynomial equation 0 = s(x) = x5 − 10λ(x2 +
x+1). We have s(0) = −10λ < 0, s′(x) = 5x4−10λ(2x+1), s′(0) = −10λ < 0
and s′′(x) = 20(x3−λ). It is easy to see now that the function s has a unique root
on the positive real line R+. This unique root is calledW∞. Hence,Wi,i+1 = W∞
for i = 1, ..., 4. Next, we considerW5,6 andW6,7:
W5,6 = lim
t→∞
−N5(t) +N4(t) + 10M5
−(1 + 9µ)N6(t) +N5(t) + 10M6 =
−1 +W∞
−(1 + 9µ)W−15,6 + 1
.
Therefore,W5,6 = 9µ+ L∞. Moreover,
W6,7 = lim
t→∞
−(1 + 9µ)N6(t) +N5(t) + 10M6
−(1 + 9µ)N7(t) + (1− µ)N6(t) + 10M7
=
−(1 + 9µ) +W5,6
−(1 + 9µ)W−16,7 + (1− µ)
.
Hence,W6,7 = W5,6/(1−µ) = (W∞+9µ)/(1−µ). Last we considerWj,j+1 for
j = 7, 8, 9:
Wj,j+1 = lim
t→∞
−(1 + 9µ)Nj(t) + (1− µ)Nj−1(t) + 10Mj
−(1 + 9µ)Nj+1(t) + (1− µ)Nj(t) + 10Mj+1
=
−(1 + 9µ) + (1− µ)Wj−1,j
−(1 + 9µ)W−1j,j+1 + (1− µ)
.
Hence, for j = 7, 8, 9 we haveWj,j+1 = Wj−1,j = W6,7.
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D.4 1G-nL model
Proof of Lemma 5.4.1.1 (Couple distribution ψF )
Recall, Xi = XLi + XBi . Let R ∈ F, R ̸= Li, Bi. As for the 1G-1L model, cf.
(5.63) and (5.64), we use linear interpolation and get
P[Li ∨Bi |Li] = P[Li ∨Bi |Bi] = C1,i + (1− C1,i)Xi (0.240)
P[R |Li] = P[R |Bi] = (1− C1,i)XR (0.241)
Next, we use that
P[R] = P[R|H]P[H] +
n∑
j=1
P[R|Lj]P[Lj] + P[R|Bj]P[Bj].
Therefore,
P[Li ∨ Bi |H] ·XH = Xi −
(
C1,i + (1− C1,i)Xi
)
Xi −
n∑
j=1,j ̸=i
(1− C1,j)XiXj
= Xi
(
(1− C1,i)−
n∑
j=1
(1− C1,j)Xj
)
(0.242)
P[H |H] = 1−
n∑
j=1
(1− C1,j)Xj
= XH +
n∑
j=1
CjXj. (0.243)
More precisely,
P[Li |H] ·XH = XLi
(
(1− C1,i)−
n∑
j=1
(1− C1,j)Xj
)
(0.244)
P[Bi |H] ·XH = XBi
(
(1− C1,i)−
n∑
j=1
(1− C1,j)Xj
)
(0.245)
Finally, we use P[R1R1] = P[R] ∓ [R1|R1] and P[R1R2] = P[R1]P[R2|R1] +
P[R2]P[R1|R2] to obtain the couple distribution stated in (5.172)-(5.178). To de-
termine ψLiLi , ψLiBi and ψBiBi , we have to consider YLi , resp. YBi , the fraction of
the population monolingual in Li, resp. bilingual in Li andH , and not in a couple
with a non-Li speaker. Recall, Ei = C1,i + (1− C1,i)Xi. We have
YLi = XLi −
1
2
ψH,Li −
1
2
∑
j ̸=i
ψLi,Lj −
1
2
∑
j ̸=i
ψLi,Bj
= XLi
(
1− 1
2
(1− C1,i)(1 +XH)
)
+XLi
(
1
2
n∑
j=1
(1− C1,j)Xj − 1
2
∑
j ̸=i
(2− C1,i − C1,j)Xj
)
= Ei ·XLi .
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Similarly, YBi = Ei ·XBi . We set Yi = YLi + YBi = Ei ·Xi. As in the 1L model,
we have
ψLi,Li =
1
Yi
(
Y 2Li + C2,iYLiYBi
)
ψLi,Li =
2
Yi
(
1− C2,i
)
YLiYBi
ψBi,Bi =
1
Yi
(
Y 2Bi + C2,iYLiYBi
)
Plugging in YLi = EiXLi and YBi = EiXBi , we obtain the distribution stated in
the lemma.
Derivation of properties of the transmission functions qR(F ) depicted
in Table 10
Here we extend the utility maximization approach suggested in Wickström (2005)
and adapted in Templin (2018) to the case of multiple minorities. Accordingly,
this proof can be seen as an extension of the related proof for the 1G-1L case,
cf. Appendix B. Families gain utility from transmitting cultural identity as well
as transmitting language(s) with high practical communication advantage (φ) and
status advantage (ω). We number families by an index k, and denote the family
type of family k by Fk. Let IF := {k | Fk = F} be the set of all families of
type F . We assume the utility of family k from transmitting repertoire R to be of
the form uk(F ;R) = uk(F ;R, φ(R), ω(R)) with ∂u/∂φ ≥ 0 and ∂u/∂ω ≥ 0.
Preferences are randomly distributed and the preference structure is assumed to
be stable and stationary over time and generations. We define XL =
∑
iXLi and
specify
ω(R) :=

g(2Si) : R = Li
g(1) : R = H,B
(0.246)
φ(R) :=

h(XLi +XBi) : R = Li
h(1−XL +XLi) : R = Bi
h(1−XL) : R = H
(0.247)
g and h being some monotonously increasing functions with
∂φ(x)/∂x, ∂ω(x)/∂x ≥ 0.
Note, we use 2Si since Si ≤ 1/2. This captures the communication and the status
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advantage. To obtain assumptions A2 and A3, we set
0 = uk(HH,Li) = uk(HBi, Li) = uk(HBj, Li)
= uk(LjBj, Li) = uk(BjBj, Li),
0 = uk(LiLi, H) = uk(LiBi, H),
0 = uk(HH,Bi) = uk(LiLi, Bi) = uk(LjLj, Bi)
= uk(LjBj, Bi) = uk(BjBj, Bi).
Parents choose the language repertoire R that yields the highest utility. We count
the number of families for which the utility from one specific repertoire is higher
than the utility from all other repertoires to obtain distribution of language reper-
toires among all children (aggregating over k). Let # denote the relative measure
and consider
ξH(HBi) = # {k ∈ IHBi uk(HBi;H) > u(HBi;Bi)}
ξBi(HBi) = # {k ∈ IHBi uk(HBi;H) < u(HBi;Bi)}
ξHBi(HBi) = # {k ∈ IHBi uk(HBi;H) = u(HBi;Bi)}
ξLi(LiBi) = # {k ∈ ILiBi uk(LiBi;Li) > u(LiBi;Bi)}
ξBi(LiBi) = # {k ∈ ILiBi uk(LiBi;Li) < u(LiBi;Bi)}
ξLiBi(LiBi) = # {k ∈ ILiBi uk(LiBi;Li) = u(LiBi;Bi)}
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ξH(BiBi) = #
k ∈ IBiBi
u(BiBi;H) > u(BiBi;Li)∧
u(BiBi;H) > u(BiBi;Bi)

ξLi(BiBi) = #
k ∈ IBiBi
u(BiBi;Li) > u(BiBi;H)∧
u(BiBi;Li) > u(BiBi;Bi)

ξBi(BiBi) = #
k ∈ IBiBi
u(BiBi;Bi) > u(BiBi;H)∧
u(BiBi;Bi) > u(BiBi;Li)

ξHLi(BiBi) = #
k ∈ IBiBi
u(BiBi;H) = u(BiBi;Li)∧
u(BiBi;H) > u(BiBi;Bi)

ξHBi(BiBi) = #
k ∈ IBiBi
u(BiBi;H) > u(BiBi;Li)∧
u(BiBi;H) = u(BiBi;Bi)

ξLiBi(BiBi) = #
k ∈ IBiBi
u(BiBi;Li) > u(BiBi;H)∧
u(BiBi;Li) = u(BiBi;Bi)

ξHLiBi(BiBi) = #
k ∈ IBiBi
u(BiBi;H) = u(BiBi;Li)∧
u(BiBi;H) = u(BiBi;Bi)

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ξH(BiBj) = #
k ∈ IBiBj
u(BiBj;H) > u(BiBj;Bi)∧
u(BiBj;H) > u(BiBj;Bj)

ξBi(BiBj) = #
k ∈ IBiBj
u(BiBj;Bi) > u(BiBj;H)∧
u(BiBj;Bi) > u(BiBj;Bj)

ξHBi(BiBj) = #
k ∈ IBiBj
u(BiBj;Bj) > u(BiBj;H)∧
u(BiBj;Bj) > u(BiBj;Bi)

ξBiBj(BiBj) = #
k ∈ IBiBj
u(BiBj;Bi) > u(BiBj;H)∧
u(BiBj;Bi) > u(BiBj;Bj)

ξHBiBj(BiBj) = #
k ∈ IBiBj
u(BiBj;H) = u(BiBj;Bi)∧
u(BiBj;H) = u(BiBj;Bj)

The sum over each of the above blocks equals 1. Assuming that the probabili-
ties of language choice of indifferent parents are equally distributed between the
languages repertoires we define qR(F ) via
qH(HH) = 1
qH(HBi) = ξH(HBi) +
1
2
ξHBi(HBi)
qH(BiBi) = ξH(BiBi) +
1
2
(ξHLi(BiBi) + ξHBi(BiBi)) +
1
3
ξHLiBi(BiBi)
qH(BiBj) = ξH(BiBj) +
1
2
(
ξHBi(BiBj) + ξHBj(BiBj)
)
+
1
3
ξHBiBj(BiBj),
qLi(LiLi) = 1
qLi(LiBi) = ξLi(LiBi) +
1
2
ξLiBi(LiBi)
qLi(BiBi) = ξLi(BiBi) +
1
2
(ξHLi(BiBi) + ξLiBi(BiBi)) +
1
3
ξHLiBi(BiBi)
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and
qBi(HBi) = 1− αH(HBi)
qBi(LiBi) = 1− αLi(LiBi)
qBi(BiBi) = 1− αH(BiBi)− αLi(BiBi)
= ξBi(BiBi) +
1
2
(ξHBi(BiBi) + ξLiBi(BiBi)) +
1
3
ξHLiBi(BiBi)
qBi(BiBj) = ξBi(BiBj) +
1
2
(
ξHBi(BiBj) + ξBiBj(BiBj)
)
+
1
3
ξHBiBj(BiBj).
Let the utility functions uk(F ;R, φ, ω) be differentiable in φ and ω with ∂u∂φ ,
∂u
∂ω
>
0. Then, the signum of the partial derivatives of qLR(F ) with respect to XH , XLi ,
XBi are given by the first 4 columns of Table 10. (If ∂u/∂φ > 0, ∂u/∂ω > 0
and φ′, ω′ > 0 then we have >0 instead of ≥ 0). If, additionally, the derivatives of
u with respect to φ, ω as well as the derivatives of ω, φ are constant and positive
(affine functions), then we can also derive the partial derivatives of qLR(F ) with
respect to XLj , cf. the last column of Table 10.
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